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## 1

#### Nuclear PRODUCTION must be for the PURPOSE of energy generation

International Atomic Energy Agency 7

<http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1290_web.pdf>

 Under the terms of Article III of its Statute, the IAEA is authorized to establish or adopt standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property, and to provide for the application of these standards. The publications by means of which the IAEA establishes standards are issued in the IAEA Safety Standards Series. This series covers nuclear safety, radiation safety, transport safety and waste safety, and also general safety (i.e. all these areas of safety). The publication categories in the series are Safety Fundamentals, Safety Requirements and Safety Guides.

 The process of inducing radioactivity.􀁌 Most commonly used to refer to the induction of radioactivity in moderators, coolants, and structural and shielding materials, caused by irradiation with neutrons.􀁌 The BSS definition — “The production of radionuclides by irradiation.” [1] —is technically adequate; however, the term ‘production’ gives a connotation that this is being done intentionally rather than, as is normally the case,incidentally.

All demonstration gets class 104 licenses – that’s research, not production

Matuzan and Walker 85

 Controlling the Atom:

The Beginnings of Nuclear Regulation, 1946-1962

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 Sections of the 1954 act reflected the state of the technology by establishing two classes of licenses for atomic facilities. One section authorized the AEC to issue commercial or "class 103" licenses (after the section number in the law) whenever it had determined that a facility had been "sufficiently developed to be of practical value for industrial or commercial purposes." Since the agency and the Joint Committee interpreted "practical value" to mean that atomic facilities had to be judged eco- nomically competitive with other energy sources, issuance of class-103 licenses was postponed until the industry had passed through its research and development phase.33 Instead, early power reactor facilities received "class-104" licenses un- der the terms of section 104. Reactors used in medical therapy, university research, and power demonstration came under this category. A key phrase authorized reactor licenses that would lead to the "demonstra- tion of the practical value . . . for industrial or commercial purposes." Class-104 licenses, then, covered all power reactors used during the developmental period until the industry could find a design that would eventually meet the "practical value" criterion of a class-103 commercial license. Furthermore, section 104 specifically instructed the AEC to im- pose the minimum amount of regulation on a licensee consistent with the public health and safety. In other words, a class-104 license indicated that the government wanted to encourage the new industry to undertake research and development under minimum regulation that would lead to major advances in power-reactor technology.34

Limits and precision – research reactors are both formally and technically distinct. There are HUNDREDS of types

World Nuclear Assocation 10

http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf61.html

 The World Nuclear Association (WNA), formerly the Uranium Institute, is an international organization that promotes nuclear power and supports the many companies that comprise the global nuclear industry. Its members come from all parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium mining, uranium conversion, uranium enrichment, nuclear fuel fabrication, plant manufacture, transport, and the disposition of used nuclear fuel as well as electricity generation itself [1]. Together, WNA members are responsible for 95% of the world's nuclear power outside of the U.S. [2] as well as the vast majority of world uranium, conversion and enrichment production.[3] The WNA says it aims to fulfill a dual role for its members: Facilitating their interaction on technical, commercial and policy matters and promoting wider public understanding of nuclear technology. [4] Accredited to the United Nations, the WNA is an independent, non-profit organization, funded primarily by membership subscriptions

Many of the world's nuclear reactors are used for research and training, materials testing, or the production of radioisotopes for medicine and industry. They are basically neutron factories.

These are much smaller than power reactors or those propelling ships, and many are on university campuses. There are about 240 such reactors operating, in 56 countries. Some operate with high-enriched uranium fuel, and international efforts are underway to substitute low-enriched fuel. Some radioisotope production also uses high-enriched uranium as target material for neutrons, and this is being phased out in favour of low-enriched uranium. Research reactors comprise a wide range of civil and commercial nuclear reactors which are generally not used for power generation. The term is used here to include test reactors, which are more powerful than most. The primary purpose of research reactors is to provide a neutron source for research and other purposes. Their output (neutron beams) can have different characteristics depending on use. They are small relative to power reactors whose primary function is to produce heat to make electricity. They are essentially net energy users. Their power is designated in megawatts (or kilowatts) thermal (MWth or MWt), but here we will use simply MW (or kW). Most range up to 100 MW, compared with 3000 MW (i.e. 1000 MWe) for a typical power reactor. In fact the total power of the world's 283 research reactors is little over 3000 MW.Research reactors are simpler than power reactors and operate at lower temperatures. They need far less fuel, and far less fission products build up as the fuel is used. On the other hand, their fuel requires more highly enriched uranium, typically up to 20% U-235, although some older ones use 93% U-235. They also have a very high power density in the core, which requires special design features. Like power reactors, the core needs cooling, though only the higher-powered test reactors need forced cooling. Usually a moderator is required to slow down the neutrons and enhance fission. As neutron production is their main function, most research reactors also need a reflector to reduce neutron loss from the core.As of October 2011 the IAEA database showed that there were 241 operational research reactors (92 of them in developing countries), 3 under construction, 202 shut down (plus 13 temporary) and 211 decommissioned.Types of research reactors There is a much wider array of designs in use for research reactors than for power reactors, where 80% of the world's plants are of just two similar types. They also have different operating modes, producing energy which may be steady or pulsed.A common design (67 units) is the pool type reactor, where the core is a cluster of fuel elements sitting in a large pool of water. Among the fuel elements are control rods and empty channels for experimental materials. Each element comprises several (e.g. 18) curved aluminium-clad fuel plates in a vertical box. The water both moderates and cools the reactor, and graphite or beryllium is generally used for the reflector, although other materials may also be used. Apertures to access the neutron beams are set in the wall of the pool. Tank type research reactors (32 units) are similar, except that cooling is more active.The TRIGA reactor is another common design (40 units). The core consists of 60-100 cylindrical fuel elements about 36 mm diameter with aluminium cladding enclosing a mixture of uranium fuel and zirconium hydride (as moderator). It sits in a pool of water and generally uses graphite or beryllium as a reflector. This kind of reactor can safely be pulsed to very high power levels (e.g. 25,000 MW) for fractions of a second. Its fuel gives the TRIGA a very strong negative temperature coefficient, and the rapid increase in power is quickly cut short by a negative reactivity effect of the hydride moderator.Other designs are moderated by heavy water (12 units) or graphite. A few are fast reactors, which require no moderator and can use a mixture of uranium and plutonium as fuel. Homogenous type reactors have a core comprising a solution of uranium salts as a liquid, contained in a tank about 300 mm diameter. The simple design made them popular early on, but only five are now operating.Research reactors have a wide range of uses, including analysis and testing of materials, and production of radioisotopes. Their capabilities are applied in many fields, within the nuclear industry as well as in fusion research, environmental science, advanced materials development, drug design and nuclear medicine.The IAEA lists several categories of broadly classified research reactors. They include 60 critical assemblies (usually zero power), 23 test reactors, 37 training facilities, two prototypes and even one producing electricity. But most (160) are largely for research, although some may also produce radioisotopes. As expensive scientific facilities, they tend to be multi-purpose, and many have been operating for more than 30 years.A total of over 670 research and test reactors has been built worldwide, 227 of these in the USA and 97 in the former Soviet Union. In the USA, 193 were commissioned in 1950s and 1960s.

## 2

#### Nuclear production locks in productionism through obsession with finance, competitiveness and technological solutions

**Maciejewska and Marszalek ’11** (Malgorzata, institute of Sociology and Faculty of Social Sciences at Wroclaw University, and Marcin, Wroclaw University (Poland), “Lack of power or lack of democracy: the case of the projected nuclear power plant in Poland,” Economic and Environmental Studies Vol. 11, No.3 (19/2011), 235-248, Sept. 2011, AM)

The mainstream discourse on nuclear power rarely takes up the question of how the global energy industry is organized. In the modern economy the production of energy around the world, which is supposed to be a kind of public good and to guarantee sustainable development, is planned and arranged under free market conditions. As a part of the global chain of extraction, production and trading, it is subordinated to the neoliberal logic on terms of which the society and economy is governed as a business enterprise with the logic of maximum interest and minimum loss. This imposes on different actors (from the international corporations to individual households) the discipline of competitiveness and profitability, resulting in the growth of existing inequalities as ‘the invisible hand’ of the free market economy legitimizes those subjects which are already in power. The modern global economy is based on irrational production and social inequalities where one can observe the processes of work intensification and the cheapening of labor. The markets are dominated by the unproductive virtual economy (See Peterson, 2002) where the major players are the financial institutions which, by means of sophisticated financial tools, buy and sell virtual products (currencies, stocks, insurances, debts and its derivatives). In effect, the major actors in the capitalist economy are the international investors who have the capability of financial liquidity, and operate with those sophisticated financial tools on the global stock market. Even when they lose those capacities because of indebtedness, the states and international organizations seem often to be willing to repair the damage by transferring the taxes paid by citizens. (This is actually happening now, during the financial crisis, when southern and western European countries are subjected to shock therapy under which governments introduce austerity measures.) The praxis of nuclear power producers and the discourse which legitimizes it is therefore reduced to one goal – increasing financial revenues. The Polish plan to build the atomic power plant seems to be another element of the competitiveness strategy. In the authorities’ mind set it could put Poland into the position of more a competitive, more dynamic economy, as expected by the European Union and international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank. The welfare of Poland’s or Niger’s society does not fit into that picture. The nuclear establishment does not take into account the most important aspect of sustainable development: the overall reduction of energy consumption and therefore of energy production. Such a policy could bring a wide range of profits to the societies, the ecosystem, as well as the economy. On the contrary, the increase of power production and power use is one of the core concepts of pro-atomic discourse. This dogmatic belief draws the ideological line indicated at the beginning: the question of energy use and the ideas for solving this problem are seen only as a matter of technological challenges and the amount of financial and material means which have to be invested in them, but not as an effort to re-organize and restructure the modern economy.

#### The system’s unsustainable – only a shift from PRODUCTIONIST EMPIRE to MULTITUDES averts extinction

Shor 10

<http://www.stateofnature.org/locatingTheContemporary.html>

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Attributing the debilitation of the U.S. economy to a mortgage crisis or the collapse of the housing market misses the truly epochal crisis in the world economy and, indeed, in capitalism itself. As economist Michael Hudson contends, "the financial 'wealth creation' game is over. Economies emerged from World War II relatively free of debt, but the 60-year global run-up has run its course. Financial capitalism is in a state of collapse, and marginal palliatives cannot revive it." According to Hudson, among those palliatives is an ironic variant of the IMF strategies imposed on developing nations. "The new twist is a variant on the IMF 'stabilization' plans that lend money to central banks to support their currencies - for long enough to enable local oligarchs and foreign investors to move their savings and investments offshore at a good exchange rate." The continuity between these IMF plans and even the Obama administration's fealty to Wall Street can be seen in the person of Lawrence Summers, now the chief economic advisor to Obama. As further noted by Hudson, "the Obama bank bailout is arranged much like an IMF loan to support the exchange rate of foreign currency, but with the Treasury supporting financial asset prices for U.S. banks and other financial institutions ... Private-sector debt will be moved onto the U.S. Government balance sheet, where "taxpayers" will bear losses." [4] So, here we have another variation of the working poor getting sapped by the economic elite! In fact, one estimate of U.S. federal government support to the elite financial institutions is in the range of $10 trillion dollars, a heist of unimaginable proportions. [5] Given the massive indebtedness of the United States, its reliance of foreign support of that debt by countries like China, which has close to $2 trillion tied up in treasury bills and other investments, a long-term crisis of profitability, overproduction, and offshoring of essential manufacturing, it does not appear that the United States and, perhaps, even the capitalist system can avoid collapse. Certainly, there are Marxist economists and world-systems analysts who are convinced that the collapse is inevitable, albeit it may take several generations to complete. The question becomes whether a dying system can be resuscitated or, if something else can be put in its place. One of the most prominent world systems scholars, Immanuel Wallerstein, puts the long-term crisis of capitalism and the alternatives in the following perspective: Because the system we have known for 500 years is no longer able to guarantee long-term prospects of capital accumulation, we have entered a period of world chaos. Wild (and largely uncontrollable) swings in the economic, political, and military situations are leading to a systemic bifurcation, that is, to a world collective choice about the kind of new system the world will construct over the next fifty years. The new system will not be a capitalist system, but it could be one of two kinds: a different system that is equally or more hierarchical and inequalitarian, or one that is substantially democratic and equalitarian. [6] What Wallerstein overlooks is the possibility that a global crisis of capitalism with its continuous overexploitation and maldistribution of essential resources, such as water, could lead to a planetary catastrophe. [7] While Wallerstein and many of the Marxist critics of capitalism correctly identify the long-term structural crisis of capitalism and offer important insights into the need for more democratic and equalitarian systems, they often fail to realize other critical predicaments that have plagued human societies in the past and persist in even more life-threatening ways today. Among those predicaments are the power trips of civilization and environmental destructiveness. Such power trips can be seen through the sedimentation of power-over in the reign of patriarchal systems and an evolutionary selection for that power-over which contaminates society and social relationships. Certainly, many of those predicaments can also be attributed to a 5000 year history of the intersection of empire and civilization. Anthropologist Kajsa Ekholm Friedman analyzes that intersection and its impact in the Bronze Age as an "imperialist project..., dependent upon trade and ultimately upon war." [8] However, over the long rule of empire and especially within the last 500 years of the global aspirations of various empires, "no state or empire," observes historian Eric Hobsbawm, "has been large, rich, or powerful enough to maintain hegemony over the political world, let alone to establish political and military supremacy over the globe." [9] While war and trade still remain key components of the imperial project today and pretensions for global supremacy persist in the United States, what is just as threatening to the world as we know it is the overexploitation and abuse of environmental resources. Jared Diamond brilliantly reveals how habituated attitudes and values precluded the necessary recognition of environmental degradation which, in turn, led to the collapse of vastly different civilizations, societies, and cultures throughout recorded history. [10] He identifies twelve contemporary environmental challenges which pose grave dangers to the planet and its inhabitants. Among these are the destruction of natural habitats (rainforests, wetlands, etc.); species extinction; soil erosion; depletion of fossil fuels and underground water aquifers; toxic pollution; and climate change, especially attributable to the use of fossil fuels. [11] U.S. economic imperialism has played a direct role in environmental degradation, whether in McDonald's resource destruction of rainforests in Latin America, Coca-Cola's exploitation of underground water aquifers in India, or Union Carbide's toxic pollution in India. Beyond the links between empire and environmental destruction, unless we also clearly understand and combat the connections between empire and unending growth with its attendant "accumulation by dispossession", we may very well doom ourselves to extinction. According to James Gustave Speth, Dean of the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, the macro obsession with growth is also intimately related to our micro habituated ways of living. "Parallel to transcending our growth fetish," Speth argues, "we must move beyond our consumerism and hyperventilating lifestyles ... This reluctance to challenge consumption has been a big mistake, given the mounting environmental and social costs of American "affluenza," extravagance and wastefulness." [12] Of course, there are significant class and ethnic/racial differences in consumerism and lifestyle in the United States. However, even more vast differences and inequities obtain between the U.S. and the developing world. It is those inequities that lead Eduardo Galeano to conclude that "consumer society is a booby trap. Those at the controls feign ignorance, but anybody with eyes in his head can see that the great majority of people necessarily must consume not much, very little, or nothing at all in order to save the bit of nature we have left." [13] Finally, from Vandana Shiva's perspective, "unless worldviews and lifestyles are restructured ecologically, peace and justice will continue to be violated and, ultimately, the very survival of humanity will be threatened." [14] For Shiva and other global agents of resistance, the ecological and peace and justice imperatives require us to act in the here and now. Her vision of "Earth Democracy" with its emphasis on balancing authentic needs with a local ecology provides an essential guidepost to what we all can do to stop the ravaging of the environment and to salvage the planet. As she insists, "Earth Democracy is not just about the next protest or next World Social Forum; it is about what we do in between. It addresses the global in our everyday lives, our everyday realities, and creates change globally by making change locally." [15] The local, national, and transnational struggles and visions of change are further evidence that the imperial project is not only being contested but also being transformed on a daily basis. According to Mark Engler, "The powerful will abandon their strategies of control only when it grows too costly for them to do otherwise. It is the concerted efforts of people coming together in local communities and in movements spanning borders that will raise the costs. Empire becomes unsustainable ... when the people of the world resist." [16] Whether in the rural villages of Brazil or India, the jungles of Mexico or Ecuador, the city squares of Cochabama or Genoa, the streets of Seattle or Soweto, there has been, and continues to be, resistance around the globe to the imperial project. If the ruling elite and many of the citizens of the United States have not yet accepted the fact that the empire is dying and with it the concentric circles of economic, political, environmental, and civilizational crises, the global multitudes have been busy at work, digging its future grave and planting the seeds for another possible world. [17]

#### Reject the aff’s neoliberal ideology. Energy debates should focus on CRITIQUE of broad structures INSTEAD of producitivist fixes. Our ROLE OF THE BALLOT is best EVEN IF they win some truth claims

Zehner 12

Green illusions,

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Since this book represents a critique of alternative energy, it may seem an unlikely manual for alternative-energy proponents. But it is. Building alternative-energy infrastructure atop America's present economic, social, and cultural landscape is akin to building a sandcastle in a rising tide. A taller sand castle won't help. The first steps in this book sketch a partial blueprint for making alternative-energy technologies relevant into the future. Technological development alone will do little to bring about a durable alternative-energy future. Reimagining the social conditions of energy use will. Ultimately, we have to ask ourselves if environmentalists should be involved in the business of energy production (of any sort) while so many more important issues remain vastly underserved. Over the next several decades, it's quite likely that our power production cocktail will look very much like the mix of today, save for a few adjustments in market share. Wind and biofuel generation will become more prevalent and the stage is set for nuclear power as well, despite recent catastrophes. Nevertheless, these changes will occur over time—they will seem slow. Every power production mechanism has side effects and limitations of its own, and a global shift to new forms of power production simply means that humanity will have to deal with new side effects and limitations in the future. This simple observation seems to have gotten lost in the cheerleading for alternative-energy technologies. The mainstream environmental movement should throw down the green energy pom-poms and pull out the bifocals. It is entirely reasonable for environmentalists to criticize fossil-fuel industries for the harms they instigate. It is, however, entirely unreasonable for environmentalists to become spokespeople for the next round of ecological disaster machines such as solar cells, ethanol, and battery-powered vehicles. Environmentalists pack the largest punch when they instead act as power production watchdogs (regardless of the production method); past environmentalist pressures have cleaned the air and made previously polluted waterways swimmable. This watchdog role will be vital in the future as biofuels, nuclear plants, alternative fossil fuels, solar cells, and other energy technologies import new harms and risks. Beyond a watchdog role, environmentalists yield the greatest progress when addressing our social fundamentals, whether by supporting human rights, cleaning up elections, imagining new economic structures, strengthening communities, revitalizing democracy, or imagining more prosperous modes of consumption. Unsustainable energy use is a symptom of suboptimal social conditions. Energy use will come down when we improve these conditions: consumption patterns that lead to debt and depression; commercials aimed at children; lonely seniors stuck in their homes because they can no longer drive; kids left to fend for themselves when it comes to mobility or sexuality; corporate influence trumping citizen representation; measurements of the nation's health in dollars rather than well-being; a media concerned with advertising over insight, and so on. These may not seem like environmental issues, and they certainly don't seem like energy policy issues, but in reality they are the most important energy and environmental issues of our day. Addressing them won't require sacrifice or social engineering. They are congruent with the interests of many Americans, which will make them easier to initiate and fulfill. They are entirely realistic (as many are already enjoyed by other societies on the planet). They are, in a sense, boring. In fact, the only thing shocking about them is the degree to which they have been underappreciated in contemporary environmental thought, sidelined in the media, and ignored by politicians. Even though these first steps don't represent a grand solution, they are necessary preconditions if we intend to democratically design and implement more comprehensive solutions in the future. Ultimately, clean energy is less energy. Alternative-energy alchemy has so greatly consumed the public imagination over recent decades that the most vital and durable environmental essentials remain overlooked and underfunded. Today energy executives hiss silver-tongued fairy tales about clean-coal technologies, safe nuclear reactors, and renewable sources such as solar, wind, and biofuels to quench growing energy demands, fostering the illusion that we can maintain our expanding patterns of energy consumption without consequence. At the same time, they claim that these technologies can be made environmentally, socially, and politically sound while ignoring a history that has repeatedly shown otherwise. If we give in to accepting their conceptual frames, such as those pitting production versus production, or if we parrot their terms such as clean coal, bridge fuels, peacetime atom, smart growth, and clean energy, then we have already lost. We forfeit our right to critical democratic engagement and instead allow the powers that be to regurgitate their own terms of debate into our open upstretched mouths. Alternative-energy technologies don't clean the air. They don't clean the water. They don't protect wildlife. They don't support human rights. They don't improve neighborhoods. They don't strengthen democracy. They don't regulate themselves. They don't lower atmospheric carbon dioxide. They don't reduce consumption. They produce power. That power can lead to durable benefits, but only given the appropriate context. Ultimately, it's not a question of whether American society possesses the technological prowess to construct an alternative-energy nation. The real question is the reverse. Do we have a society capable of being powered by alternative energy? The answer today is clearly no. But we can change that. Future environmentalists will drop solar, wind, biofuels, nuclear, hydrogen, and hybrids to focus instead on women's rights, consumer culture, walkable neighborhoods, military spending, zoning, health care, wealth disparities, citizen governance, economic reform, and democratic institutions. As environmentalists and global citizens, it's not enough to say that we would benefit by shifting our focus. Our very relevance depends on it.

## 3

#### Obama win now by a decisive, but narrow margin

Mark Blumenthal, HuffPo, 10/1/12, New 2012 Polls Show Little Change In State Of Race , www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/01/2012-polls-obama-romney\_n\_1928472.html?utm\_hp\_ref=elections-2012

With attention turning to the first of three upcoming national debates, new polls show President Barack Obama continuing to hold a narrow lead over Republican nominee Mitt Romney, both nationwide and in the key battleground states that are likely to decide the election.

Two new national surveys released on Monday morning both show a slightly closer race than most other recent polls, although those new results are consistent with previous surveys from the same organizations, indicating that Obama's September lead is holding.

The new Washington Post/ABC News survey finds Obama leading by just 2 percentage points nationwide (49 percent to 47 percent) among the voters deemed most likely to vote. But that result was no different than their previous survey, taken just after the Democratic convention three weeks ago, which showed Obama with a 1-point edge (49 percent to 48 percent).

However, among all registered voters nationwide, the new Post/ABC poll shows Obama leading by 5 percentage points (49 percent to 44 percent), again the same margin as their survey found three weeks ago. The Post also reports that Obama's lead over Romney is larger (52 percent to 41 percent) among a subset of likely voters in swing states.

Similarly, a new Politico/George Washington University Battleground poll also finds Obama leading by 2 percentage points among likely voters (49 percent to 47 percent), a finding essentially unchanged from the 3-point Obama margin (50 percent to 47 percent) found in their previous survey.

The four results have been collectively more favorable to Romney than those produced by other recent national polls, and more importantly, they have shown no statistically meaningful trend in September. The HuffPost Pollster tracking model, which draws on all national and state-level polling and corrects for consistent "house effect" differences among pollsters, continues to give Obama a slightly larger, 4 percentage point lead over Romney.

Similarly, a handful of new statewide surveys released over the weekend shows results consistent with a 3- to 4-point Obama lead nationwide.

In Iowa, a new Des Moines Register Iowa poll found Obama leading by 4 percentage points (49 percent to 45 percent), exactly the same margin as the Pollster tracking model.

In Ohio, an automated recorded-voice survey by the Democratic-affiliated firm Public Policy Polling gives Obama a 4 percentage point advantage, while a new Columbus Dispatch mail-in survey gives Obama a 9-point lead. Not surprisingly, Obama's lead on the Pollster tracking model falls somewhere in between.

Finally, another new PPP poll from North Carolina shows a dead-even race, with each candidate at 48 percent -- again, consistent with a similarly close margin on HuffPost's tracking model. North Carolina has been the closest of the 50 states over the last three weeks.

Thus, the combination of national and statewide polling continues to show Obama leading Romney by statistically meaningful margins in all of the battleground states except North Carolina. Were he to carry all of the states where he is currently leading, Obama would win 332 electoral votes -- far more than the 270 needed to win. Romney currently leads in states accounting for 191 electoral votes.

Can Wednesday night's nationally televised debates between Obama and Romney, the first of three to be held between now and late October, be a "game changer" for Romney? Not likely, according to George Washington University political scientist John Sides.

"When it comes to shifting enough votes to decide the outcome of the election," Sides writes in the Washington Monthly, "presidential debates have rarely, if ever, mattered."

Sides cites research by political scientists Robert Erikson and Christopher Wlezien, who studied polling from every election from 1952 to 2008 and found that while debates sometimes nudge results, they rarely produce substantial changes in voter preferences. Erikson and Wlezien found that since 1960, the leader in the polling before the debates remained the leader after the debates.

The most significant before-and-after debate shift was toward Gerald Ford in his 1976 race against Jimmy Carter. However, as Erikson and Wlezien note, "Carter's support was in steady decline" during the final month of the race.

It is worth remembering that while Obama enjoys a statistically meaningful lead in national polling, his margin remains relatively modest compared to past elections. So while a "nudge" toward Romney on the order of what debates produced in 1980, 2000 or 2004 might not be enough to move Romney ahead, it could make for a much closer race.

The plan upsets Obama’s balancing act on energy, reduces environmentalist turnout critical to reelection

Schnur, 4-9

Dan Schnur, director of the Jesse M. Unruh Institute of Politics at the University of Southern California; he served as the national communications director of Senator John McCain’s presidential campaign in 2000, “The President, Gas Prices and the Pipeline,” <http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/09/the-president-gas-prices-and-the-keystone-pipeline/>

Like every president seeking re-election, Barack Obama walks the fine line every day between the discordant goals of motivating his party’s strongest loyalists and reaching out to swing voters for their support. A few weeks ago, that pathway took him to a tiny town in Oklahoma, where, caught between the anti-drilling demands of the environmental community and the thirst for more affordable gasoline from unions, business owners and drivers, the president announced his support for building half of an oil pipeline.

The economic impact of rising energy prices in itself is considerable, but the psychological toll on voters is just as significant, as tens of millions of motorists are reminded by large signs on almost every street corner of the financial pain of filling their gas tanks. Obama and his political lieutenants are acutely aware that this growing frustration has the potential to complicate an election year that otherwise seems to be shifting in the incumbent’s favor.

As a result, Obama has been hitting the energy issue hard in recent weeks, at least as hard as a candidate can hit when forced to navigate between two almost mutually exclusive political priorities. The result is a president who talks forcefully of the benefits of wind and solar power while also boasting about the amount of oil the nation produces under his leadership.

There are times when this gets slightly uncomfortable. Obama recently called for increased exploration along the Atlantic Coast but stopped short of calling for expanded drilling in that region. This is the energy policy equivalent of admitting to an experiment with marijuana but not inhaling.

Where the issue becomes more tangible and therefore trickier for Obama is when the multiple choices become binary. The debate over the proposed XL Keystone Pipeline that would transport Canadian oil through the nation’s heartland to the Gulf of Mexico crystallizes the choices involved and forces a shades-of-gray conversation into starker hues of black and white.

Obama recognizes that the devoted environmentalists who represent a critical portion of the Democratic party base need some motivation to turn out for him in the fall. But he also understands that centrist voters who support him on a range of other domestic and foreign policy matters could be lured away by a Republican opponent who either promises relief at the gas pump or who can lay blame at the White House doorstep for those higher prices. Even more complicated is the role of organized labor, which has poured immense amounts of support into Obama’s re-election but also prioritizes the job-creation potential of the pipeline.

The result of these competing political and policy pressures brought Obama to Ripley, Okla., where he tried to satisfy the needs of these various audiences without alienating any of them. First, the president endorsed the southern portion of the Keystone project in order to relieve the glut of domestically drilled oil that is now unable to make it to refineries near the Gulf of Mexico in a timely manner. This had the effect of irritating his environmental allies but failed to mollify the project’s advocates, who pointed out that the review process that the president called for was already underway.

He then reiterated the administration’s antipathy toward the northern section of the pipeline, which would allow Canadian-drilled oil to be transported into this country. This provided some comfort to drilling opponents, but infuriated both the pro-oil forces and the Canadian government. The most likely outcome is that Canada will still build a pipeline, but rather one that goes westward to the Pacific Ocean north of the United States border and then ships Canadian oil to China instead of into this country.

#### Romney win causes China-bashing – causes a trade war

Gerstein 11

(Josh, writer @ Politico, “The GOP's China syndrome”, 11/22/12, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1111/68952.html)

Mitt Romney says America is at war with China — a “trade war” over its undervalued currency. “They’re stealing our jobs. And we’re gonna stand up to China,” the former Massachusetts governor declared in a recent Republican presidential debate, arguing that the United States should threaten to impose tariffs on Chinese imports. When Romney steps on stage tonight for another debate, this one devoted to foreign policy, that kind of China-bashing is likely to be a favorite theme. With a moribund economy and relatively little traction for other international issues, the threat posed by cheap Chinese imports and Chinese purchases of U.S. debt is an irresistible target. The problem, China experts are quick to point out, is that those attacks often fly in the face of the business interests Republicans have traditionally represented, not to mention the record many of the candidates have either supporting trade with China — or actively soliciting it. Just last year, for example, Romney slammed President Barack Obama for growth-killing protectionism after he put a 35 percent tariff on Chinese tires because of a surge of cheap imports. And, Romney wrote in his book, “No Apology: The Case for American Greatness,” “Protectionism stifles productivity.” And though Texas Gov. Rick Perry predicted at a debate this month that “the Chinese government will end up on the ash heap of history if they do not change their virtues,” a picture posted on the Internet shows a smiling Perry on a trade mission to Shanghai and Beijing posing with Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi after presenting him with a pair of cowboy boots. Nor has Perry been shy about encouraging Chinese investments in Texas: In October 2010, he appeared at the announcement of a new U.S. headquarters for Huawei Technologies to be located in Plano, Texas, despite lingering concerns among U.S. security officials that Huawei-made telecommunications equipment is designed to allow unauthorized access by the Chinese government. “There’s a certain pandering going on,” said Nicholas Lardy of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, who adds that the GOP rhetoric is squarely at odds with the views of the U.S. establishment, which believes a showdown with China over the trade issue “will make things worse, not better.” Not all of the 2012 GOP presidential hopefuls have taken to publicly pummeling Beijing. The only bona fide China expert in the group, former Ambassador to China Jon Huntsman, has criticized Romney for being cavalier and simplistic in his talk of tariffs. “You can give applause lines, and you can kind of pander here and there. You start a trade war if you start slapping tariffs randomly on Chinese products based on currency manipulation,” Huntsman said at a recent debate. “That doesn’t work.” Former Sen. Rick Santorum also rejected the idea of slapping tariffs on Beijing if it won’t buckle on the currency issue. “That just taxes you. I don’t want to tax you,” Santorum said. Newt Gingrich says he wants to bring a world of hurt down on Beijing for alleged Chinese cyberattacks on the U.S. and theft of intellectual property, though he’s vague about how. “We’re going to have to find ways to dramatically raise the pain level for the Chinese cheating,” the former house speaker declares. And Herman Cain talks of a threat from China, but says the answer is to promote growth in the U.S. “China’s economic dominance would represent a national security threat to the USA, and possibly to the rest of the world,” Cain wrote in May in the Daily Caller. “We can outgrow China because the USA is not a loser nation. We just need a winner in the White House.” Romney’s rhetoric has been **particularly harsh**. “It’s predatory pricing, it’s killing jobs in America,” he declared at the CNBC debate earlier this month, promising to make a formal complaint to the World Trade Organization about China’s currency manipulation. “I would apply, if necessary, tariffs to make sure that they understand we are willing to play at a level playing field.” The Romney campaign insists those tariffs are entirely distinguishable from the tire duties Obama imposed in 2009. “The distinction between Obama’s tire action and what Gov. Romney is proposing is simple,” said a Romney aide who did not want to be named. “President Obama is not getting tough with China or pushing them unilaterally, he is handing out political favors to union allies. [Romney’s] policy focuses on fostering competition by keeping markets open and the playing field level.” Romney, who helped set up investment bank Bain Capital, has long been a favorite of Wall Street, so his stridency on the China trade issue has taken some traditional conservatives — for whom free trade is a fundamental tenet — by surprise. National Review said Romney’s move “risk[ed] a trade war with China” **and was “a remarkably bad idea.”** In fact, many business leaders give Obama good marks for his China policy. “What the Obama administration has done in not labeling China as a ‘currency manipulator’ is correct,” said one U.S. business lobbyist who closely follows U.S.-China trade issues and asked not to be named. “We’re very leery of a tit-for-tat situation,” he added, while acknowledging that the anti-China rhetoric is “good politics.”

#### That goes nuclear

Taaffe 5

(Peter Taaffe, “China, A New Superpower?,” Socialist Alternative.org, Nov 1, 2005, pg. <http://www.socialistalternative.org/news/article11.php?id=30>)

While this conflict is unresolved, the shadow of a trade war looms. Some commentators, like Henry C.K. Liu in the Asia Times, go further and warn that "trade wars can lead to shooting wars." China is not the Japan of the 21st century. Japan in the 1980s relied on the U.S. military and particularly its nuclear umbrella against China, and was therefore subject to the pressure and blackmail of the U.S. ruling class. The fear of the U.S., and the capitalists of the "first world" as a whole, is that China may in time "out-compete" the advanced nations for hi-tech jobs while holding on to the stranglehold it now seems to have in labor-intensive industries. As the OECD commented recently: "In the five-year period to 2003, the number of students joining higher education courses has risen by three and a half times, with a strong emphasis on technical subjects." The number of patents and engineers produced by China has also significantly grown. At the same time, an increasingly capitalist China - most wealth is now produced in the private sector but the majority of the urban labor force is still in state industries - and the urgency for greater energy resources in particular to maintain its spectacular growth rate has brought it into collision on a world scale with other imperialist powers, particularly the U.S. In a new worldwide version of the "Great Game" - the clash for control of central Asia's resources in the nineteenth century - the U.S. and China have increasingly come up against and buffeted one another. Up to now, the U.S. has held sway worldwide due to its economic dominance buttressed by a colossal war machine accounting for 47% of total world arms spending. But Iraq has dramatically shown the limits of this: "A country that cannot control Iraq can hardly remake the globe on its own." (Financial Times) But no privileged group disappears from the scene of history without a struggle. Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. defense secretary, has stated: "Since no nation threatens China, one must wonder: why this growing [arms] investment? Why these continuing large and expanding arms purchases?" China could ask the same question of the U.S. In order to maintain its position, the U.S. keeps six nuclear battle fleets permanently at sea, supported by an unparalleled network of bases. As Will Hutton in The Observer has commented, this is not because of "irrational chauvinism or the needs of the military-industrial complex, but because of the pressure they place on upstart countries like China." In turn, the Chinese elite has responded in kind. For instance, in the continuing clash over Taiwan, a major-general in the People's Liberation Army baldly stated that if China was attacked "by Washington during a confrontation over Taiwan... I think we would have to respond with nuclear weapons." He added: "We Chinese will prepare ourselves for the destruction of all of the cities east of Xian. Of course, the Americans would have to be prepared that hundreds... of cities would be destroyed by the Chinese." This bellicose nuclear arms rattling shows the contempt of the so-called great powers for the ordinary working-class and peasant peoples of China and the people of the U.S. when their interests are at stake.

## 4

#### Fiscal cliff negotiations will succeed now, but pre-election groundwork key

Jonathan Weisman, NYTimes, 10/1/12, Leaders at Work on Plan to Avert Mandatory Cuts, www.nytimes.com/2012/10/02/us/senate-leaders-at-work-on-plan-to-avert-fiscal-cliff.html?\_r=2&hp&&pagewanted=all

Senate leaders are closing in on a path for dealing with the “fiscal cliff” facing the country in January, opting to try to use a postelection session of Congress to reach agreement on a comprehensive deficit reduction deal rather than a short-term solution.

Senate Democrats and Republicans remain far apart on the details, and House Republicans continue to resist any discussion of tax increases. But lawmakers and aides say that a bipartisan group of senators is coalescing around an ambitious three-step process to avert a series of automatic tax increases and deep spending cuts.

#### Plan kills Obama

Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 1/9/12, Obama Plays Safe on Energy Policy, Lexis

With less than a year to go until he faces re-election, US President Barack Obama is trying to avoid controversial energy policy decisions, postponing the finalization of restrictions on oil refinery and power plant emissions and delaying the approval of a major crude pipeline project. The president’s caution will prolong the status quo on issues where the industry both opposes and supports the administration’s plans, and also illustrates what's at stake for energy policy depending on whether or not Obama is given another four years in office. Most of Obama's original campaign pledges on promoting alternatives to fossil fuels and tackling climate change have not passed muster with Congress, most notably an ambitious plan for national carbon controls, a subsequent toned-down clean energy standard floated after the carbon legislation failed, and repeated efforts to repeal $30 billion-$40 billion worth of oil industry tax deductions over 10 years ( PIW May9'11 ). The one exception has been the passage of $90 billion in clean energy funding as part of an economic stimulus bill passed early in Obama's term, but the White House has been unable to repeat this success in other energy policy areas ( PIW Feb.23'09 ).

#### Presidential leadership is key to a compromise – the alternative is the collapse of hegemony, a double-dip recession, and war in the Middle East

Hutchison, U.S. Senator from the great state of Texas, 9/21/2012

(Kay Bailey, “A Looming Threat to National Security,” States News Service, Lexis)

Despite warnings of the **dire consequences**, **America is teetering at the edge of a fiscal cliff**, with January 1st, 2013 as the tipping point. On that date, **unless Congress and the White House can reach agreement** on how to cut the federal deficit, all taxpayers will be hit with higher taxes and deep cuts - called "sequestration" - will occur in almost all government spending, disrupting our already weak economy and putting our national security at risk.

According to the House Armed Services Committee, if sequestration goes into effect, it would put us on course for more than $1 trillion in defense cuts over the next 10 years. What would that mean? A huge hit to our military personnel and their families; devastating cuts in funding for critical military equipment and supplies for our soldiers; and **a** potentially **catastrophic blow to our** national defense and **security capabilities** in a time of increasing violence and danger.

All Americans feel a debt of gratitude to our men and women who serve in uniform. But Texas in particular has a culture that not only reveres the commitment and sacrifice they make to protect our freedom, we send a disproportionate number of our sons and daughters to serve.

The burden is not borne solely by those who continue to answer the call of duty, but by their families as well, as they endure separation and the anxiety of a loved one going off to war. These Americans have made tremendous sacrifices. They deserve better than to face threats to their financial security and increased risks to their loved ones in uniform, purely for political gamesmanship.

Sequestration would also place an additional burden on our economy. In the industries that support national defense, as many as 1 million skilled workers could be laid off. With 43 straight months of unemployment above 8 percent, it is beyond comprehension to add a virtual army to the 23 million Americans who are already out of work or under-employed. **Government and private economic forecasters warn that sequestration will push the country back into recession next year**.

The recent murder of our Ambassador to Libya and members of his staff, attacks on US embassies and consulates and continued riots across the Middle East and North Africa are stark reminders that great portions of the world remain volatile and hostile to the US. **We have the mantle of responsibility that being the world's lone super-power brings**. **In the absence of U.S. military leadership**, **upheaval in the Middle East would be worse**. **As any student of history can attest**, **instability does not confine itself to national borders**. **Strife that starts in one country can spread like wildfire across a region**.

Sequestration's cuts would reduce an additional 100,000 airmen, Marines, sailors and soldiers. That would leave us with the smallest ground force since 1940, the smallest naval fleet since 1915 and the smallest tactical fighter force in the Air Force's history. With the destabilization in the Middle East and other areas tenuous, we would be left with a crippled military, **a diminished stature internationally and a loss of technological** research, development and **advantage** - just as actors across the globe are increasing their capabilities.

Sequestration can still be avoided. **But that will require** leadership from the President that has thus far been missing. Congress and the White House must reach a long-term agreement to reduce $1 trillion annual budget deficits, without the harsh tax increases that could stall economic growth and punish working families.

#### Middle East goes nuclear

James A. **Russell,** Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, ‘9 (Spring) “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” IFRI, Proliferation Papers, #26, http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26\_Russell\_2009.pdf

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.

## 5

#### The 50 United States should expand loan guarantees for Liquid Fluoride Thorium Reactors in the United States.

States have awesome loan guarantees

Saha, 11

(Sr. Policy Analyst-Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program, January, “State Clean Energy: Financing Guidebook,” http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/1101CLEANENERGYFINANCING.PDF)

States can use their own funds to reduce the risk for private sector investors and thus encourage greater private sector participation in clean energy. Decreasing risk is especially important in new markets, such as clean energy. The sections below describe four credit enhancement mechanisms that states can use to support clean energy. Loan Loss Reserve Funds (LRF). These are funds set aside to cover potential defaults in a loan portfolio. A loss reserve fund provides partial risk coverage to encourage lenders to pioneer new products, broaden access to financing, increase the size of unsecured loans, extend loan tenors, and/or lower interest rates. LRFs are particularly useful in markets consisting of a large number of small projects, where financial institutions will be making a large number of relatively small loans, such as loans for energy efficiency improvements or residential-scale renewable projects. Loan loss reserves can exceed 20 percent of the total loan portfolio, but have typically been set at around 10 percent, sometimes with the ability to adjust as these loan performance data become available. The Clean Energy Works Portland program, in Oregon, has set up a 10 percent loan loss reserve fund for its energy efficiency retrofit program. More detail on this program can be found in Chapter 3. The Michigan SAVES residential retrofit program entails a 20 percent loan loss reserve for the first $200,000 in loans and a 5 percent loan loss reserve for each future loan. Debt Service Reserves. States can set aside cash reserves to guarantee the payment of principal and interest. Such a reserve may be a useful tool for state bond issuers who wish to boost the security of their bonds. The reduced risk from adding a debt service reserve may help states expand the market for their bonds while reducing the bond coupon rate. For example, states can use SEP funds to establish a debt service reserve to support federally authorized clean energy bonds, such as QECBs and CREBs. Private business and public entities have used debt service reserves for years to support debt issues; they typically represent about 10 percent of the bond principal. Subordinated Debt. State governments can use a subordinated debt structure to help guarantee the capital cost of a clean energy project. This involves the use of two separate loans (senior and subordinated). The state project funder (which acts as the subordinated lender) takes on much greater risk than the senior lender. This structure permits the senior lender, typically a private sector entity experienced in project finance, to put in more capital and charge a lower interest rate because the subordinated lender is absorbing most of the project risk. State governments, utilities, or others investing in clean energy funds (for example, public benefit funds) agree to act as the subordinated lender, guaranteeing any project losses up to the value of their loan. The Vermont Clean Energy Development Fund (CEDF) uses subordinated debt financing. Established in 2005 by state statute, the fund receives between $4 million and $7 million per year from the Department of Public Service and the utility Entergy. It has a fund manager who, with an investment committee of expert stakeholders, identifies and allocates funds to subordinated debt investments. Loan Guarantees. States can also reduce risk for private capital by guaranteeing repayment of loans in the event of default. This reduces the interest rate the state must pay and helps secure participation by private sector partners. Although most examples of loan guarantees are federal, states can develop their own loan guarantee programs. In Illinois, the legislature passed a bill bringing renewable energy projects under the state’s development assistance umbrella, managed by the Illinois Finance Authority (IFA). The legislation authorized the IFA to issue $3 billion in loan guarantees for economic development purposes. Under this expanded financing model, a developer would still launch a renewable energy project using traditional lenders but add the IFA as a partner, providing a loan guarantee to the private sector lenders. IFA participation adds the state’s moral obligation, which is expected to help to reduce the cost of the loan. State governments rely on a number of different sources of capital to support clean energy finance programs. States seeking to secure clean energy capital may wish to consider a number of approaches described here, either alone or in combinations.

## solvency

Nuclear’s too expensive

Folbre, professor of economics – University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 3/26/’12

(Nancy, “The Nurture of Nuclear Power,” <http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/the-nurture-of-nuclear-power/>)

Remember the brouhaha about $563 million in Obama administration loan guarantees to Solyndra, the solar panel manufacturer that went belly up last fall? Neither President Obama nor Republicans in Congress have voiced opposition to an expected $8.3 billion Energy Department guarantee to help the Southern Company, a utility giant, build nuclear reactors in Georgia. Pressed to respond to the comparison, Representative Cliff Stearns, Republican of Florida and chairman of the Energy and Commerce subcommittee on oversight and investigations, explained that the loan guarantee for nuclear power plant construction was for a “proven industry that has been successful and has established a record.” The nuclear power industry has certainly established a record – for terrifying accidents. Most recently, the Fukushima Daiichi disaster in Japan led to the evacuation of 90,000 residents who have yet to return home and to the resignation of the prime minister. It prompted the German government to begin phasing out all nuclear generation of electricity by 2022. Yet the industry has proved remarkably successful at garnering public support in the United States, ranging from public insurance against accident liability to loan guarantees. An article last year in The Wall Street Journal observed that subsidies per kilowatt hour during its initial stages of development far exceeded those provided to solar and wind energy technologies. According to a detailed report published by the Union of Concerned Scientists, subsidies to the nuclear fuel cycle have often exceeded the value of the power produced. Buying power on the open market and giving it away for free would have been less costly. Heightened concerns about safety have driven recent cost estimates even higher, scaring off most private investors. Travis Hoium, an analyst who has written extensively about the industry on the investment Web site The Motley Fool, calls nuclear power a dying business. In an article, “Warren Buffett Wants a Subsidy From You,” he clearly explains recent efforts to shift risk from investors to ratepayers by allowing utilities to charge for construction in advance. Investor interest in nuclear-generated electricity has declined partly as a result of the boom in shale gas extraction. But energy sources that don’t increase carbon emissions are also playing a major role, with wind, hydropower and other renewables projected to provide about 30 percent of expected additions to power generation capacity in the United States between 2010 and 2035.

Multiple technical barriers

Rhodes, editor – Energy Source @ Forbes, 2/29/’12

(Chris, “Thorium Nuclear Power -- A Lesson From Norway,” Forbes)

It may well turn out that thorium is the better nuclear fuel as compared with uranium, since it offers the advantages that: (1) it is present in around 3 times the abundance of uranium on Earth, overall, (2) it can be bred into the fissile nuclear fuel uranium-233, (3) far less plutonium and other transuranic elements are produced than is the case from uranium fuel, (4) the thorium fuel cycle might be used to consume plutonium, thus reducing the nuclear stockpile while converting it into useful electrical energy.

However, it is a very big accelerator that will be needed to do the job, and the estimated costs for the project are about 500 million Euros. There are various advantages cited for this type of reactor, including the claim that it can be stopped easily if things get out of hand, and that it produces less long-lived nuclear waste than the uranium-fuelled fission reactors that are currently in common use. However, there are a whole host of scientific and engineering challenges that need to be overcome, and even identified in the first place because nobody has ever built one of these reactors, and hence the plans are still only on the drawing board.

As I have already stressed, it is a very big accelerator that will be needed if the project has **any chance of success**, so big in fact that there are none with sufficient power anywhere in the world. Some of the suggestions include using molten lead as the coolant for the system, but the reactor would run at a temperature above 700 degrees C. when the material becomes corrosive. A number of countries (including the US, Russia, the UK, France and Japan) have entrenched firm investments in uranium based reactors, and will use them for as long as they can. There are sizeable quantities of uranium on the world market, although the price has recently soared. Nonetheless, there is likely to be resistance to the research and development of a brand-new technology based on thorium, in view of huge costs that will effectively be borne by the Norwegian taxpayer if they go it alone down this unlit path.

Framing issue for all evidence—their evidence is either based on conspiracy theories OR has no technical expertise

Shahan, director/editor – CleanTechnica, writer – Scientific American, 9/11/’12

(Zachary, “Why Thorium Nuclear Isn’t Featured on CleanTechnica,” <http://cleantechnica.com/2012/09/11/why-thorium-nuclear-isnt-featured-on-cleantechnica/>)

Now, before I get into the details of why thorium is anything but awesome, I want to say a few things about the culture that surrounds the “thorium will solve all our problems!” idea. Thorium enthusiasts are often willing to make claims like, “if it weren’t for the government, we would have switched to thorium nuclear energy decades ago.” Or, “thorium nuclear will solve all our problems, but it’s been suppressed by big government for decades.”

I have to admit that I’ve gotten into far too many discussions with conspiracy theorists in the past several years (mostly regarding the topic of global warming). Two things I’ve learned are that 1) they think nearly everything wrong in the world is due to governmental conspiracy; 2) you cannot expect to have a logical conversation with them — **presenting facts does not matter at all.**

Believe me, I understand that most if not all governments have a lot of corrupt politicians and leaders in them, that rich, entrenched energy industries have far too much control, and do suppress new technologies that could threaten their livelihood. That said, everything is not a conspiracy, and there are legitimate reasons why wind and solar energy are blowing up in use and popularity but thorium is not. There’s a good reason (or many good reasons) why wind turbines and solar panels are in place all over the world, but **there isn’t a single commercial thorium reactor in operation.** It’s not because every government in the world is suppressing thorium. It’s most likely because **thorium simply isn’t what its proponents say it is**.

Now, many or most of the commenters and bloggers who are into thorium come into the discussion in a very conspiratorial way, from my experience, which immediately throws up a yellow flag (note: not a red flag, but a yellow one). As I said, I’ve spent way too much time unsuccessfully trying to bring science and logic into discussions with conspiracy theorists.

Conspiracy theorists aren’t the only ones getting behind thorium, though. I know some very intelligent people not obsessed with conspiracy who think it could be awesome. But the thing is, nuclear technology and science is very technical. While hearing a handful of nice things about thorium in what sounds like technical or scientific language might get some people excited, it really shouldn’t. Unless you have a ton of time on your hands to very scientifically study the matter (not read blogs about the topic), you should probably defer to independent experts who have studied the matter, and have carefully studied the claims of the thorium fan club.

You might also consider that some governments (i.e. India) have been trying to get thorium off the ground for decades, with apparently no success, and many others have researched it (including world-leading countries such as Germany, Japan, the UK, Russia, and the US). Do you really think that every government that looks into the matter doesn’t want cheap, safe energy?

Loan guarantees are unnecessary and insufficient—regulatory hurdles and waste outweigh

Spencer, research fellow in nuclear energy – Heritage Foundation, 10/15/’10

(Jack, <http://blog.heritage.org/2010/10/15/no-loan-guarantee-no-nuclear-not-quite/>)

And this was consistent with what many on the nuclear industry have been saying. To move forward, industry argued, they needed the federal government to back up the multi-billion-dollar investments. This credit subsidy would give recipients access to below-market capital, which would have serious impact on the balance sheet of any multi-billion-dollar project.

Such subsidies to offset the risk of the first few plants could be justified. The fact is that the federal government imposes significant risk to nuclear investors. Washington’s amateurish approach to fixing its broken nuclear waste management policy and an antiquated and unpredictable regulatory regime would make any sane businessperson think twice about nuclear energy. But given loan guarantees, the soundness of the technology and the potential long-term economic benefits of building a nuclear power plant kept investors coming.

At least until the burden of dealing with the federal government outweighed the benefit of the subsidy. That seems to be what happened with Constellation.

Absent the loan guarantee, we were told there would be no new nuclear power. Yet today The Washington Post reported that Electricite de France (EDF), one of Constellation’s partners in the project and the world’s largest nuclear plant operator, said that it was willing to take 100 percent of the project’s financial risk, thus removing the need for a loan guarantee—though it must be stated that EDF did not explicitly say that it would not pursue a loan guarantee at some future point. But taking on 100 percent of the risk burden would seem to preclude a subsidy that removes a significant portion of that risk.

Although EDF’s decision does not guarantee that Calvert Cliff’s 3 will move forward, it does demonstrate that loan guarantees are not essential to new nuclear power and could actually indicate that they are detrimental. EDF’s decision to shoulder 100 percent of the risk of the project demonstrates the market viability of nuclear power even absent federal backing.

## prolif

#### Obama won’t get tough

Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 2/7/12, Obama's Nuclear Mistake, www.nationalreview.com/blogs/print/290330

What prompted Obama to kick this political nest? A stunning inattention to nuclear-export realities, his own nuclear-control rhetoric, and history.

In 2008, President Bush negotiated a nuclear-cooperative agreement with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This agreement featured two new and important nonproliferation conditions. The first required the UAE to forswear making nuclear fuel — a process that can bring states to the very brink of acquiring bombs. The second stipulated that the UAE must open its nuclear facilities to intrusive nuclear inspections authorized under a special international understanding known as the Additional Protocol. While it negotiated this agreement with the UAE, the Bush administration also peddled its new, tougher conditions to existing and prospective U.S. civilian-nuclear-technology recipients, including Jordan, Egypt, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam.

Initially, this effort enjoyed President Obama’s support after he succeeded Bush: He put the final touches on the UAE deal and in 2009 sold it as the new nonproliferation “Gold Standard” for future civilian nuclear-cooperation deals. After a year’s effort trying to get Jordan, Vietnam, and South Korea to forswear making nuclear fuel, though, Team Obama started to go wobbly.

First, in the late summer of 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the U.S. had initialed a nuclear deal with Vietnam that lacked the Gold Standard conditions. The Hill went nuts. Letters were sent to the secretary of state, and State quietly put the Vietnam agreement on ice while the National Security Council ordered an interagency policy review. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg, who wanted to uphold the standard, fought Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel Poneman, who did not. Nothing was decided.

Then, in July of 2011, Steinberg left the government. In short order, Poneman prevailed over remaining resistance within State. Late last year, State resumed nuclear cooperation talks with Vietnam. Anxious to notify the Hill, as required by law, Undersecretary of State Eileen Tauscher and Deputy Secretary Poneman tried to arrange a private, classified briefing with the House and Senate foreign-affairs committee chairmen and ranking members. But all the important members were out of town. So instead, the two officials sent them a short note.

It was a knee-slapper. First, it said the administration had decided that pushing the Bush administration’s Gold Standard would actually risk undermining nuclear nonproliferation. “We are concerned,” Tauscher and Poneman argued, that pushing this standard would “reduce[ ] the number of future U.S. partners, minimizing our nonproliferation influence.”

Second, they noted that “France and Russia in particular are very aggressive in pursuing nuclear business,” that “neither imposes enrichment or reprocessing conditions in their agreements,” and that for every billion dollars of exports, the U.S. is able to support 10,000 jobs. So, if we want jobs, we have to back off pushing nuclear nonproliferation? That seems to be the letter’s conclusion. Yet it’s unclear if there are any significant U.S. reactor exports to be made, or any truly American vendors to make them. Nearly 80 percent of Westinghouse’s nuclear division is now Japanese- and Kazakhstani-owned; roughly half of General Electric’s is Japanese-owned. As for nuclear manufacturing, nearly all of that is now done overseas. Also, the Fukushima tsunami disaster has endangered whatever U.S. nuclear reactor or component exports might otherwise be left. Certainly prospective foreign customers have been loath to forswear suing U.S. nuclear firms in the case of a nuclear accident. Yet without such a pledge, U.S. vendors will not sell. The letter’s most egregious error, though, is its misreading of the nuclear market. Contrary to the two officials’ suggestion, the most profitable nuclear sales prospect is not overseas reactors, where profit margins can be negative. Instead, it’s supplying nuclear fuel to run the U.S.’s 104 power reactors, the world’s largest fleet. Russia and France are eager to penetrate this market. France is building a $4.8 billion fuel-fabrication plant in Georgia for the U.S. Department of Energy and has secured a $2 billion conditional federal loan guarantee to enrich uranium in Idaho. Russia would like to establish a similar U.S. enrichment project. Bottom line: If the U.S. wants to make a nuclear buck, doing so while maintaining nonproliferation standards depends far less on what other nuclear suppliers are doing overseas than those foreign suppliers’ export profits depend on securing U.S. taxpayer funds and loan guarantees.

So far, however, Team Obama has avoided exploiting this leverage. Impatient, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs has reported out a bill (H.R. 1280) to push the Gold Standard by increasing congressional oversight over U.S. civilian nuclear-cooperative agreements. The Senate has yet to act.

#### No risk of Asia war – Peaceful China and multilateral institutions

Bitzinger and Desker, 9

[Richard, Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Barry, Dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Director of the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, “ Why East Asian War is Unlikely,” Survival | vol. 50 no. 6 | December 2008–January 2009

 The Asia-Pacific region can be regarded as a zone of both relative insecurity and strategic stability. It contains some of the world’s most significant flashpoints – the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the Siachen Glacier – where tensions between nations could escalate to the point of major war. It is replete with unresolved border issues; is a breeding ground for transnational terrorism and the site of many terrorist activities (the Bali bombings, the Manila superferry bombing); and contains overlapping claims for maritime territories (the Spratly Islands, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands) with considerable actual or potential wealth in resources such as oil, gas and fisheries. Finally, the Asia-Pacific is an area of strategic significance with many key sea lines of communication and important chokepoints. Yet despite all these potential crucibles of conflict, the Asia-Pacific, if not an area of serenity and calm, is certainly more stable than one might expect. To be sure, there are separatist movements and internal struggles, particularly with insurgencies, as in Thailand, the Philippines and Tibet. Since the resolution of the East Timor crisis, however, the region has been relatively free of open armed warfare. Separatism remains a challenge, but the break-up of states is unlikely. Terrorism is a nuisance, but its impact is contained. The North Korean nuclear issue, while not fully resolved, is at least moving toward a conclusion with the likely denuclearisation of the peninsula. Tensions between China and Taiwan, while always just beneath the surface, seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict any time soon, especially given recent Kuomintang Party victories in Taiwan and efforts by Taiwan and China to re-open informal channels of consultation as well as institutional relationships between organisations responsible for cross-strait relations. And while in Asia there is no strong supranational political entity like the European Union, there are many multilateral organisations and international initiatives dedicated to enhancing peace and stability, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. In Southeast Asia, countries are united in a common geopolitical and economic organisation – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – which is dedicated to peaceful economic, social and cultural development, and to the promotion of regional peace and stability. ASEAN has played a key role in conceiving and establishing broader regional institutions such as the East Asian Summit, ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) and the ASEAN Regional Forum. All this suggests that war in Asia – while not inconceivable – is unlikely. This is not to say that the region will not undergo significant changes. The rise of China constitutes perhaps the most significant challenge to regional security and stability – and, from Washington’s vantage point, to American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. The United States increasingly sees China as its key peer challenger in Asia: China was singled out in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review as having, among the ‘major and emerging powers … the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States’.1 Although the United States has been the hegemon in the Asia-Pacific since the end of the Second World War, it will probably not remain so over the next 25 years. A rising China will present a critical foreign-policy challenge, in some ways more difficult than that posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War.2 While the Soviet Union was a political and strategic competitor, China will be a formidable political, strategic and economic competitor. This development will lead to profound changes in the strategic environment of the Asia-Pacific. Still, the rise of China does not automatically mean that conflict is more likely; the emergence of a more assertive China does not mean a more aggressive China. While Beijing is increasingly prone to push its own agenda, defend its interests, engage in more nationalistic – even chauvinistic – behaviour (witness the Olympic torch counter-protests), and seek to displace the United States as the regional hegemon, this does not necessarily translate into an expansionist or warlike China. If anything, Beijing appears content to press its claims peacefully (if forcefully) through existing avenues and institutions of international relations, particularly by co-opting these to meet its own purposes. This ‘soft power’ process can be described as an emerging ‘Beijing Consensus’ in regional international affairs. Moreover, when the Chinese military build-up is examined closely, it is clear that the country’s war machine, while certainly worth taking seriously, is not quite as threatening as some might argue.

#### No widespread proliferation

Hymans 12

Jacques Hymans, USC Associate Professor of IR, 4/16/12, North Korea's Lessons for (Not) Building an Atomic Bomb, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137408/jacques-e-c-hymans/north-koreas-lessons-for-not-building-an-atomic-bomb?page=show

Washington's miscalculation is not just a product of the difficulties of seeing inside the Hermit Kingdom. It is also a result of the broader tendency to overestimate the pace of global proliferation. For decades, Very Serious People have predicted that strategic weapons are about to spread to every corner of the earth. **Such warnings have routinely proved wrong** - for instance, the intelligence assessments that led to the 2003 invasion of Iraq - but they continue to be issued. In reality, despite the diffusion of the relevant technology and the knowledge for building nuclear weapons, the world has been experiencing a great proliferation slowdown. Nuclear weapons programs around the world are taking much longer to get off the ground - and their failure rate is much higher - than they did during the first 25 years of the nuclear age.

As I explain in my article "Botching the Bomb" in the upcoming issue of Foreign Affairs, the key reason for the great proliferation slowdown is the absence of strong cultures of scientific professionalism in most of the recent crop of would-be nuclear states, which in turn is a consequence of their poorly built political institutions. In such dysfunctional states, the quality of technical workmanship is low, there is little coordination across different technical teams, and technical mistakes lead not to productive learning but instead to finger-pointing and recrimination. **These problems are debilitating**, and **they cannot be fixed** simply by bringing in more imported parts through illicit supply networks. In short, as a struggling proliferator, North Korea has a lot of company.

#### US won’t exert nonproliferation leadership

Cleary 12

Richard Cleary, American Enterprise Institute Research Assistant, 8/13/12, Richard Cleary: Persuading Countries to Forgo Nuclear Fuel-Making, npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1192&tid=30

The cases above offer a common lesson: The U.S., though constrained or empowered by circumstance, can exert considerable sway in nonproliferation matters, **but** often **elects not to apply the most powerful tools at its disposal for fear of jeopardizing other objectives**. The persistent dilemma of how much to emphasize nonproliferation goals, and at what cost, has contributed to cases of **nonproliferation failure**. The inconsistent or incomplete application of U.S. power in nonproliferation cases is most harmful when it gives the impression to a nation that either sharing sensitive technology or developing it is, or will become, acceptable to Washington. **U.S. reticence** historically, with some exceptions, **to prioritize nonproliferation**—and in so doing reduce the chance of success in these cases—**does not leave room for** great **optimism about future U.S. efforts at persuading countries to forgo nuclear fuel-making**.

#### Nuclear energy cred fails—countries say no to US tech if it constrains them

Cleary 12

Richard Cleary, American Enterprise Institute Research Assistant, 8/13/12, Richard Cleary: Persuading Countries to Forgo Nuclear Fuel-Making, npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1192&tid=30

The examples above show the limitations of both demand and supply side efforts. Supply side diplomatic interventions, made before the transfer of technology, have been at times effective, particularly in precluding nuclear fuel-making in the short term and buying time for more lasting solutions. However, as the Pakistan and Brazil cases illustrated, supply side interventions are no substitute for demand side solutions: **Countries face political choices regarding nuclear fuel-making**. **A nation set upon an independent fuel-making capacity**, such as Pakistan or Brazil, **is unlikely to give up efforts because of supply side controls**. Multilateral fuel-making arrangements, as proposed repeatedly by the United States, have not materialized and therefore seem to have had little tangible influence.

#### US leadership on prolif-resistant nuclear energy cooperation fails, causes backlash that undermines nonproliferation

Hibbs 12

Mark Hibbs, Carnegie Nuclear Policy Program Senior Associate, 8/7/12, Negotiating Nuclear Cooperation Agreements, carnegieendowment.org/2012/08/07/negotiating-nuclear-cooperation-agreements/d98z

**U.S. resolve to include a no-ENR pledge in the body of new bilateral agreements will be seen** by some countries **as arrogant and unacceptable**. Incorporating ENR terms into side-letters or preambles may be less offensive. That approach would also more easily facilitate including reciprocal commitments by the United States into its 123 bargains with foreign countries. These might include guaranteeing nuclear fuel supply through participation in the U.S. fuel bank, facilitating the country’s access to other back-up sources of nuclear fuel, and, in the future, perhaps even taking back U.S.-origin spent fuel.

The outcome of any negotiation for a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement will depend on the leverage both sides bring to the table. When the United States negotiated most of the 22 such agreements in force today, it was the world’s leading provider of nuclear technology, equipment, and fuel. As the examples of Jordan and Vietnam show, unlike half a century ago, nuclear newcomers today don’t need to buy American.

The vendor field is populated by firms in Argentina, Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, Kazakhstan, Namibia, Niger, Russia, and South Korea, and in the future they will be joined by others in China and India. Governments in these countries do not seek to establish a no-ENR requirement as a condition for foreign nuclear cooperation. Some of them, Australia and Canada for example, have strong nonproliferation track records. **Countries** now **seeking** to form **foreign industrial partnerships to set up nuclear power** programs **have numerous options and they will favor arrangements that provide them the most freedom and flexibility**.

**Equity in international nuclear affairs matters**. By negotiating with its partners voluntary political agreements, including side benefits to limit the application of sensitive technologies, instead of trying to legally **compel** them to make **concessions that are politically onerous, the U**nited **S**tates **can** serve its nonproliferation and security interests while **avoid**ing the **challenge to U.S. credibility** that would follow from rigid application of a one-size-fits-all policy.

The United States should show nonproliferation leadership by generally discouraging countries without enrichment and reprocessing capabilities from embarking in this direction. But negotiators need policy guidelines that provide for flexibility and encourage them to create incentives to get desired results. To some extent, the current policy may be informed by the insight that trying to negotiate no-ENR terms into the operative text of an agreement may fail, and that other approaches may be more productive. It also reflects the reality that U.S. leverage on nuclear trade is declining.

#### Maintaining trade through weak nuclear agreements solves prolif—shift to restrictive agreements scuttles everything

NEI 12

Nuclear Energy Institute, May 2012, Issues in Focus: Nuclear Energy Exports and Nonproliferation, www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/newplants/whitepaper/issues-in-focus-nuclear-energy-exports-and-nonproliferation

These imperatives are inextricably linked. To maintain U.S. influence over global nonproliferation policy and international nuclear safety, the U.S. commercial nuclear energy sector must participate in the rapidly expanding global market for nuclear energy technologies (439 commercial nuclear reactors in operation around the world, 65 under construction, 162 planned or on order).

Without U.S. commercial engagement, the United States would have substantially diminished influence over other nations’ nonproliferation policies and practices. U.S. technology and U.S. industry are a critical engine that drives U.S. nonproliferation policies. A successful nuclear trade and export policy must be a partnership between government and industry.

A Section 123 Agreement is a prerequisite for U.S. commercial nuclear exports. It is also promotes U.S. nonproliferation interests. Section 123 Agreements already include provisions governing enrichment and reprocessing of U.S.- controlled nuclear material, including a prohibition on enrichment or reprocessing **without prior U.S. consent**. **Any effort** in U.S. 123 agreements **to impose additional restrictions on enrichment and/or reprocessing** of nuclear material controlled by other **countries is seen by** many **countries as an overreach by the U**nited **S**tates.

It would be counterproductive to require other nations to forswear enrichment and reprocessing in order to execute a Section 123 agreement with the United States. Most **nations would refuse to do so, and would simply turn to other commercial nuclear suppliers** – France, Russia and others that do not impose such requirements. **Without a Section 123 agreement, the U**nited **S**tates **cannot engage in commercial nuclear trade**, and thus has substantially diminished influence over nonproliferation.

Unilateral requirements, imposed in the name of nonproliferation, could have the **perverse effect of undermining U.S. influence over nonproliferation policy**.

#### Strong ENR kills the US-ROK 123 agreement

Sang-Hun 11

Choe Sang-Hun, NYTimes, 12/6/11, U.S. and South Korea Renew Talks on Nuclear Technology, www.nytimes.com/2011/12/07/world/asia/us-and-south-korea-renew-talks-on-nuclear-technology.html

United States and South Korean negotiators on Tuesday resumed their low-key but highly sensitive talks on whether South Korea should be allowed to do what Washington has tried to stop North Korea from doing: enrich uranium and reprocess spent nuclear fuel.

Under a 1974 treaty with the United States, the South agreed to refrain from using those technologies, which can be used to create fuel for nuclear power plants, but also to make nuclear weapons. They began talks a year ago to rewrite the treaty.

South Korea wants the ban lifted, arguing that it desperately needs to reprocess its accumulating spent fuel from nuclear reactors to reduce its stored waste. It also wants to use reprocessing and enrichment to secure fuel supplies for its expanding nuclear power industry. The country aspires to meet 60 percent of its electricity needs with nuclear power by 2030 and become a global exporter of nuclear reactors.

**The U**nited **S**tates **supports a revised agreement** that “will reflect the increased importance that the Republic of Korea is playing in the global nuclear energy arena,” the chief United States negotiator, Robert J. Einhorn, said Monday in Seoul, using South Korea’s formal name.

His South Korean counterpart, Park Ro-byug, said the current agreement was drafted in the days when South Korea was what he called a “unilateral recipient” of American help in civil nuclear engineering. He said it was time for the two allies to create a “mutually beneficiary” treaty that acknowledges South Korea as a global player in peaceful uses of nuclear power.

Behind such diplomatic talk lurk the two nation’s different views on uranium enrichment and reprocessing spent fuel.

“The United States opposes the spread of enrichment and reprocessing even to South Korea, because it wants to set an absolute standard to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation,” said William Tobey, a senior fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. “While Seoul does not pose such a threat, a hard-and-fast standard will be the strongest bulwark against weapons proliferation by other states.”

Song Min-soon, a former South Korean foreign minister who is now an opposition lawmaker, said the **negotiations** would “**serve as an important test” of how the U**nited **S**tates **wants to be regarded by South Koreans. “If they pressure South Korea too much, it might spawn anti-American sentiment**,” he said, **along with** what he characterized as “**calls for a nuclear sovereignty**.”

## resource wars

#### NUCLEAR DESALINATION along with PRODUCTIVIST distribution creates a water nightmare massacre

Barlow 9

Blue Covenant: The Global Water Crisis and the Coming Battle for the Right Maude Victoria Barlow (born May 24, 1947) is a Canadian author and activist. She is the National Chairperson of The Council of Canadians, a citizens’ advocacy organization with members and chapters across Canada. She is also the co-founder of the Blue Planet Project, which works internationally for the human right to water. Maude chairs the board of Washington-based Food & Water Watch, is a founding member of the San Francisco–based International Forum on Globalization, and a Councillor with the Hamburg-based World Future Council. In 2008/2009, she served as Senior Advisor on Water to the 63rd President of the United Nations General Assembly. She has authored and co-authored 16 books. Maude Barlow is the recipient of 11 honorary doctorates as well as many awards, including the 2005 Right Livelihood Award (known as the “Alternative Nobel”), the Citation of Lifetime Achievement which she received at the 2008 Canadian Environment Awards, the 2009 Earth Day Canada Outstanding Environmental Achievement Award, the 2009 Planet in Focus Eco Hero Award, and the 2011 EarthCare Award, the highest international honour of the Sierra Club (U.S.).

Three scenarios collude toward disaster. Scenario one: The world is running out of freshwater. It is not just a question of finding the money to hook up the two billion people living in water-stressed regions of our world. Humanity is polluting, diverting and depleting the Earth's finite water resources at a dangerous and steadily increasing rate. The abuse and displacement of water is the ground-level equivalent of greenhouse gas emissions, and likely as great a cause of climate change. Scenario two: Every day more and more people are living without access to clean water. As the ecological crisis deepens, so too does the human crisis. More children arc killed by dirty water than by war, malaria, hiv/aids and traffic accidents combined. The global water crisis has become a most powerful symbol of the growing inequality in our world. While the wealthy enjoy boutique water at any time, millions of poor people have access only to contaminated water from local rivers and wells. Scenario three: A powerful corporate water cartel has emerged to seize control of every aspect of water for its own profit. Corporations deliver drinking water and take away wastewater; corporations put massive amounts of water in plastic bottles and sell it to us as at exorbitant prices; corporations are building sophisticated new technologies to recycle our dirty water and sell it back to us; corporations extract and move water by huge pipelines from watersheds and aquifers to sell to big cities and industries; corporations buy, store and trade water on the open market, like running shoes. Most importantly, corporations want governments to deregulate the water sector and allow the market to set water polity. Every day, they get closer to that goal. Scenario three deepens the crises now unfolding in scenarios one and two. Imagine a world in twenty years in which no substantive progress has been made to provide basic water services in the Third World; or to create laws to protect source water and force industry and industrial agriculture to stop polluting water systems; or to curb the mass movement of water by pipeline, tanker and other diversions, which will have created huge new swaths of desert. Desalination plants will ring the world's oceans, many of them run by nuclear power; corporate-controlled nanotechnology will clean up sewage water and sell it to private utilities, which will in turn sell it back to us at a huge profit; the rich will drink only bottled water found in the few remaining uncontaminated parts of the world, or sucked from the clouds by corporate-controlled machines, while the poor will die in increasing numbers from a lack of water. This is not science fiction. This is where the world is headed unless we change course - a moral and ecological imperative.

#### The COMMONS can reverse neoliberal water control and solves scarcity better

Barlow 9

Blue Covenant: The Global Water Crisis and the Coming Battle for the Right Maude Victoria Barlow (born May 24, 1947) is a Canadian author and activist. She is the National Chairperson of The Council of Canadians, a citizens’ advocacy organization with members and chapters across Canada. She is also the co-founder of the Blue Planet Project, which works internationally for the human right to water. Maude chairs the board of Washington-based Food & Water Watch, is a founding member of the San Francisco–based International Forum on Globalization, and a Councillor with the Hamburg-based World Future Council. In 2008/2009, she served as Senior Advisor on Water to the 63rd President of the United Nations General Assembly. She has authored and co-authored 16 books. Maude Barlow is the recipient of 11 honorary doctorates as well as many awards, including the 2005 Right Livelihood Award (known as the “Alternative Nobel”), the Citation of Lifetime Achievement which she received at the 2008 Canadian Environment Awards, the 2009 Earth Day Canada Outstanding Environmental Achievement Award, the 2009 Planet in Focus Eco Hero Award, and the 2011 EarthCare Award, the highest international honour of the Sierra Club (U.S.).

Water Democracy The alternative to crisis three - the corporate control of water - is public control. The creation of a worldwide water cartel is wrong ethically, environmentally and socially and ensures that the decisions regarding the allocation of water are made based on commercial, not environmental or social, concerns. Private transnational corporations cannot maintain a competitive position in the water industry if they operate on the principles of water conservation, water justice and water democracy. Only governments, with their mandate to work in the public good, can operate on these principles. Water corporations, be they utilities, bottled water companies or the new water reuse industry, are dependent on increased consumption to generate profits and will never be able to seriously join the effort to protect and conserve source water. Further, the control of water supplies by corporations, usually foreign, dramatically reduces the democratic oversight of the communities and countries in which they operate. Water must be understood to be part of the global commons but clearly subject to local, democratic and public management. There are many alternatives to the corporate control of water and countless examples of where it is working. Public Services International and the World Development Movement have done a great deal of work on alternatives to private control of water services and advocate public-public partnerships (pups). As David Hall and Emanuele Lobina explain in Water as a Public Service, water utilities have to have political, public legitimacy, legal powers, financial resources and a sustainable labor force. Established water operators in both the North and South have developed these capacities. But many in the South have not been able to do so yet. pups are a mechanism for providing capacity building for these countries, either through Water Operator Partnerships, whereby established public systems transfer expertise and skills to those in need, or through projects whereby public institutions such as public sector unions or public pension fund boards, use their resources to support public water services in developing countries. The objective is to provide local management and workers with the necessary skills to deliver water and provide wastewater services to the public.

No nuclear exports—bureaucracy and foreign government competition

NEI, Nuclear Energy Institute, Winter ‘12

(“U.S. Nuclear Export Rules Hurt Global Competitiveness,” <http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/publicationsandmedia/insight/insightwinter2012/us-nuclear-export-rules-hurt-global-competitiveness/>)

Today, U.S. dominance of the global nuclear power market has eroded as suppliers from other countries **compete aggressively against American exporters.** U.S. suppliers confront competitors that benefit from various forms of state promotion and also must contend with a U.S. government that has not adapted to new commercial realities. The potential is tremendous—$500 billion to $740 billion in international orders over the next decade, representing tens of thousands of potential American jobs, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce.

With America suffering a large trade deficit, nuclear goods and services represent a market worth aggressive action.

However, antiquated U.S. government approaches to nuclear exports are challenging U.S. competitiveness in the nuclear energy market. New federal support is needed if the United States wants to reclaim dominance in commercial nuclear goods and services—and create the jobs that go with them.

“The U.S. used to be a monopoly supplier of nuclear materials and technology back in the ’50s and ’60s,” said Fred McGoldrick, former director of the Office of Nonproliferation and Export Policy at the State Department. “That position has eroded to the point where we’re a minor player compared to other countries.”

America continues to lead the world in technology innovation and know-how. So what are the issues? And where is the trade?

Effective coordination among the many government agencies involved in nuclear exports would provide a boost to U.S. suppliers.

 “Multiple U.S. agencies are engaged with countries abroad that are developing nuclear power, from early assistance to export controls to trade finance and more,” said Ted Jones, director for supplier international relations at NEI. The challenge is to create a framework that allows commercial nuclear trade to grow while ensuring against the proliferation of nuclear materials.

 “To compete in such a situation, an ongoing dialogue between U.S. suppliers and government needs to be conducted and U.S. trade promotion **must be coordinated at the highest levels**,” Jones said.

Licensing U.S. Exports

Jurisdiction for commercial nuclear export controls is divided among the Departments of Energy and Commerce and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and has not been comprehensively updated to coordinate among the agencies or to reflect economic and technological changes over the decades. The State Department also is involved in international nuclear commerce. It negotiates and implements so-called “123 agreements” that allow for nuclear goods and services to be traded with a foreign country.

The federal agencies often have different, conflicting priorities, leading to a lack of clarity for exporters and longer processing times for export licenses.

“The U.S. nuclear export regime is the **most complex and restrictive in the world** and the least efficient,” said Jones. “Furthermore, it is poorly focused on items and technologies that pose little or no proliferation concern. By trying to protect too much, we risk diminishing the focus on sensitive technologies and handicapping U.S. exports.”

A case in point is the Energy Department’s Part 810 regulations. While 123 agreements open trade between the United States and other countries, Part 810 regulates what the United States can trade with another country. For certain countries, **it can take more than a year to obtain “specific authorizations”** to export nuclear items. Because other supplier countries authorize exports to the same countries with fewer requirements and delays, the Part 810 rules translate into a significant competitive disadvantage for U.S. suppliers.

Today, 76 countries require a specific authorization, but DOE has proposed almost doubling that number—to include for the first time countries that have never demonstrated a special proliferation concern, that are already part of the global nuclear supply chain, and that plan new nuclear infrastructure.

The proposed Part 810 rule would do nothing to reduce lengthy license processing times, said Jones. Other nuclear supplier countries impose strict guidelines on their licensing agencies for timely processing of applications. Equivalent licenses must be processed in fewer than nine months in France, fewer than 90 days in Japan and 15 days in South Korea.

One possible solution, said McGoldrick, would be to set similar deadlines for issuance of licenses. U.S. agencies “could have deadlines set forth in the new [Part 810] regulations, which would give the relevant government agencies specified times in which to act on a license. Time could be exceeded only under certain circumstances,” said McGoldrick.

Instituting Same Rules for Everyone

At stake is not just the nation’s manufacturing base, but thousands of jobs. In 2008, all exports supported more than 10 million jobs, according to “The Report to the President on the National Export Initiative.” One of the report’s recommendations was to expand opportunities for U.S. commercial nuclear exports.

No water wars – best studies

Allouche 11, research Fellow – water supply and sanitation @ Institute for Development Studies, frmr professor – MIT, ‘11

(Jeremy, “The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade,” Food Policy, Vol. 36 Supplement 1, p. S3-S8, January)

The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity (whether of food or water) will lead to conflict and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and population growth since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that most empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian arguments. Technological change and greater inputs of capital have dramatically increased labour productivity in agriculture. More generally, the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable.

Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations

In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of alarmist scenarios have linked the increasing use of water resources and food insecurity with wars. The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an instrumental purpose; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level.

In the Middle East, presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers have also used this bellicose rhetoric. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. The evidence seems quite weak. Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, none of these declarations have been followed up by military action.

The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems.

None of the various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a casus belli. Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited purely to governmental rhetoric intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18).

As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, more than two-thirds of over 1800 water-related ‘events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), organized political bodies signed between the year 805 and 1984 more than 3600 water-related treaties, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 (FAO, 1978 and FAO, 1984).

The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. There is however no direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example Allouche, 2005, Allouche, 2007 and [Rouyer, 2000] ). Water rich countries have been involved in a number of disputes with other relatively water rich countries (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of available water shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity drives the process of co-operation among riparians (Dinar and Dinar, 2005 and Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006).

In terms of international relations, the threat of water wars due to increasing scarcity does not make much sense in the light of the recent historical record. Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable.

The debates over the likely impacts of climate change have again popularised the idea of water wars. The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict (Brauch, 2002 and Pervis and Busby, 2004). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin ( [Barnett and Adger, 2007] and Kevane and Gray, 2008).

#### Best empirical evidence disproves their speculation

Weinthal and Rengosh 11

 Routledge Handbook of Global Public Health

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PhD Political Science, Columbia University, 1998

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Weinthal's experience lies in environmental policy, international environmental institutions, the political-economy of the resource curse, water cooperation and conflict, and environmental security.

 By the end of the twentieth century, it was thus widely assumed that water scarcity would be a driver of conflict between nation states, especially in the arid regions of MEN A. World leaders such as former UN secretary-general, Boutros Boucros-Ghali, famously warned, 'the next war in the Middle East will be fought over water, not polities' (Vesilind 1993: 53). The Economist, furthermore, predicted in 1999 that \*[w]ith 3,5 billion people affected by water shortages by 2050, conditions are ripe for a century of water conflicts'. The empirical evidence, however, has yet to support such prophecies. Rather, when it comes to water resources at the interstate level, cooperation is much more ubiquitous. The historical record shows that states rarely if ever go to war over water; in parsing more than 1,800 state-to-state water interactions in trans-boundary basins between 1946 and 1999, Wolf et al. (200.3) demonstrated that none have led to formal war.

#### No war – deterrence checks escalation

Ganguly, 8

[Sumit Ganguly is a professor of political science and holds the Rabindranath Tagore Chair at Indiana University, Bloomington. “Nuclear Stability in South Asia,” International Security, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Fall 2008), pp. 45–70]

As the outcomes of the 1999 and 2001–02 crises show, nuclear deterrence is robust in South Asia. Both crises were contained at levels considerably short of full-scale war. That said, as Paul Kapur has argued, Pakistan’s acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability may well have emboldened its leadership, secure in the belief that India had no good options to respond. India, in turn, has been grappling with an effort to forge a new military doctrine and strategy to enable it to respond to Pakistani needling while containing the possibilities of conflict escalation, especially to the nuclear level.78 Whether Indian military planners can fashion such a calibrated strategy to cope with Pakistani probes remains an open question. This article’s analysis of the 1999 and 2001–02 crises does suggest, however, that nuclear deterrence in South Asia is far from parlous, contrary to what the critics have suggested. Three specific forms of evidence can be adduced to argue the case for the strength of nuclear deterrence. First, there is a serious problem of conflation in the arguments of both Hoyt and Kapur. Undeniably, Pakistan’s willingness to provoke India has increased commensurate with its steady acquisition of a nuclear arsenal. This period from the late 1980s to the late 1990s, however, also coincided with two parallel developments that equipped Pakistan with the motives, opportunities, and means to meddle in India’s internal affairs—particularly in Jammu and Kashmir. The most important change that occurred was the end of the conflict with the Soviet Union, which freed up military resources for use in a new jihad in Kashmir. This jihad, in turn, was made possible by the emergence of an indigenous uprising within the state as a result of Indian political malfeasance.79 Once the jihadis were organized, trained, armed, and unleashed, it is far from clear whether Pakistan could control the behavior and actions of every resulting jihadist organization.80 Consequently, although the number of attacks on India did multiply during the 1990s, it is difficult to establish a firm causal connection between the growth of Pakistani boldness and its gradual acquisition of a full-fledged nuclear weapons capability.

Second, India did respond with considerable force once its military planners realized the full scope and extent of the intrusions across the Line of Control. Despite the vigor of this response, India did exhibit restraint. For example, Indian pilots were under strict instructions not to cross the Line of Control in pursuit of their bombing objectives.81 They adhered to these guidelines even though they left them more vulnerable to Pakistani ground ªre.82 The Indian military exercised such restraint to avoid provoking Pakistani fears of a wider attack into Pakistan-controlled Kashmir and then into Pakistan itself. Indian restraint was also evident at another level. During the last war in Kashmir in 1965, within a week of its onset, the Indian Army horizontally escalated with an attack into Pakistani Punjab. In fact, in the Punjab, Indian forces successfully breached the international border and reached the outskirts of the regional capital, Lahore. The Indian military resorted to this strategy under conditions that were not especially propitious for the country. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister, had died in late 1964. His successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, was a relatively unknown politician of uncertain stature and standing, and the Indian military was still recovering from the trauma of the 1962 border war with the People’s Republic of China.83 Finally, because of its role in the Cold War, the Pakistani military was armed with more sophisticated, U.S.-supplied weaponry, including the F-86 Sabre and the F-104 Starfighter aircraft. India, on the other hand, had few supersonic aircraft in its inventory, barring a small number of Soviet-supplied MiG-21s and the indigenously built HF-24.84 Furthermore, the Indian military remained concerned that China might open a second front along the Himalayan border. Such concerns were not entirely chimerical, because a Sino-Pakistani entente was under way. Despite these limitations, the Indian political leadership responded to Pakistani aggression with vigor and granted the Indian military the necessary authority to expand the scope of the war. In marked contrast to the politico-military context of 1965, in 1999 India had a self-confident (if belligerent) political leadership and a substantially more powerful military apparatus. Moreover, the country had overcome most of its Nehruvian inhibitions about the use of force to resolve disputes.85 Furthermore, unlike in 1965, India had at least two reserve strike corps in the Punjab in a state of military readiness and poised to attack across the border if given the political nod.86 Despite these significant differences and advantages, the Indian political leadership chose to scrupulously limit the scope of the conflict to the Kargil region. As K. Subrahmanyam, a prominent Indian defense analyst and political commentator, wrote in 1993:.

The awareness on both sides of a nuclear capability that can enable either country to assemble nuclear weapons at short notice induces mutual caution. This caution is already evident on the part of India. In 1965, when Pakistan carried out its “Operation Gibraltar” and sent in infiltrators, India sent its army across the cease-fire line to destroy the assembly points of the infiltrators. That escalated into a full-scale war. In 1990, when Pakistan once again carried out a massive infiltration of terrorists trained in Pakistan, India tried to deal with the problem on Indian territory and did not send its army into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.87

Resource scarcity leads to cooperation, not war – empirically proven

Dalby 6 (Simon, Dept. Of Geography, Carleton University, "Security and environment linkages revisited" in Globalisation and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualising Security in the 21st Century, www.ntu.edu.sg/idss/publications/SSIS/SSIS001.pdf)

In parallel with the focus on human security as a necessity in the face of both natural and artificial forms of vulnerability, recent literature has emphasised the opportunities that environmental management presents for political cooperation between states and other political actors, on both largescale infrastructure projects as well as more traditional matters of wildlife and new concerns with biodiversity preservation (Matthew/Halle/Switzer 2002). Simultaneously, the discussion on water wars, and in particular the key finding the shared resources frequently stimulate cooperation rather than conflict, shifted focus from conflict to the possibilities of environmental action as a mode of peacemaking. Both at the international level in terms of environmental diplomacy and institution building, there is considerable evidence of cooperative action on the part of many states (Conca/Dabelko 2002). Case studies from many parts of the world suggest that cooperation and diplomatic arrangements can facilitate peaceful responses to the environmental difficulties in contrast to the pessimism of the 1990’s where the focus was on the potential for conflicts. One recent example of the attempts to resolve difficulties in the case of Lake Victoria suggests a dramatic alternative to the resource war scenarios. The need to curtail over-fishing in the lake and the importance of remediation has encouraged cooperation; scarcities leading to conflict arguments have not been common in the region, and they have not influenced policy prescriptions (Canter/Ndegwa 2002). Many conflicts over the allocations of water use rights continue around the world but most of them are within states and international disputes simply do not have a history of leading to wars.

No resource wars – empirics

Salehyan 7

[Idean, assistant professor of political science - University of North Texas, “The new myth about climate change,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story\_id=3922]

First, aside from a few anecdotes, there is little systematic empirical evidence that resource scarcity and changing environmental conditions lead to conflict. In fact, several studies have shown that an abundance of natural resources is more likely to contribute to conflict. Moreover, even as the planet has warmed, the number of civil wars and insurgencies has decreased dramatically. Data collected by researchers at Uppsala University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo shows a steep decline in the number of armed conflicts around the world. Between 1989 and 2002, some 100 armed conflicts came to an end, including the wars in Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. If global warming causes conflict, we should not be witnessing this downward trend.

# 2NC

## AT: State Fiat Bad

The States CP is the topic---jurisdictional questions are key to energy production debates

Kay, 12

(Senior Extension Associate with the Community & Regional Development Institute-Cornell Dept. of Sociology, “Energy Federalism: Who Decides?,” http://devsoc.cals.cornell.edu/cals/devsoc/outreach/cardi/programs/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=1071714)

**Questions about energy production** and consumption are acquiring renewed urgency in the 21st Century. Some **go to the heart of our nation’s system of federalism,** as an underlying but ever-present friction mounts over the way in which decision making power has been divided between central and more locally distributed political units. What is at stake? According to one author, “**the choice of regulatory forum often seems to determine the outcome of the controversy**. That may explain why Americans have traditionally **shed so much** metaphorical and genuine **blood deciding what are essentially jurisdictional disputes between governmental institutions.”**

A number of factors have raised these issues into greater prominence. Energy specific influences include the depletion of low cost oil, advances in energy extraction technology, and increased awareness of the link between climate change and energy consumption and production. Another element is the long standing but increasingly hardened absence of a broad based consensus over energy policy at the federal level, despite calls for such a policy that date back to at least the Nixon administration. These have been superimposed on shifting political trends in other areas, including the expanding national political divide. After the crest of federal adoption of new environmental legislation in the 1960’s and 1970’s, powerful and complex cross currents arose. Mostly “conservative” and anti- (or anti-“big”) government forces mobilized in the devolution, deregulation, privatization, and property rights movements.

In contrast, “progressive” movements evolved in response to increased globalization (of economic and environmental issues) and personalization (eg. of communications/information technology) by promoting global governance in some arenas and relocalization or local empowerment in others. Several energy examples being played out in New York State, as well as in other states and on the national stage, serve as useful and representative illustrations of the fundamental but insufficiently appreciated tensions raised. The first involves the spread of the controversial hydraulic fracturing technology that is used to extract oil and gas from “unconventional” reserves of shale and other rocks. The second and third involve the generation and distribution of electricity: where the authority to site electricity generating stations is vested, and who has the authority to site transmission lines that move electricity from their mostly rural points of extraction or generation to their mostly urban points of consumption. These are but a few among many examples that highlight the extent to which the proliferating threads of debate about energy federalism are being cinched into an increasingly dense tangle.

Turns decision-making—policy decisions lack meaning if they ignore the states’ role

Kay, 12

(Senior Extension Associate with the Community & Regional Development Institute-Cornell Dept. of Sociology, “Energy Federalism: Who Decides?,” http://devsoc.cals.cornell.edu/cals/devsoc/outreach/cardi/programs/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=1071714)

New Yorkers are “spilling blood” - in the metaphorical sense suggested above - over whether local, state or federal government should control the fate of hydraulic fracturing in NYS. Blood pressures have also risen over who should permit moderately sized electric generating facilities and control the siting of natural gas and electricity transmission corridors. Not infrequently, advocates who argue for or against federal or state or “home rule” in one context reflexively take the opposite position in another. This may make strategic sense in the heat of battle over specific policy decisions about particular energy technologies or fuels or sites. However, **a danger exists for** partisans and **policy makers who fail to lift their line of sight above the battlefield**. **Unless** principled **arguments about the benefits and costs of rebalancing federalism are considered**, the distribution of power and passion that lead to precedent and victory in one arena may well simply **set the stage for defeat in another.** Sovocool suggests that “marble cake” federalism is the best suited and most practical approach to energy policy making. Be that as it may, it should be evident that the claimed benefits of each approach he lists are more of a promise than a guarantee. The point of this paper is not to identify a universally preferred structure of federalism, but **to advocate that energy literacy incorporate basic governance principles**. This would require all involved to step back from the fray for a harder look at the implications of energy federalism for long term strategic concerns as well as short term tactical arguments.

The judge should be an independent policy analyst.

Their interpretation is incoherent – no one person is the federal government.

Sole decision maker is wrong and kills education

Rabe, 8

(Prof of Public Policy-Ford School at Michigan, “States on Steroids: The Intergovernmental Odyssey of American Climate Policy,” Review of Policy Research, Vol. 25, Issue 2, March)

Climate change has conventionally been framed as an issue that would be addressed by an international regime established through negotiation among nation-states. The experience of policy development in the decade following the signing of the Kyoto Protocol indicates that climate change also **needs to be examined as a challenge of multilevel governance. The increasingly central role of state governments** in American climate policy formation squares with recent experience in other Western democracies that share authority across governmental levels. This paper examines the American experience, considering factors that have contributed to a state-centric policy process and using that body of experience to assess competing strategic choices faced by individual states based on their mix of emission trends and policy adoption rates. In turn, the collective state experience allows for consideration of the varied political feasibility of competing climate policy tools that remain under active review in subnational, national, and international contexts. The paper concludes with a set of scenarios that explore different ways in which a state-centric system may be integrated with expanding involvement at the national level. Most scholarly and journalistic analysis presents the odyssey of climate change policy in the United States as if America was a unitary system of government. This leads to a familiar tale, whereby the federal government signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, spurned ratification four years later, and neither the Clinton nor subsequent Bush Administration and respective Congresses have been able to agree to anything beyond climate research funding and voluntary reduction programs. At the same time, conventional analysis has assumed that climate policy would entail bargaining and implementation among nations, culminating in a world climate regime. More than a decade after the signing of Kyoto, it is increasingly evident that climate policy is proving far messier than prevailing depictions had anticipated. The Kyoto process is in tatters, attributable not only to American disengagement but also to an inability of many ratifying nations to honor their commitments. This is reflected in numerous failures to approach pledged emissions reductions, as in the Canadian and Japanese cases, or to successfully implement national or multinational policies, as in the stumbles of the Emissions Trading Scheme in the European Union. There also continues to be enormous uncertainty about engagement by developing nations, at the very point where China is primed to eclipse the United States as the world's leading national source of greenhouse gases. But perhaps the biggest single surprise as climate policy continues to evolve is that in the American case and many others, it is becoming increasingly evident that **climate policy constitutes an issue of federalism** or multilevel governance. As the recent emergence of California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger as a claimant to the title of “world leader” in the development of far-reaching climate policy attests, individual units across different federal or multilevel governance systems may have more in common with one another in climate policy than they have with the neighboring units of their overall federation. Indeed, one can see stronger parallels between such jurisdictions as Connecticut and Sweden, Pennsylvania and Germany, New York and New South Wales, and North Carolina and Ontario than exists across many members of the same federation. This paper will focus primarily on the American case, considering more than a decade of state and federal policy experience and attempting to distill lessons that could guide future policy development. First, it will offer an overview of American subnational policy development, attempting to provide a review of the tapestry of policies that have been enacted over the past decade and some of the key factors that have led to such a robust state response in the absence of federal mandates or incentives. Second, this will lead to a consideration of the divergent paths taken by the 50 states, reflected in their carbon dioxide emission trends since 1990 and varied levels of climate policy development. This section will explore the unique contexts facing various states, particularly the differing strategic considerations for them (and for their representatives in Congress) as they consider unilateral policy steps or the possibility of federal policy in the 110th Congress and beyond. Third, the collective state experience offers some possible lessons for future policy development at either subnational or national levels. In particular, we will see that there appears to be a nearly inverse relationship between those policies that policy analysts tend to endorse as holding the greatest promise to reduce emissions in a cost-effective manner and the political feasibility of respective policy options. These patterns could offer significant lessons for the future of climate policy development, outlining both challenges and opportunities for future policy whether enacted at the single-state, multistate, or federal levels. Finally, we look ahead and consider alternative scenarios for future development of American climate policy, building on recent experience to anticipate possible next directions (Selin & VanDeveer, 2007).

CP key to neg strategy—prevents small sector affs.

States CP research key to effective policy design

Shobe, 12

(Director-Center for Economic and Policy Studies & Professor of Public Policy-UVA, “Rethinking Environmental Federalism in a Warming World,” January, http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP-12-04.pdf)

In the next section of the paper we describe **the tenets of environmental federalism** as it has developed in the economics literature and as it has been implemented in practice. We then develop a framework for what we call climate federalism to address the unique characteristics of ubiquitous greenhouse gas emissions as a purely global externality. Subnational levels of government **play a crucial role** in determining the infrastructure of our economy and the nature of social relations, which in turn affect the path of emissions. We argue that the **division of authority** in a federal state **has a very large effect on what** national **policies can and should be implemented**. The transmission of incentives within a federal system will determine whether all levels of government contribute effectively. The active involvement of various levels of government will also influence the local political economy of climate policy. **Any effective policy design must recognize both the constraints and the opportunities presented by a federal structure of government**. In many cases, little is known about the likely interactions among national and subnational strategies and policies.

Choice of the actor shapes every level of policy effectiveness

Shobe, 12

(Director-Center for Economic and Policy Studies & Professor of Public Policy-UVA, “Rethinking Environmental Federalism in a Warming World,” January, http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP-12-04.pdf)

Because energy is used in every aspect of economic activity, the large reductions in energy and fossil fuel use needed to meet reasonable emissions reduction goals, if implemented through direct national standards, would require an unprecedented involvement of the national government in state and local autonomy—an involvement that may easily run afoul of constitutional restrictions on the reach of national authority. The intrusiveness of national authority would certainly engender considerable political resistance as emissions reduction requirements became more stringent, which argues strongly for finding methods of implementing reductions that maximize local flexibility. **At every step, from the assignment of decisionmaking authority to policy design, implementation, and enforcement**, a national climate **policy will be shaped** by national, state, and local political interests and **on the relative value of centralized or decentralized institutional arrangements. Policy analysis has focused almost exclusively on national policy** and even on the need to harmonize climate policies across countries, implicitly assuming that the development and harmonization of climate policies at the subnational level would be mandated or guaranteed.

## AT: No 50 State

CP is real world---NGA acts together on energy issues

ENN, 1

(Environmental News Network, 8/17, Governors Want State, Local Input into National Energy Plans, Lexis)

The governors of the 50 states, 3 territories, and 2 commonwealths have adopted a comprehensive national energy policy emphasizing conservation.

At the closing session of the 93rd Annual Meeting of the National Governors Association last week in Providence, R.I., the governors sent a message to the White House that state and local authorities must have input into the nation's energy plans. "The policy sends a clear message that solving our nation's energy problems demand more conservation, especially utilizing renewable fuels like ethanol," said Iowa Gov. Thomas Vilsack, chairman of the association's Committee on Natural Resources. Ensuring "environmental quality" comes second in the list of 10 principles

## AT: Fed Backing Key

No need for fed backing—state support can bridge the commercialization gap

Sinclair, 10

(JD-Cornell & Executive Director of Clean Energy States Alliance, “Federal Climate and Energy Legislation and the States: Legislative Principles

and Recommendations for a New Clean Energy Federalism,” April http://www.cleanegroup.org/assets/Uploads/2011-Files/Reports/CEGCleanEnergyFederalismv3April2010.pdf)

As is so often the case, selected state funding mechanisms have **already demonstrated that new approaches for bridging the commercialization finance gap can have important results**. In many states, for example, agencies commit to build a strong industrial “cluster” around high growth technologies such as nanotechnology or life sciences research and commercialization. Similar programs could be envisioned **to spawn robust clean energy industrial clusters** across a variety of dedicated subsectors nationwide. Allocating allowance funds to support such programs, perhaps augmented with state matching funds, would be a natural extension of these already successful programs. Allowance funding also could be used in a number of ways to make progress toward other related efforts to help bridge the commercialization finance gap. At the national level, most programs, such as the current DOE Title 1703 effort and the proposed Clean Energy Deployment Administration, focus on the provision of attractively priced debt capital for emerging technologies. An important complementary program could be modeled on the Massachusetts Renewable Energy Trust program for equity investments. It made a key equity investment in the then struggling Evergreen Solar company. With the later commercial success of the firm, the Trust realized significant gains on its investment and was able to utilize these gains to fund its own expanded solar programs. Similar efforts could be envisioned in other states, perhaps spurred by match funding from federal emissions allowance resources. Such investments can hit key state priorities (protecting jobs and promoting state economic development), at the same time that they help push towards the nation’s goal of accelerated clean energy development. This approach is particularly interesting because it would have states work alongside local technology development firms to **aid them in “de-risking” an emerging technology as it moves towards commercialization. State agencies could also provide lower costs of capital and/or more forgiving performance requirements** than other, largely private investors in an investment, in return for the important economic development impacts that a successful new clean energy enterprise can provide.

State loan guarantees solve even in the absence of fed support

Sinclair, 10

(JD-Cornell & Executive Director of Clean Energy States Alliance, “Federal Climate and Energy Legislation and the States: Legislative Principles

and Recommendations for a New Clean Energy Federalism,” April http://www.cleanegroup.org/assets/Uploads/2011-Files/Reports/CEGCleanEnergyFederalismv3April2010.pdf)

Over the past decade, more than 20 states have established ratepayer-funded clean energy funds to support energy efficiency, renewable energy project deployment, or both in most cases. These programs have provided both technical assistance and **direct financial support** for a wide range of low carbon technologies and project sizes. And they have maintained the pace of clean energy innovation in an era when federal resources were scarce or non-existent. Clean energy funds often provide rebates to lower the upfront costs of off-the-shelf technologies—ranging from individual CFL light bulbs and Energy Star-rated appliances to commercial-scale solar photovoltaic and hot water systems. Many funds also offer focused grant solicitations to support larger projects, pre-commercial technologies and clean energy manufacturing. In addition, to multiply the impact of their funds and provide only the level of public financial support that clean energy projects need, a number of states have also established loan or investment programs. These programs combine lower rates of return and a greater ability to underwrite loans for renewable energy technologies. With the overwhelming percentage of the life cycle cost of a clean energy installation being embedded in its initial capitalization (since there are typically no fuel costs), such projects are inordinately sensitive to levels and cost of financial leverage, so such loan programs can be of particular value.

## AT: Investor Signal

Their evidence assume a patchwork of state policies—the CP standardizes them and sends a consistent signal.

[Providing the incentive is sufficient—reduces cost—1AC ev…]

State policies are a better signal for investors

Sinclair, 10

(JD-Cornell & Executive Director of Clean Energy States Alliance, “Federal Climate and Energy Legislation and the States: Legislative Principles

and Recommendations for a New Clean Energy Federalism,” April http://www.cleanegroup.org/assets/Uploads/2011-Files/Reports/CEGCleanEnergyFederalismv3April2010.pdf)

1. States should and will remain the laboratories of experimentation and innovation on technology and economic development because **most energy investment decisions are made at the state and/or local utility and customer level**. 2. State and local clean energy development decisions are **made closer to the markets, are often more politically durable and stable over time, and should be encouraged**. 3. There is no simple, standard or optimal clean energy program design and practice that will achieve carbon stabilization; instead, all states and local jurisdictions should be given adequate federal resources and assistance to create and implement a diverse portfolio of finance, technology, and policy tools to create the necessary fifty state programs to advance a clean energy future. 4. There are many existing, experienced and “best practice” state-based, clean energy institutions that deserve continued and expanded support for their decade-long successes in these areas. 5. States can develop **more nuanced and effective finance mechanisms that can leverage private sector development because they know their markets, their market players and their barriers to success**.

6. Bottom-up, distributed solutions that the states can provide have always proved the most responsive and nimble solutions that best respect the ever changing demands of locally regulated state energy investment decisions, which are the hallmark of the US energy sector. 7. States should be given express authority to enact climate and clean energy policy and laws that are more stringent and aggressive than the federal programs. Specific legislative principles and concepts should inform all recommendations regarding the role of states in future national climate and energy legislation. These overarching principles and concepts frame how the specific proposals made here should be envisioned and realized, and they address the core elements of this report: allowance funding for states, new state-based financing programs, and encouraging disruptive climate technology innovation. State Allowance Funding

For allowance funding to the states, Congress should: 1. Rely on the expertise of the existing state programs and agencies that have deployed clean energy over the last decade with tremendous success. 2. Defer to state expertise in the allocation or investment of allowance funding at the state level. 3. Provide states with significant flexibility and specific incentives to employ a broad portfolio of financing tools and strategies to accelerate clean energy deployment to reflect each state’s political and resource context. 4. Call on every state to seek out and develop, wherever possible, opportunities to leverage their emissions allocation-derived funding with associated private capital to the greatest extent possible. 5. Encourage coordination among states to follow best practices and develop effective, program investments based on the storehouse of experience that state clean energy programs offer. 6. Encourage states to use allowance funding to partner and pursue joint multistate clean energy projects and programs to reduce administrative costs and ensure coordinated technology commercialization activities across states and regions.

Viewed as more certain and predictable than the fed

Milford, 12

(President-Clean Energy Group, “Clean-Energy Finance to Beat Beltway Blues,” http://www.cleanegroup.org/blog/clean-energy-finance-to-beat-beltway-blues/)

As the country looks for new sources of clean energy finance while Congress remains paralyzed, we might have missed the most obvious funders that have been right under our noses for years. They are the public infrastructure finance agencies all over America that know how to raise capital at the scale needed in this sector. In turn, Congress and the Administration should look to new policies to support this emerging, state-based infrastructure financing trend.

Hundreds of billions of dollars are needed scale up renewable energy, energy efficiency and clean energy manufacturing support. To fill this gap, some are looking to the states, regions and localities, a return to federalism as an investment strategy. Federal gridlock reminds us again that **states have been the clean energy innovators**. State funds have raised and leveraged over $12 billion in clean energy investment in the last decade. And clean energy policy at the state level has been done on a relatively bipartisan basis, unlike in Washington. In this search for new forms of clean energy finance, a large group of state and local finance partners has been overlooked – the public authorities and other entities that do tax-exempt and taxable bond financing – a $3 trillion industry that has financed our nation’s infrastructure and public improvements, from bridges to hospitals to university expansion. In the U.S. over 50,000 state and local agencies help finance economic and community development. To date, these agencies have not been that active in clean energy, with the exception of a few projects; but they now want to aggressively move into clean energy financing. As to the capital they can raise, municipal bond issuers in March 2012 alone brought 1,196 deals to market worth $34.50 billion. That makes $78.3 billion in 2,927 deals in only the first three months of 2012. Let’s compare this scale to the possible declining federal support. Tax equity revenue generated for wind through the uncertain production tax credit was about $3.5 billion in 2011, while federal support for solar through various subsidies was about $2.5 billion. These amounts are what municipal bond authorities finance every few days, every week of the year, all across the country.

Now, these bonding instruments are not exact replacements for tax equity investment, but they could usher in new forms of finance strategies. These tools have the **potential to enlist major capital players such as institutional investors** and pension funds that look for **longer term, more predictable returns** from infrastructure bonds—creating a new investment profile for clean energy with **investors that finance at scale.** So far, there are some interesting emerging examples of bond financing in this space. In New Jersey, bond financing is being used to scale up solar installations though traditional public authority activity, now almost $200 million in investment. There are other models in energy efficiency finance and in other sectors that can be scaled up and replicated across the country.Oddly enough, until now no one has ever approached these public infrastructure finance agencies to work on clean energy in any systematic way across clean energy markets. Some good news is that the membership organization of these authorities, the Council of Development Finance Agencies or CDFA, has entered into a partnership with Clean Energy Group and state clean energy funds to begin to explore use of bonding tools to finance clean energy.

So we have a **unique financing situation for clean energy**. To grow a robust clean energy economy, we have a new group of financial players who know how to raise hundreds of billions of dollars for infrastructure investment. They are motivated to make significant new investments in clean energy using existing bond instruments. They have begun to make small moves into the clean energy space, with a handful of investments. They are interested in becoming major players. While the deadlock in Washington and the **uncertainty over federal support is** unwelcome, it need **not mean a death knell for** the clean **energy** industry. Instead, we have an opportunity to return to our federalist roots and look for our states, regions and local bonding agencies to begin to finance clean energy in the same way we scaled up the infrastructure that made America what it is today. At the same time, there are many ways for the Administration to help, from clarifying various tax exempt rules to favor clean energy bonds to considering other support mechanisms that put the states in the financing lead. Congress too has a role to play to create a more bottom up, federalist financing strategy for clean energy. At the very least, this new state-based policy conversation around infrastructure finance should begin now, to begin to shape a new clean energy investment strategy that does not rely so much on the whims of Washington.

Empirics

Milford, 10

(President-Clean Energy Group, “Innovation to Infrastructure: Clean Energy without Cap and Trade,” November, http://www.cleanegroup.org/assets/Uploads/InnovationtoInfrastructureCEGPaper11.10.10final.pdf)

Given this reality and the historical trends of state leadership in financing energy projects, the future of energy policy will not reside in Washington, if it ever did. Instead, **states will be central to any clean energy transformation in the U**.**S**. State clean energy funds — now in over 20 states with others implementing an array of clean energy programs — are the clean energy experts. State policies and programs are now the **main driving force for clean energy progress** in this country, because states view clean energy as a foundation of their environmental and economic development strategies. The most recent data show that between 1998 and 2009, states, through their own funds, have supported over 72,000 new, clean energy projects across the United States. To bring these projects to market over this eleven year period, states have invested $2.7 billion of their own public funds, almost a half a billion dollars in state funds in 2009 alone. This is separate and apart from any federal stimulus funds, a remarkable demonstration of the states’ commitment to clean energy as part of their future economic development strategies. This public investment, in turn, **leveraged at least $9.7 billion of additional private and public investment**. In other words, in the last decade, states have been responsible for generating more than $12 billion of public and private investment in clean energy — a truly sensational public investment success story.

## at: thorium exports solve

Supply side approaches don’t solve—countries want ENR capabilities and aren’t motivated by economics

Perkovich, vice president for studies and director – Nuclear Policy Program @ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ‘7

(George, “Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security, 2007 Report Card on Progress,” June)

Non–nuclear weapon states such as Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, and South Africa do not want to get shut out of an enrichment market that will grow if nuclear energy enjoys a renaissance. Other states resent being denied access to additional nuclear technologies when they feel that they have not benefited from nuclear cooperation as it is, and the nuclear weapon states have not delivered on the original disarmament bargain. The United States and other countries have fallen back to a **voluntary approach**, premised on the argument that the market for nuclear fuel supplies has always worked well for states that fulfill their NPT obligations. To bolster confidence in the market, new proposals are being offered to back up existing arrangements with terms so reassuring that countries will choose not to undertake the expense of indigenous enrichment and reprocessing. The gentle, modest spirit of this voluntary approach is widely welcomed. But it would likely attract the states that do not pose a security threat in any case, while those interested in enriching uranium for export or in hedging or breaking their nonproliferation commitments would choose to ignore them. Perhaps in principle everyone has their price, and if the United States and other potential fuel-service providers offered fuel and spent-fuel services at low enough prices and high enough reliability levels, all potential hedgers would recommit themselves to eschew enrichment and reprocessing. And if prices were low enough and spent-fuel services attractive enough, perhaps the international community would agree that any state that launched development of indigenous fissile material production capabilities instead of relying on international fuel services would be casting a shadow of doubt over the peacefulness of its nuclear program. But realistically, as long as there was no rule being violated, the international community would merely watch and wait until the state broke an established rule, probably at a stage much closer to the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

#### Fails—won’t accept nuclear waste

McGoldrick 11

Fred McGoldrick, CSIS, spent 30 years at the U.S. State and Energy Departments and at the U.S. mission to the IAEA, negotiated peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements with a number of countries and helped shape the policy of the United States to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, May 2011, Limiting Transfers of Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology: Issues, Constraints, Options, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/MTA-NSG-report-color.pdf

**The political obstacles to offering broad-based cradle-to-grave services will be formidable**. With the possible exception of Russia, no major supplier country is currently in a position to provide power reactor fuel to other countries with a firm commitment to take back the used nuclear fuel. France and the UK accept foreign spent fuel for reprocessing but require the return of waste and recovered material to the sending state—although if a market for MOX emerges, they could convert such material to MOX and sell it to utilities in other European states. No other countries have yet been willing to accept other states’ spent nuclear fuel.

Nobody will adopt our safety standards

Ferguson 10—President of the Federation of American Scientists. Adjunct Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and an Adjunct Lecturer in the National Security Studies Program at the Johns Hopkins University. (Charles, Testimony before the House Committee on Science and Technology for the hearing on Charting the Course for American Nuclear Technology: Evaluating the Department of Energy’s Nuclear Energy Research and Development Roadmap, <http://gop.science.house.gov/Media/hearings/full10/may19/Ferguson.pdf>)

Request the Obama administration to provide a strategy for international sales of SMRs that only meet high standards of safety, security, and proliferation resistance. Achieving adoption of these criteria will likely face resistance from states that have available small and medium power reactors that fall short in one or more of the standards.

He acknowledges that all his safety recommendations would never fly

Ferguson 10—President of the Federation of American Scientists. Adjunct Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and an Adjunct Lecturer in the National Security Studies Program at the Johns Hopkins University. (Charles, Testimony before the House Committee on Science and Technology for the hearing on Charting the Course for American Nuclear Technology: Evaluating the Department of Energy’s Nuclear Energy Research and Development Roadmap, <http://gop.science.house.gov/Media/hearings/full10/may19/Ferguson.pdf>)

Considering proliferation resistance, their preferred approach is to eliminate the need for on-site refueling of the reactor and to provide for waste disposal away from the client country. By eliminating on-site refueling the recipient country would not need to access the reactor core, where plutonium—a weapons-usable material—resides. By removing the reactor core after the end of service life, the recipient country would have access to fissile material contained in the used fuel. Both of these proposed criteria present technical and political challenges.

Ideally, the reactor would have a core life of 30 or more years. Such reactors are presently in use in the U.S. Navy. But the problem from a proliferation standpoint is that these reactors are fuelled with weapons-grade uranium. Thus, if a client country seized such a reactor and if it could break into the reactor’s core, it could have bomb-usable fissile material. While the transfer of U.S. naval reactor technology is not advisable, perhaps there are other methods to achieve lifetime cores. A Japanese group of researchers, for example, examined a conceptual design for a small lead-bismuth cooled fast neutron reactor that computer simulations indicate the fuel could last for 30 years.11

**Fast reactors, however, have had a history of poor performance** and have generally cost much more than thermal reactors.12 Only Russia presently has a large commercial fast reactor in operation although China, Japan, and India have active fast reactor programs. A more promising method for lifetime cores may involve thorium, a fertile element that can be used to make fissile fuel. Depending on the reactor design, thorium-based fuels offer favorable proliferation-resistant properties. Concerning long-lived cores, a research group has recently shown via computer simulations that thorium-type small reactors may not need refueling until after 10 years and further design may result in even longer lived cores.13

But these concepts will likely require **many years of development** before they are ready for the commercial market. And although thorium reactors, in principle, look promising, the **dominant paradigm** has been to favor uranium-fuelled reactors.14 Marketplace inertia and comfort level with the uranium-based technologies have erected barriers to different concepts. Moreover, the small reactor designs that are further along in development do not have long-lived cores.

Even if proliferation-resistant lifetime core reactors were available, the other challenge is to provide a proliferation-resistant pathway to nuclear waste management. As indicated by Brown and Hasberger, the ideal would be to remove as soon as possible the used fuel from the recipient country. But then the question is: What country will accept the used fuel and the other radioactive materials? No country has opened up a permanent repository for domestically generated nuclear waste. However, Russia has accepted used fuel from client states under the condition that Russia reprocesses the used fuel to extract plutonium for reuse. Also, Britain and France have reprocessed used fuel from client states under the condition that high level waste is returned to the clients.

Another option is to send used fuel from SMRs and perhaps other reactors fueled under a fuel leasing agreement to territory designated as an international zone. Such a zone would have to have rigorous security. In addition to making the difficult decision as to where to site this zone, supplier states would also have to reach agreement on whether to just store the used fuel or to reprocess it in order to recycle the plutonium and other fissionable materials. The political obstacles to creating this option for used fuel disposal appear formidable.

## uniqueness—weak 123 good

#### Weaker 123 agreements sufficient to solve prolif—plan pushes it to far collapsing them undermine nonprolif

McGoldrick 10

Fred McGoldrick, CSIS, spent 30 years at the U.S. State and Energy Departments and at the U.S. mission to the IAEA, negotiated peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements with a number of countries and helped shape the policy of the United States to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, 11/30/10, The U.S.-UAE Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: A Gold Standard or Fool’s Gold?, http://csis.org/files/publication/101130\_McGoldrick\_USUAENuclear.pdf

Finally, while we have many ways to promote nonproliferation objectives, one important nonproliferation tool that we cannot afford to lose is our ability to enter into peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements with other countries. This capability, among others, has allowed the United States to promote widespread acceptance of nonproliferation norms and restraints, including international safeguards and physical protection measures and the NPT. U.S. agreements for cooperation in peaceful nuclear energy with other states require strict nonproliferation controls that go beyond those of other suppliers, such as consent rights on reprocessing, enrichment, and storage of weapons-usable materials subject to our agreements. They also provide a framework for establishing invaluable person-to-person and institution-to-institution contacts and collaboration that can help advance our nonproliferation objectives.

If we insist that our cooperating partners forswear enrichment and reprocessing, we risk losing out on nuclear sales and the jobs that go with them—no small matter in current economic conditions. But more to the point of this article, **we cannot afford to lose this important nonproliferation tool by trying to impose conditions that others will reject**. Requiring the UAE conditions in future U.S. peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements will further erode, if not shut out, the United States from the international nuclear arena and deprive it of the influence that peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements provide in strengthening the global nonproliferation regime. This so-called gold standard may turn out to be fool’s gold.

#### Weak agreements are better than none for prolif

NEI 12

Nuclear Energy Institute, June 2012, H.R. 1280:

A Misguided Attempt to Control Enrichment and Reprocessing Technologies, http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/newplants/whitepaper/white-paper--hr-1280-a-misguided-attempt-to-control-enrichment-and-reprocessing-technologies

The irony of H.R. 1280 and its companion report is that the E&R restrictions they advocate as a condition for U.S. nuclear cooperation would constitute a clear setback to the bill’s stated goal of nuclear nonproliferation. **If the U.S. insists on conditions for nuclear trade that buyers will reject and that other suppliers don’t impose, the U.S. will lose nuclear cooperation agreements as** important **tools for promoting U.S. nonproliferation** interests. Without these agreements, the United States cannot maximize its influence—including consent rights over used nuclear fuel and retransfer rights over exported items and technology—as a partner and supplier in developing new nuclear infrastructure.

**Failure to conclude nuclear cooperation agreements** with Jordan, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia and other countries **with emerging civil nuclear programs silences the U.S. as a voice in shaping the direction of these programs**. Among the lost opportunities are the ability to share best practices on nonproliferation and safety, and to detect potential illicit activities.

#### Even weak 123s solve prolif—plan undermines leadership

NEI 12

Nuclear Energy Institute, June 2012, Nuclear Energy Industry Position On Controls over Enrichment and Reprocessing Technologies, www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/newplants/whitepaper/nuclear-industry-position-on-enrichment-and-reprocessing

Section **123 agreements provide critical nonproliferation benefits**. These include significant commitments to safeguard materials, to prevent material diversion for non-peaceful purposes, and to provide adequate security for materials. The agreements provide for U.S. consent rights over the enrichment, reprocessing and retransfer of U.S. materials. This means that obligations are attached to these materials which include stringent nonproliferation assurances that these materials will not contribute to weapons programs. **Proliferation has never resulted from transfers overseas as a result of Section 123 agreements**.

A unilateral and inflexible requirement that countries forswear their rights to E&R as a condition for a Section 123 agreement would have the **perverse effect of undermining U.S. nonproliferation interests by significantly reducing the number of countries willing to engage in** civil nuclear **commerce with the U**nited **S**tates. Other nuclear suppliers like Russia, France, Japan and South Korea stand ready to engage in nuclear commerce with other countries, irrespective of whether they have concluded a 123 agreement with the United States. As a result, the net effect of refusing to conclude 123 agreements with countries that are unwilling to renounce E&R would be to encourage them to do business with other suppliers, thereby foregoing the economic and national security benefits of commercial nuclear engagement.

When a country like the UAE is willing, in the context of a Section 123 agreement with the United States, to renounce its rights under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to develop E&R, the United States should, of course, stand ready to include that commitment in the Section 123 agreement. But when a country intent on developing a commercial nuclear power industry makes clear that it is unwilling to renounce these rights in a bilateral agreement with the United States, it would be self-defeating to forego the nonproliferation and other benefits to the United States of concluding a Section 123 agreement with that country.

## ---Turns Prolif

#### More restrictions are poison pill for nuclear cooperation agreements—world will shift to other markets

NEI 12

Nuclear Energy Institute, June 2012, H.R. 1280:

A Misguided Attempt to Control Enrichment and Reprocessing Technologies, http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/newplants/whitepaper/white-paper--hr-1280-a-misguided-attempt-to-control-enrichment-and-reprocessing-technologies

The U.S. no longer plays a dominant role in the international nuclear market and, therefore, is in no position to insist that other countries renounce E&R capabilities. GAO figures show that, between 1994 and 2008, the U.S. share of global nuclear reactor and component exports fell from 11 percent to 7 percent, and fuel exports dropped from 29 percent to just 10 percent.5 Many countries still value U.S. cooperation agreements as a means to gain access to U.S. nuclear technology and trade privileges, and for the ability to handle U.S.-flagged items. But unlike in decades past, alternative sources of reactors, components and fuel are widely available.

The age of U.S. primacy on the international nuclear market is long over, and H.R. 1280’s **insistence that countries renounce E&R** as a condition of a U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement **amounts to a poison pill: no other sup- pliers demand such a concession**, and these suppliers will be the ones that benefit from nations that consider the signing away of E&R rights too steep a price for U.S. collaboration.

Countries Will Not Match the UAE’s Bilateral Commitment

The H.R. 1280 report points to the legally binding commitment by the UAE to forswear E&R in its bilateral nuclear cooperation agree- ment as the proper standard for all U.S. nu- clear cooperation agreements. But the UAE example involves a unique set of economic and political circumstances, and **if the U.S. insists** that **all partners for nuclear cooperation follow suit**, it is likely that **few, if any, additional nuclear cooperation agreements will be negotiated**.

As the H.R. 1280 report acknowledges, the UAE had already voluntarily adopted a national policy to renounce E&R before negotiations for a U.S.-UAE 123 agreement began. The UAE’s decision was likely made easier by the fact that E&R facilities in the UAE would not be profitable in the absence of plans to construct a large reactor fleet. And the UAE does not possess domestic uranium reserves that could supply facilities to enrich fuel for international markets.

The UAE’s acquiescence on E&R should be viewed in its unique context: in 2006, the U.S. Congress had expressed a strong lack of confidence in UAE, and blocked the UAE Government-owned firm Dubai Ports World from operating U.S. ports. Two years later, the UAE was understandably concerned that Congress would ask hard questions about its intentions in the course of considering the U.S.-UAE 123 agreement, and the renunciation of E&R in that agreement helped mute criticism. This set of circumstances is unlikely to be repeated in other cases.

#### Leads to backlash—perceived as discriminatory

NEI 12

Nuclear Energy Institute, June 2012, H.R. 1280:

A Misguided Attempt to Control Enrichment and Reprocessing Technologies, http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/newplants/whitepaper/white-paper--hr-1280-a-misguided-attempt-to-control-enrichment-and-reprocessing-technologies

Recent **initiatives to deny E&R technologies** to countries that do not possess them **have provoked** **strong objections** from nuclear supplier and consumer countries alike. In 2004, NSG members and the broader international community lodged forceful complaints against President Bush’s proposal for the NSG to provide fuel assurances only to states that forswear E&R and refrain from transferring E&R technologies to any state that does not possess them. Many **nations consider such efforts discriminatory** and in violation of sovereign rights specifically guaranteed by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to nonnuclear-weapons states. Uranium producer countries like Australia and Canada have also objected on grounds that they may one day wish to enrich the uranium they produce.

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which includes many prospective partners for U.S. nuclear cooperation, has strongly opposed restrictions on E&R in various international fora, including the IAEA Board of Governors and NPT Review Conferences. The final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference affirmed the inalienable rights of parties to use nuclear energy peacefully “without jeopardizing its policies for international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle choices.” The document asserted a legitimate right, particularly among developing countries, to full access to nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes. The document called on parties to “eliminate in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty.”

#### Zero aff

Grossman 12

Elaine Grossman, National Journal, 5/4/12, Nuclear Trade Reform Bill Faces Hostile Lobbying, as Obama Team Renews Policy Review, Lexis

The legislation "threatens thousands of American jobs and billions of dollars in exports by U.S. companies," said Alex Flint, NEI senior vice president for governmental affairs. "**Without a Section 123 agreement, there are no contracts, no supply relationships, and waning U.S. influence on nuclear nonproliferation or nuclear safety**."

Flint also asserted that "with the sole exception of United Arab Emirates, U.S. requests that potential trading partners forswear enrichment and reprocessing activities have been publicly rejected as an infringement of their sovereign rights."

## ---AT: Plan Makes Pressure Effective\*\*\*

#### No effective pressure—other supplies will fill-in post-US demands

McGoldrick 10

Fred McGoldrick, CSIS, spent 30 years at the U.S. State and Energy Departments and at the U.S. mission to the IAEA, negotiated peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements with a number of countries and helped shape the policy of the United States to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, 11/30/10, The U.S.-UAE Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: A Gold Standard or Fool’s Gold?, http://csis.org/files/publication/101130\_McGoldrick\_USUAENuclear.pdf

As noted earlier, some have characterized the U.S.-UAE agreement as a “gold standard” and as a model for future U.S. agreements. **The U**nited **S**tates clearly **needs to take a leadership role** in preventing the risks of the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies. **But we should remember** the adage that **if you are trying to lead, you should, “Look over your shoulder** now **and** then to **be sure someone’s following you**.” (Henry Gilmer). The widespread opposition to the Bush proposal in the NSG demonstrates that none of the other major nuclear suppliers are willing to ban transfers of enrichment and reprocessing to countries that do not already have such capabilities. While suppliers have been cautious about exporting such technologies and most consumers have shown no immediate interest in acquiring these capabilities, there is no evidence that nuclear-weapon states, nonnuclear- weapon states, industrialized countries, or developing nations support the notion that countries in good nonproliferation standing should be pressed to undertake a legal obligation to abstain from enrichment and reprocessing. **Other suppliers are simply not going to impose the UAE model on their cooperating partners**.

#### Pressure doesn’t solve—just causes a shift to other suppliers

McGoldrick 11

Fred McGoldrick, CSIS, spent 30 years at the U.S. State and Energy Departments and at the U.S. mission to the IAEA, negotiated peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements with a number of countries and helped shape the policy of the United States to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, May 2011, Limiting Transfers of Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology: Issues, Constraints, Options, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/MTA-NSG-report-color.pdf

With a number of other potential suppliers available, states with nuclear power ambitions have **no compelling economic incentive** to conclude any kind of an understanding with the United States in which they would forswear E&R **or even indicate their intention** to abstain from such technologies. While some countries may value the conclusion of a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States as a way to validate their nonproliferation credentials, U.S. attempts to insist on language in such agreements that would bar E&R **may simply lead states to choose other suppliers**.

Neither the NSG as a whole nor individual suppliers like France, Russia or South Korea are likely require their customers to foreswear or forgo their rights to enrichment and reprocessing. As suppliers, these countries can offer E&R services commercially without transferring the technology to the recipient customer state and without requiring political commitments that would go against NPT article IV rights. Thus it is highly questionable whether the U.S.- UAE peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement will serve as a model for other agreements in the Middle East or elsewhere.

It remains to be seen whether it will be possible to resurrect the 1992 Joint Declaration for the two Koreas. The difficulty of convincing North Korea to eliminate its capabilities may be so great that it may not have a major influence on decisions about enrichment or reprocessing/ pyroprocessing in South Korea.

Continuing to pursue this approach may exacerbate perceptions that the United States is seek- ing to take away the rights of some countries who are parties in good standing to the NPT.

## ---Turns Prolif—Proliferator

#### Makes country’s decision to prolif more likely

Lewis 12

Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation, 8/1/12, It's Not as Easy as 1-2-3, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/01/it\_s\_not\_as\_easy\_as\_1\_2\_3?page=full

Before joining the Obama administration, Deputy Energy Secretary Daniel Poneman outlined a very similar approach in a 2004 article written with three colleagues titled "Making the World Safe for Nuclear Energy." A wag might note that a better goal is making nuclear energy safe for the world, but no matter. The best way to prevent the spread of ENR technology, Poneman and his colleagues argued, was to rely on "market forces … supplemented by government-to-government assurances that fuel services to users not be withheld for any reason other than a material violation of international non-proliferation commitments." This approach was decidedly all carrot and no stick because, Poneman and his colleagues warned, trying to dictate who is allowed to enrich and reprocess and who is not "will almost certainly ignite debates and passions that are more likely to strangle than to promote the prospects of this regime." **Attempting to impose ENR restrictions**, they concluded, **might actually spur proliferation**.

## ROK Link Extn

#### Shift to restrictive 123 agreements undermines US-ROK nuclear agreement

McGoldrick 9

Fred McGoldrick, Center for US-Korea Policy, Asia Foundation, November 2009, New US-ROK Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/McGoldrickUSROKCUSKP091130.pdf

**Most likely to complicate** the **negotiation** of a new U.S.-ROK peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement is the implementation of a U.S. right to consent to South Korea’s reprocessing of used nuclear fuel from its nuclear program.1

[Footnote1: There have also been reports that the ROK may also consider the acquisition of enrichment technology, a step that could also conflict with U.S. nonproliferation policy. See “Seoul considering options to improve energy efficiency” *Korean Herald*, July 8, 2009.]

#### Scuttles the ROK agreement

McGoldrick 11

Fred McGoldrick, CSIS, spent 30 years at the U.S. State and Energy Departments and at the U.S. mission to the IAEA, negotiated peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements with a number of countries and helped shape the policy of the United States to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, May 2011, Limiting Transfers of Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology: Issues, Constraints, Options, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/MTA-NSG-report-color.pdf

**The U**nited **S**tates **will** likely **face resistance if it seeks to require that the R**epublic **o**f **K**orea **forswear enrichment and reprocessing** as it negotiates a new peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with the Republic of Korea (ROK) to replace the existing agreement that expires in 2014. The ROK is expected to press the United States to provide the same kind of advance, long-term consent to reprocessing12 used nuclear fuel subject to the new U.S.-ROK agreement as it has given in the cases of its agreements with Japan and EURATOM. However, the U.S. has long opposed reprocessing on the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher stated in written answers to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in connection with her nomination hearings, that, “the existence of a reprocessing plant in the Republic of Korea would be inconsistent with the commitments made in the 1992 Joint Declaration.” That declaration provides that: “The South and the North shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.” Now the North Koreans have both technologies. The South Koreans, on the other hand, are likely to press the point that North Korean reprocessing and enrichment, and its nuclear weapons tests, both constitute a violation of the two countries’ 1992 denuclearization agreement. This, they will argue, renders null and void the South Korean commitment in that agreement not to possess enrichment or reprocessing capabilities and further that the ROK has the right to engage in reprocessing as long as it is abiding by its NPT obligations. The ROK will also likely make the case that it has the right to engage in reprocessing as long as it is abiding by its NPT obligations.

#### Undermines negotiations

McGoldrick 10

Fred McGoldrick, spent 30 years at the U.S. State and Energy Departments and at the U.S. mission to the IAEA, negotiated peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements with a number of countries and helped shape the policy of the United States to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, 2010, U.S.-ROK Nuclear Nonproliferation Cooperation, http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/McGoldrickNonprolifAbstract.pdf

One issue that is most likely to complicate the negotiation of a new U.S.-ROK peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement is the implementation of a U.S. right to consent to the reprocessing of used nuclear fuel from the South Korean nuclear program. A major objective for South Korea in negotiating a new agreement with the U.S. will most likely be to obtain U.S. consent on an advance, long-term basis both to reprocessing or pyroprocessing of used nuclear fuel subject to the agreement and to the use of the recovered plutonium and other transuranics in fast reactors. However, the U.S. has long approached the issue of reprocessing with great caution.

## 2nc no exports

Bureaucratic overlap means export deals barely ever get approved—AND foreign governments prop up nuclear export markets which means US industry doesn’t get business-that’s NEI.

Multiple barriers overwhelm the aff

NEI, National Export Initiative, September ‘10

(“REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE NATIONAL EXPORT INITIATIVE: The Export Promotion Cabinet’s Plan for Doubling U.S. Exports in Five Years”)

Expand opportunities for the U.S. nuclear energy industry. Nuclear energy is also an integral part of a clean energy economy. While nuclear power already provides approximately 20 percent of U.S. electricity, wider deployment of civil nuclear reactors in the United States and around the world could provide the massive amount of electricity needed to power the global economy, while substantially reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The U.S. nuclear industry can expand its manufacturing base significantly as it takes advantage of the growing global demand for nuclear power. But the nuclear sector also faces substantial obstacles, including difficulties in obtaining new plant financing, workforce gaps, the lack of a global nuclear liability regime, supply chain constraints, licensing and regulatory-related delays, uncertainty with respect to disposal of spent fuel, and formidable state-owned competition.74

No licensing standards, insufficient government support, and bureaucracy

ITA, U.S. Department of Commerce International Trade Administration, February ‘11

(“The Commercial Outlook for U.S. Small Modular Nuclear Reactors,” [http://trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/public/@tg\_ian/@nuclear/documents/webcontent/tg\_ian\_003185.pdf](http://trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/public/%40tg_ian/%40nuclear/documents/webcontent/tg_ian_003185.pdf))

Just like exporters of traditional large reactors, U.S. SMR vendors would face intense foreign competition, primarily by state-owned or state-aligned enterprises. Foreign nuclear companies have enjoyed **significant** government **support**, ranging from direct government ownership and management to favorable financing, industrial coordination, and support for manufacturers. Some U.S. suppliers also regard the lack of international licensing standards as an obstacle to expanding their business. They say that obtaining regulatory approval in one market does not provide any “leg up” in obtaining approval in another market, which means that the process has to be repeated for each country that the supplier wants to sell to. However, **it is difficult to see how international licensing standards could be developed or enforced** given the unique national circumstances that factor into a regulator’s licensing decisionmaking. The discretion of these national regulators cannot be compromised. More generally, **U.S. suppliers** also **say** that the lack of regulatory infrastructure in many countries interested in SMR technology **is a problem** for ensuring the safe and secure deployment of the technology. This challenge also applies to larger, traditional reactors. Nuclear liability is a significant concern for SMR and large reactor designers. Currently, no global nuclear liability regime exists. This situation not only complicates commercial arrangements, but also means that, in the unlikely event of a nuclear incident, claims for damages would be the subject of protracted and complicated litigation in the courts of many countries against multiple potential defendants with no guarantee of recovery. The IAEA-sponsored Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC) is the only international instrument that provides the basis for establishing a global regime, including countries with and without nuclear power facilities. U.S. nuclear suppliers have stated that the implementation of CSC is a necessity for pursuing a major nuclear export program.

Tons of export issues—subsidies to the domestic industry don’t solve

Lieberman, senior government relations specialist – American Physical Society, 11/15/’11

(Jodi, “Nonproliferation, Congress, and Nuclear Trade: Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose,” CSIS Proliferation Prevention Program Policy Perspective)

**Current Environment**

Last year, GAO conducted another study targeted on the principal challenges facing U.S. nuclear industry. In its November 2010 report, GAO identified, based on discussions with the Departments of Commerce, State, and Energy, the NRC, as well as U.S. industry and NEI, the following challenges facing the U.S. nuclear industry:31

 A decline in domestic manufacturing capabilities. The nuclear industry, according to a January 2010 International Trade Administration (ITA) report, had “atrophied” to the point where the United States is a net importer, not exporter, of nuclear components and materials;

 Increased international competition from foreign state-owned suppliers, which are heavily subsidized and supported by their governments. Foreign firms receive strong financial and political support through direct government ownership and subsidies, including government support for bids through high-level advocacy or by providing customers additional services and expertise. For example, the French and Korean presidents traveled to UAE to advocate for their country’s respective bids to build new reactors there. French officials told GAO that their government’s philosophy on nuclear cooperation includes providing a package of regulatory, financial, and technical assistance to partner countries developing their civilian nuclear power programs. Further, some of the largest markets for nuclear goods and services—France, Russia, and the Republic of Korea (ROK)—have significant barriers to U.S. industry entry because of the presence of a state-owned competitor;

Lack of a global liability regime. The United States has ratified the Convention on Supplemental Compensation, but the convention has not come into force yet. Without a global liability regime in force that channels liability for accidents at a nuclear facility to the operator, industry fears they may be held liable as suppliers. Foreign state-owned companies do not face the same problem because they are indemnified by their government. U.S. industry cannot obtain insurance sufficient to cover their potential liabilities resulting from a potential nuclear reactor accident overseas.

 DOE process for authorizing transfer of U.S. nuclear technology and technical information overseas (Part 810 authorizations). According to industry, **DOE regulations are outdated, lack clarity, and place U.S. companies at a competitive disadvantage.** According to a foreign country official interviewed by GAO, buying fuel from the United States is not “client-friendly.”

That GAO report also concluded that the Commerce Department Civil Nuclear Trade Initiative is not as effective as it could be in promoting U.S. nuclear exports because it has limited resources, no dedicated funding, and is organized and run by one staff member working at 80 percent time and two staff members working at 75 percent and 50 percent time. In that same report, GAO noted that no federal agency collects or tracks information on exports that would have enabled them to fully assess the amount and value of exports facilitated by U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements. However, using available information from the UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database (Comtrade), GAO found that the U.S. share of global nuclear exports had decreased significantly over the last 15 years. This decline included sales of sensitive nuclear material: $1.8 billion in 1994 versus $1.6 billion in 2008 (or a decline from 29 percent of the market to 10 percent of the market over that period). Moreover, while the value of U.S. nuclear reactor exports, major components, and equipment increased between 1994 and 2008, the global share of such exports had declined from 11 percent to 7 percent.

GAO concluded that U.S. industry already faces significant challenges in export competitiveness. If laws seeking to tighten nonproliferation restrictions somehow made U.S. products less attractive to buyers overseas, there would be little data to establish a direct link.

Conclusion

The competitiveness of the U.S. nuclear industry has been a concern for the last decade, and there have been several U.S. government **programs to support** new nuclear **construction in the United States.** There have been fewer efforts to support U.S. nuclear exports akin to those employed by other countries. Without significant government support and subsidies, U.S. nuclear export competitiveness will continue to face serious challenges.

## desal fails

#### It’s a ridiculous net negative because it costs more than squo desal

Smith et al 11

<http://ifg.org/pdf/Nuclear_Roulette_book.pdf>

GAR SMITH—Editor Emeritus of Earth Island Journal, a former editor of Common Ground magazine, a Project Censored Award-winning journalist, and co-founder of Environmentalists Against War. ERNEST CALLENBACH—Author of Ecotopia, Ecotopia Emerging, Ecology: A Pocket Guide and was coauthor of EcoManagement. For many years, he edited film books and natural history guides for the University of California Press. AILEEN MIOKO-SMITH—Founder and Director of Green Action in Kyoto and is a leading anti-nuclear campaigner in Japan. JERRY MANDER—Founder, Distinguished Fellow, International Forum on Globalization

By 2025, 3.5 billion people will face severe fresh-water shortages. Nuclear proponents groping for justifications to expand nuclear power have argued that the waste heat from power plants can provide a “cheap and clean” solution to the inherently costly process of removing salt from seawater. Desalination plants (there are 13,080 worldwide, mostly oil- and gas-fired and mostly in wealthy desert nations) already produce more than 12 billion gallons of drinkable water a day.153 The first nuclear desalinator was installed in Japan in the late 1970s and scores of reactor-heated desalination plants are operating around the world today. But nuclear desalination is another False Solution.The problem with atomic water-purifiers is that using heat to treat seawater is an obsolete 20th-century technology.Thermal desalination has given way to new reverse osmosis systems that are less energy intensive and 33 times cheaper to operate.154 Nuclear desalination advocates claim that wind, solar, and wave power aren’t up to the task while new low-temperature evaporation technology may be able to produce highpurity water at temperatures as low as 122° Fahrenheit.155 Promoting reactors as a solution to the world’s water shortage is especially ludicrous since nuclear power plants consume more water than any other energy source.156

#### Water TECH FIXES compound the distribution problem

Barlow 9

Blue Covenant: The Global Water Crisis and the Coming Battle for the Right Maude Victoria Barlow (born May 24, 1947) is a Canadian author and activist. She is the National Chairperson of The Council of Canadians, a citizens’ advocacy organization with members and chapters across Canada. She is also the co-founder of the Blue Planet Project, which works internationally for the human right to water. Maude chairs the board of Washington-based Food & Water Watch, is a founding member of the San Francisco–based International Forum on Globalization, and a Councillor with the Hamburg-based World Future Council. In 2008/2009, she served as Senior Advisor on Water to the 63rd President of the United Nations General Assembly. She has authored and co-authored 16 books. Maude Barlow is the recipient of 11 honorary doctorates as well as many awards, including the 2005 Right Livelihood Award (known as the “Alternative Nobel”), the Citation of Lifetime Achievement which she received at the 2008 Canadian Environment Awards, the 2009 Earth Day Canada Outstanding Environmental Achievement Award, the 2009 Planet in Focus Eco Hero Award, and the 2011 EarthCare Award, the highest international honour of the Sierra Club (U.S.).

High Technology Solutions Are Part of the Problem Where they are taking proactive steps to alleviate the water crisis, many nations and the international financial institutions are promoting the high-technology solutions of dams, diversions and desalination. While it is difficult to imagine a world without these fixtures, in the long run, all are part of the problem and they will not provide the answers we need. On the contrary, these expensive technologies all have the potential to do great harm to the ecosystems in which they are placed, further exacerbating the global water crisis.

## impacts

#### Best empirical evidence disproves their speculation

Weinthal and Rengosh 11

 Routledge Handbook of Global Public Health

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Weinthal's experience lies in environmental policy, international environmental institutions, the political-economy of the resource curse, water cooperation and conflict, and environmental security.

 By the end of the twentieth century, it was thus widely assumed that water scarcity would be a driver of conflict between nation states, especially in the arid regions of MEN A. World leaders such as former UN secretary-general, Boutros Boucros-Ghali, famously warned, 'the next war in the Middle East will be fought over water, not polities' (Vesilind 1993: 53). The Economist, furthermore, predicted in 1999 that \*[w]ith 3,5 billion people affected by water shortages by 2050, conditions are ripe for a century of water conflicts'. The empirical evidence, however, has yet to support such prophecies. Rather, when it comes to water resources at the interstate level, cooperation is much more ubiquitous. The historical record shows that states rarely if ever go to war over water; in parsing more than 1,800 state-to-state water interactions in trans-boundary basins between 1946 and 1999, Wolf et al. (200.3) demonstrated that none have led to formal war.

# 1NR

## link

Their evidence conflates support for nuclear power and incentives for increased production—the plan won’t garner support

Mariotte, 2012

Michael Mariotte, Executive Director of Nuclear Information and Resource Service, 6-5-2012, “Nuclear Power and Public Opinion: What the polls say,” http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/06/05/1097574/-Nuclear-Power-and-Public-Opinion-What-the-polls-say

Conclusion 1: The public does NOT want to pay for new nuclear power. It IS willing to pay for renewable energy.

This one is a slam dunk.

New nuclear reactors are simply too expensive for utilities to build with their own assets. Nor are banks willing to lend money for most nuclear projects; they’re considered too risky given the long history of cost overruns, defaults, cancellations and other problems. Thus, the only two means of financing a new reactor are to either get money from taxpayers, through direct federal loans or taxpayer-backed loan guarantees, or from ratepayers in a few, mostly Southern states, which allow utilities to collect money from ratepayers before reactors are built—a concept known either as “early cost recovery” or Construction Work in Progress (CWIP).

ORC International (which polls for CNN,, among others) has asked a straightforward question for the past two years (March 2011 and February 2012) in polls commissioned by the Civil Society Institute: “Should U.S. Taxpayers Take on the Risk of Backing New Nuclear Reactors?” The answer? Basically identical both years: 73% opposed in 2011, 72% opposed in 2012.

Maybe using the work “risk” skews the poll, you think? So ORC also asked, “Do you favor or oppose shifting federal loan guarantees from nuclear energy to clean renewables?” The answer was basically the same: 74% said yes in 2011, 77% in 2012 with 47% “strongly” holding that opinion both years.

A third poll conducted by ORC for Civil Society Institute in March 2012 asked this question:

“Utilities in some states are allowed to charge electricity ratepayers for “Construction Work in Progress” for new power plants. This means that ratepayers – instead of the companies – pay for construction of new nuclear reactors and other major power plants before any electricity ever reaches customers, thereby lowering the financial risks to shareholders. Knowing this, which of the following statements about “Construction Work in Progress” most closely reflects your view?”

The answer: fully 80% opposed CWIP.

Most pollsters have not asked similar questions; interestingly though, Rasmussen did in May 2012 for an undisclosed client. Their question: “The government is providing billions in loan guarantees to help the development of new nuclear plants. Would that money be better spent on the development of alternative new energy sources?” Unfortunately, Rasmussen did not publicize the results and hid them behind a paywall, which we were not inclined to pursue. But if anyone has access to that, we’d love to know what Rasmussen found.

Conclusion 2: Americans do not think nuclear power is “clean” energy, and still don’t want to pay for it.

Jumping back to ORC International, their March 2012 poll found this:

About two out of three Americans (66 percent) – including 58 percent of Republicans, 65 percent of Independents, and 75 percent of Democrats -- agree that the term “‘clean energy standard’ should not be used to describe any energy plan that involves nuclear energy, coal-fired power, and natural gas that comes from hydraulic fracturing, also known as ‘fracking.’”

and this:

About three out of four Americans (73 percent) agree that “federal spending on energy should focus on developing the energy sources of tomorrow, such as wind and solar, and not the energy sources of yesterday, such as nuclear power.” Fewer than one in four (22 percent) say that “federal spending on energy should focus on existing energy sources, such as nuclear, and not emerging energy sources, such as wind and solar.”

Meanwhile, the New York Times in May reported on a Harvard/Yale poll (also behind a paywall), conducted in 2011 but released in May 2012, that found that Americans are willing to pay an average of $162/year more for clean energy than they are paying now—an average 13% increase in electric bills. But when clean energy was defined as including nuclear power or natural gas, that support plummeted.

This is consistent with findings over the past decade, which have shown that nuclear power has typically ranked well below renewable energy sources, especially solar and wind, in public opinion, at times battling with coal for least-favorite U.S. energy source.

A March 2012 Gallup poll found that 69% of Americans support spending more government money on solar and wind power—with majorities among Democrats (84%) and Republicans (51%) alike. But support for “expanding the use of nuclear power” barely received a majority (52%) and then only due to Republican support: 64% of Republicans supported that idea, only 41% of Democrats.

Conclusion 3: On new reactors, how one asks the question matters.

Gallup and the Nuclear Energy Institute ask the same question: “Overall, do you strongly favor, somewhat favor, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose the use of nuclear energy as one of the ways to provide electricity in the U.S.?”

This question doesn’t really get to the issue of support for new nuclear reactors, although NEI typically tries to spin it that way. Although a question of support for current reactors wasn’t asked in any recent poll we saw, the public traditionally has been more supportive of existing reactors than new ones, and the question above could easily be interpreted as support for existing reactors, or even simple recognition that they exist. The results may also be skewed by the pollsters throwing nuclear in as “one of the ways,” without a context of how large a way.

Nonetheless, despite asking the same question, Gallup and NEI can’t agree on the answer. NEI, for example, in November 2011 asserted that 28% of the public strongly favors nuclear power with an additional 35% somewhat in favor. NEI found only 13% strongly opposed and another 21% somewhat opposed. A May 2012 NEI poll did not publicly break down the numbers into strongly vs somewhat, but claimed a similar 64-33% split between support for nuclear power and opposition.

Gallup, asking the same question in March 2012, found a narrower split. A smaller number was strongly in favor (23%, a drop of 5%) and a larger number strongly opposed (24%, increase of 3%)—overall an 8-point anti-nuclear swing among those with strong opinions. Those in the middle were 34% somewhat favor vs 16% somewhat opposed. The 2012 numbers were slightly worse for nuclear power than the identical question asked in March 2011, just before Fukushima.

But other polls suggest that Gallup and NEI may be asking the wrong question. For example, the LA Times reported on a Yale-George Mason University poll in April 2012 that found that support for new nuclear power had dropped significantly, from 61% in 2008 to 42% today.

Even Rasmussen in its May 2012 poll found that only 44% support building new reactors. That was good news for Rasmussen since it found that only 38% oppose them, with a surprising 18% undecided (surprising because no other poll we saw had such a high undecided contingent for any nuclear-related question).

Meanwhile the March 2012 ORC International poll found that:

“Nearly six in 10 Americans (57 percent) are less supportive of expanding nuclear power in the United States than they were before the Japanese reactor crisis, a nearly identical finding to the 58 percent who responded the same way when asked the same question one year ago. Those who say they are more supportive of nuclear power a year after Fukushima account for well under a third (28 percent) of all Americans, little changed from the 24 percent who shared that view in 2011.”

But perhaps the most telling, and easily the most interesting, poll comes from a March 2012 poll from the Yale Project on Climate Change Communications. Participants were asked, “When you think of nuclear power, what is the first word or phrase that comes to your mind?”

29% of those polled said “disaster.” Another 24% said “bad.” Only about 15% said “good” and that was the only measurable group that had anything positive to say. That poll also found that, “…only 47 percent of Americans in May 2011 supported building more nuclear power plants, down 6 points from the prior year (June 2010), while only 33 percent supported building a nuclear power plant in their own local area.”

Conclusions

Americans are not exactly wild about the idea of building new nuclear reactors. Polls asking the question different ways arrive at different results; at the lowest common denominator it is safe to say the country is divided on the issue. But Americans clearly don’t want to pay for construction of new reactors. And the reality is that no utility wants to or even can spend its own money building new reactors—they’re just too expensive. Congress, State legislatures and Public Service Commissions would do well to heed that warning, especially since it crosses all party and political lines.

It is also clear that the American public does not see nuclear power as a “clean energy” source (nor, for that matter, “clean” coal or natural gas fracking). Congressional or state efforts to include these technologies in a “clean energy standard” or a clean energy bank concept are bound to fail.

Unpopular post-Fukushima

YPCC, 3-11

2012, Yale Project on Climate Change Communication, “The Climate Note,” http://environment.yale.edu/climate/the-climate-note/nuclear-power-in-the-american-mind/

How did American images of nuclear power change in response to the Fukushima disaster? Using two separate nationally representative surveys – one conducted in June of 2005 and the second in May of 2011 – we asked Americans to provide the first word or phrase that came to mind when they thought of “nuclear power.” We then categorized these free associations to identify the most common images of nuclear power in the American mind.

Compared to 2005, Americans in May of 2011 were significantly more likely to associate nuclear power with images of “disaster” (including many direct references to Fukushima) or “bad” (including bad, dangerous, and scary). And as described in our report: Public Support for Climate & Energy Policies, only 47 percent of Americans in May 2011 supported building more nuclear power plants, down 6 points from the prior year (June 2010), while only 33 percent supported building a nuclear power plant in their own local area.

Fukushima was a “focusing event” – a crisis that generates massive media and public attention and ripple effects well beyond the disaster itself. The meltdown and release of radioactive materials at Fukushima directly impacted the air, water, soil, people, and biota in the immediate vicinity of the facility, but the ripple effects of the disaster cascaded through broader Japanese society, causing, among other things, the prime minister to pledge the end of nuclear power in Japan. Further, the ripples, like the tsunami that triggered the crisis, ricocheted across the world, leading the German government to pledge the phase-out of nuclear power, reviews of nuclear plant safety in other countries, and shifts in global public opinion about nuclear energy, including a shift in the meaning of "nuclear power" in the American mind.

Obama strategy proves—he won’t take credit for the plan

Levine, 9-7

Greg Levine, contributing editor and former managing editor of Fire Dog Lake, former strategic consultant and lobbiest, 9-7-2012, “Obama Drops Nuclear from Energy Segment of Convention Speech,” http://capitoilette.com/2012/09/07/obama-drops-nuclear-from-energy-segment-of-convention-speech/

Yes, despite a concrete acknowledgement two minutes later that “climate change is not a hoax” and “droughts and floods and w**i**ldfires are not a joke,” the president still brags of opening “millions of new acres for oil and gas exploration in the last three years”–and then he promises to open more. And, yes, there is still a reference to the fool’s anthracite, “clean coal,” this time incongruously grouped with “wind and solar.” But notice what is not there–not in this section, not in the paragraph about the climate, not anywhere in the entire 38-minute speech.

President Obama no longer promises to “safely harness nuclear power”–that likely would have sounded like a cruel joke in a world now contaminated by the ongoing Fukushima disaster–but beyond that, he does not promise anything about nuclear power at all. There was no platitude, no carefully crafted signal to the industry that has subsidized much of Obama’s political career, no mention of nuclear power whatsoever.

That is not to say that the entire 2012 Democratic National Convention was a nuclear-free zone. A few hours before the president took the stage at the Time Warner Cable Arena, James Rogers, co-chair of the Charlotte host committee, and oh, by the way, CEO of Duke Energy, stepped to the lectern and endorsed Obama’s “all of the above” energy “strategy” (they keep using that word; I do not think it means what they think it means):

We need to work even harder toward a future of affordable, reliable and cleaner energy. That means we need to invest heavily in new zero-emission power sources, like new nuclear, wind and solar projects, as well as new technologies, like electric vehicles.

Well, if you are looking for a future of affordable, reliable and cleaner energy, you need look no further than nu–wait, what? If you are looking for those three features in an energy future, it is hard to imagine a worse option than the unsustainably expensive, chronically unreliable and dangerously dirty nuclear power plant. And, as has been discussed here many times, nuclear is not a zero-emission source, either. The massive carbon footprint of the nuclear fuel lifecycle rivals coal, and that doesn’t even consider the radioactive isotopes that facilities emit, even when they are not encountering one of their many “unusual events.”

But the CEO of the Charlotte-based energy giant probably has his eyes on a different prize. Rogers, who has been dogged by questions about a power grab after Duke’s merger with Progress Energy and his lackluster performance as fundraiser-in-chief for the DNC, sits atop a company that operates seven US nuclear power plants, and is partners in a plan to build two new AP1000 reactors in Cherokee County, South Carolina.

That last project, which is under active review by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, awaiting a combined construction and operating license, is one of a small handful of proposed new nuclear facilities currently scrambling for financing. The South Carolina plant, along with a pair of reactors in Georgia, two slated for a different site in South Carolina, and possibly one more in Tennessee, represent what industry lobbyists like to call the “nuclear renaissance.”

But completion of any of the above is nowhere close to guaranteed, and even if some of these reactors are eventually built, none will be able to generate even one kilowatt of commercial power until years after President Obama completes his sought-after second term.

Which, if you really care about America’s energy future, is, of course, all for the better. As even James Rogers noted in his speech (and he gets props for this):

 [W]e cannot lose sight of energy efficiency. Because the cleanest, most efficient power plant is the one we never have to build.

That Duke’s CEO thought to highlight efficiency is interesting. That President Obama, with his well-documented ties to the nuclear industry, chose not to even mention nuclear power is important.

In the wake of Fukushima, where hundreds of thousands of Japanese have been displaced, where tens of thousands are showing elevated radiation exposure, and where thousands of children have thyroid abnormalities, no one can be cavalier about promising a safe harnessing of the atom. And in a world where radioisotopes from the breached reactors continue to turn up in fish and farm products, not only across Japan, but across the northern hemisphere, no one can pretend this is someone else’s problem.

Obama and his campaign advisors know all this and more. They know that most industrialized democracies have chosen to shift away from nuclear since the start of the Japanese crisis. They know that populations that have been polled on the matter want to see nuclear power phased out. And they know that in a time of deficit hysteria, nuclear power plants are an economic sinkhole.

And so, on a night when the president was promised one of the largest audiences of his entire campaign, he and his team decided that 2012 was not a year to throw a bone to Obama’s nuclear backers. Obama, a consummate politician, made the decision that for his second shot at casting for the future, nuclear power is political deadweight.

Environmentalists believe the plan trades off with renewables

Sheppard, 2010

Kate Sheppard, staff writer, 2-4-2010, “Obama's Nuclear Giveaway,” Mother Jones, http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2010/02/obamas-nuclear-giveaway

Environmental groups warn that if the Obama administration sinks large sums into nuclear power, it will come at the expense of other energy sources that are both cheaper and more effective at combating pollution. In a 2009 study, economist Mark Cooper, senior fellow at the Institute for Energy and the Environment at Vermont Law School, found that building and operating 100 new nuclear reactors—as some Republicans have advocated—would cost $1.9 trillion to $4.1 trillion more over the life of the reactors than generating the same amount of electricity from renewable energy and energy efficiency measures. Investing the same amount in renewable energy by 2030 would cut at least twice as much carbon pollution, according to a study by Environment America.

## Impact ov

#### Relations collapse causes a shooting war – that’s taaffe

#### Highest probability—spike in relations causes war

Miller, assistant professor of international security studies – National Defense University, 12/16/’11

(Paul, <http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/16/how_dangerous_is_the_world_part_ii>)

China in 2011 is even more clearly a danger equal to or greater than the danger it posed during the Cold War.  We went through two phases with China:  from 1950 to 1972 the United States and China were declared enemies and fought to a very bloody stalemate in the Sino-America battles of the Korean War, but the overt hostility was less dangerous because of China's crippling economic weakness.  From 1972 to 1989, the U.S. and China lessened their hostility considerably, but China's power also began to grow quickly as it liberalized its economy and modernized its armed forces.  In other words, in phase one, China was hostile but weak; in phase two, more friendly but also more powerful. We have never faced a China that was both powerful and hostile.

That is exactly the scenario that may be shaping up.  China's economic and military modernization has clearly made it one of the great powers of the world today, including nuclear weapons, a ballistic-missile capability, and aspirations for a blue-water navy.  At the same time, Chinese policymakers, like their Russian counterparts, continue to talk openly about their intent to oppose American unipolarity, revise the global order, and command a greater share of global prestige and influence.  There are several flashpoints where their revisionist aims might lead to conflict:  Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, the South China Sea, etc.  And U.S. relations with China are prone to regular downward spikes (as during the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989, the 1996 cross-straits crisis, the accidental embassy bombing in 1999, the EP3 incident in 2001, the anti-satellite missile test in 2007, and the current trade and currency dispute, to say nothing of our annual weapons sales to Taiwan).  A militarized conflict with China is more likely today, with greater consequences, than at almost any point since the Korean War.

#### Independently, increased pressure on China destroys relations—key to NK prolif, disease, Asia war, and terrorism—solves every extinction risk

Hachigian, senior fellow – Center for American Progress, ‘10

(Nina, “The US-China Expectations Gap: An Exchange,” *Survival*, Volume 52, Issue 4, August, p. 67 – 86)

We find ourselves at a transitional moment in the global order. China, long a rising power, has now arrived on the world stage. The United States, for two decades the sole global superpower, is reeling from the global economic downturn and entangled in two difficult wars. Meanwhile, global threats like the economic crisis, global warming and nuclear proliferation only grow more intense.

These shifts in the international environment raise some major questions. To what extent do shared global challenges push the United States and China toward shared responsibility? What considerations will spur them to join or lead other nations in collective action? What are the signs that China is ready to help solve global problems? What are the signs that the United States is genuinely ready to share leadership? What will be the consequences if US and Chinese foreign policies fail to coordinate on matters of shared concern?

The White House under President Barack Obama has outlined the contours of a national security paradigm that differs substantially from its predecessor. It is clear to the president's political allies and detractors alike that he approaches foreign policy not in terms of asserting America's unparalleled might, but of seeking common cause on shared global challenges. In our age of security interdependence, the White House realises that cooperation with pivotal powers like China is vital to resist threats - terrorism, nuclear proliferation, pandemics, economic crises, global warming - that can harm Americans where they live. In other words, the extent to which China helps solve global problems has very tangible consequences for ordinary Americans, affecting the frequency and severity of hurricanes they experience, the quality of their jobs, or the degree of protection they enjoy against avian flu and rogue nuclear states such as North Korea.

Washington and Beijing have framed US-China relations as a positive, constructive and comprehensive relationship that provides a basis for partnership and shared responsibility on the key global issues of our time. For this approach to truly contribute toward international peace and prosperity, however, China has to become more active in forging collective responses to global challenges, and the United States has to accept China's greater influence over those responses. The stakes are high; if Beijing and Washington fail to cooperate, progress will falter and the consequences could be disastrous.

#### Disease causes extinction

Keating, 9

(Deputy Web Editor-Foreign Policy, 11/13, “The End of the World, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/11/13/the\_end\_of\_the\_world?page=full)

How it could happen: Throughout history, plagues have brought civilizations to their knees. The Black Death killed more off more than half of Europe's population in the Middle Ages. In 1918, a flu pandemic killed an estimated 50 million people, nearly 3 percent of the world's population, a far greater impact than the just-concluded World War I. Because of globalization, diseases today spread even faster - witness the rapid worldwide spread of H1N1 currently unfolding. A global outbreak of a disease such as ebola virus -- which has had a 90 percent fatality rate during its flare-ups in rural Africa -- or a mutated drug-resistant form of the flu virus on a global scale could have a devastating, even civilization-ending impact. How likely is it? Treatment of deadly diseases has improved since 1918, but so have the diseases. Modern industrial farming techniques have been blamed for the outbreak of diseases, such as swine flu, and as the world’s population grows and humans move into previously unoccupied areas, the risk of exposure to previously unknown pathogens increases. More than 40 new viruses have emerged since the 1970s, including ebola and HIV. Biological weapons experimentation has added a new and just as troubling complication.

#### NK prolif causes nuclear war – it turns and outweighs their impact which is only about the SOUTH

Allison, Professor of Government @ Harvard, ‘10

(Graham, "Nuclear Disorder: Surveying Atomic Threats," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 89, Issue 1, p. 74-85, Jan/Feb)

THE GLOBAL nuclear order today could be as fragile as the global financial order was two years ago, when conventional wisdom declared it to be sound, stable, and resilient. In the aftermath of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, a confrontation that he thought had one chance in three of ending in nuclear war, U.S. President John F. Kennedy concluded that the nuclear order of the time posed unacceptable risks to mankind. "I see the possibility in the 1970s of the president of the United States having to face a world in which 15 or 20 or 25 nations may have these weapons," he forecast. "I regard that as the greatest possible danger." Kennedy's estimate reflected the general expectation that as nations acquired the advanced technological capability to build nuclear weapons, they would do so. Although history did not proceed along that trajectory, Kennedy's warning helped awaken the world to the intolerable dangers of unconstrained nuclear proliferation. His conviction spurred a surge of diplomatic initiatives: a hot line between Washington and Moscow, a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, a ban on nuclear weapons in outer space. Refusing to accept the future Kennedy had spotlighted, the international community instead negotiated various international constraints, the centerpiece of which was the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Thanks to the nonproliferation regime, 184 nations, including more than 40 that have the technical ability to build nuclear arsenals, have renounced nuclear weapons. Four decades since the npt was signed, there are only nine nuclear states. Moreover, for more than 60 years, no nuclear weapon has been used in an attack. In 2004, the secretary-general of the un created a panel to review future threats to international peace and security. It identified nuclear Armageddon as the prime threat, warning, "We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the nonproliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation." Developments since 2004 have only magnified the risks of an irreversible cascade. The current global nuclear order is extremely fragile, and the three most urgent challenges to it are North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan. If North Korea and Iran become established nuclear weapons states over the next several years, the nonproliferation regime will have been hollowed out. If Pakistan were to lose control of even one nuclear weapon that was ultimately used by terrorists, that would change the world. It would transform life in cities, shrink what are now regarded as essential civil liberties, and alter conceptions of a viable nuclear order. Henry Kissinger has noted that the defining challenge for statesmen is to recognize "a change in the international environment so likely to undermine a nation's security that it must be resisted no matter what form the threat takes or how ostensibly legitimate it appears." The collapse of the existing nuclear order would constitute just such a change - and the consequences would make nuclear terrorism and nuclear war so imminent that prudent statesmen must do everything feasible to prevent it. THE NUCLEAR CASCADE SEVEN STORY LINES are advancing along crooked paths, each undermining the existing nuclear order. These comprise North Korea's expanding nuclear weapons program, Iran's continuing nuclear ambitions, Pakistan's increasing instability, al Qaeda's enduring remnant, growing cynicism about the nonproliferation regime, nuclear energy's renaissance, and the recent learning of new lessons about the utility of nuclear weapons in international affairs. Most of the foreign policy community has still not absorbed the facts about North Korean developments over the past eight years. One of the poorest and most isolated states on earth, North Korea had at most two bombs' worth of plutonium in 2001. Today, it has an arsenal of ten bombs and has conducted two nuclear weapons tests. It is currendy harvesting the plutonium for an 11th bomb and restoring its reactor in Yongbyon, which has the capacity to produce a further two bombs' worth of plutonium a year. In addition, Pyongyang has repeatedly tested long-range missiles that are increasingly reliable, has proliferated nuclear technology (including the sale of a Yongbyon-style reactor to Syria), and may be developing a second path to nuclear weapons by building a facility to enrich uranium. From the perspective of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, two questions jump off the page. First, does Kim Jong Il imagine that he could get away with selling a nuclear weapon to Osama bin Laden or Iran? The fact that he sold Syria a plutonium-producing reactor suggests that he does. Second, what are the consequences for the npt if one of the world's weakest states can violate the rules of the regime with impunity and defy the demands of the strongest states, which are those that are charged with its enforcement? Already, North Korea's nuclear advances have triggered reflections in Seoul, Tokyo, and other regional capitals about options that were previously considered taboo. Although Japan's political culture is unambiguously against nuclear weapons, in 2002 then Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi demonstrated how quickly that could change when he observed publicly, "It is significant that although we could have them, we don't." And because Japan has a ready stockpile of nearly 2,000 kilograms of highly enriched uranium and a well-developed missile program (for launching satellites), if Tokyo were to conclude that it required a credible nuclear deterrent of its own, it could adopt a serious nuclear weapons posture virtually overnight.

## XT – Romney Bashes China

#### Currency manipulation’s key

Palmer 12

(Doug, Romney would squeeze China on currency manipulation-adviser, , 3/27/2012 p. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/28/us-usa-romney-china-idUSBRE82Q0ZS20120328)

Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney is looking at ways to increase pressure on China over what he sees as currency manipulation and unfair subsidy practices, a Romney campaign adviser said on Tuesday. "I think he wants to maximize the pressure," Grant Aldonas, a former undersecretary of commerce for international trade, said at a symposium on the future of U.S. manufacturing. Aldonas served at the Commerce Department under Republican President George W. Bush. Romney, the front-runner in the Republican race to challenge President Barack Obama for the White House in November, has promised if elected he would quickly label China a currency manipulator, something the Obama administration has six times declined to do. That would set the stage, under Romney's plan, for the United States to impose countervailing duties on Chinese goods to offset the advantage of what many consider to be China's undervalued currency. Last year, the Democratic-controlled Senate passed legislation to do essentially the same thing. However, the measure has stalled in the Republican-controlled House of Representatives, where leaders say they fear it could start a trade war, and the Obama administration has not pushed for a House vote on the currency bill. The U.S. Treasury Department on April 15 faces a semi-annual deadline to declare whether any country is manipulating its currency for an unfair trade advantage. The department, under both Democratic and Republican administrations, has not cited any country since 1994, when China was last named. Asked if Romney was serious about declaring China a currency manipulator, Aldonas answered: "He is."

#### Worst trade war ever!

Shedlock 12

(Mish, a registered investment advisor representative for SitkaPacific Capital Management. Sitka Pacific is an asset management firm whose goal is strong performance and low volatility, regardless of market direction, interviewed by James Stafford @ OilPrice, “Is Global Trade About To Collapse? Where are Oil Prices Headed? A Chat with Mish” Wed, 25 July 2012, http://oilprice.com/Interviews/Global-Trade-Likely-to-Collapse-if-Romney-Wins-Interview-with-Mike-Shedlock.html)

Oilprice.com: In regards to presidential elections, how do you think energy will fare under Obama and under Romney? Which sectors will benefit, and which will suffer?

Mish: Mitt Romney has declared that if he’s elected he is going to label China a currency manipulator and increase tariffs on China across the board. That's something that I believe he might be able to do by mandate. If he's elected and he does follow through, I think the result will be a global trade war the likes of which we have not seen since the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act compounded problems during the Great Depression. Simply put, I think that global trade will collapse if Romney wins and he follows through on his campaign promises.

#### Vowed for the first day in office

Hon 12

(Chua Chin – US Bureau Chief, “No repeat of Nixon's audacious state visit; Few believe US, Chinese leaders have latitude to stage similar move today” February 20, 2012, The Straits Times)

In the US, the growing partisan rancour over China policy was captured in a perfect 'split-screen moment' when Mr Xi was feted last Tuesday by the Obama administration, only to be attacked the next day by a ferocious broadside from Republican presidential hopeful Mitt Romney. 'We must forthrightly confront the fact that the Chinese government continues to deny its people basic political freedoms and human rights... A nation that represses its own people cannot ultimately be a trusted partner in an international system based on economic and political freedom,' Mr Romney wrote in an op-ed that appeared on the Wall Street Journal's website last Wednesday night. The article came just hours after the Chinese leader addressed top lawmakers and businessmen in Washington. A day earlier, Mr Xi had also met President Barack Obama and his top Cabinet officials in the White House. Mr Romney went as far as to call Mr Obama 'a near supplicant to Beijing' and warned that a China 'that is a prosperous tyranny will increasingly pose problems'. Over-the-top rhetoric on China is nothing new in American politics. What is striking about the latest criticisms is that they did not emerge from the political fringe but came instead from a mainstream political figure like Mr Romney, whose background as a highly successful venture capitalist and former governor of Massachusetts puts him firmly in the centre of the American establishment. The Obama administration was much more restrained, but did not shy away from publicly criticising China amid the diplomatic niceties either. As the cameras rolled to record their first-ever meeting in the Oval Office last Tuesday, Mr Obama pointedly reminded Mr Xi that Beijing must play by the rules of the road in global trade and economics. Hours later at a formal luncheon held at the State Department in Mr Xi's honour, US Vice-President Joe Biden raised eyebrows by launching into a strongly worded critique of China's 'deteriorating' human rights record and its recent decision to veto a United Nations resolution against Syria. 'If an American vice-president went to China and had been treated to that kind of lecture, the White House press corps would have forced him to say something in response and it would have been a spiral downward,' said Mr Douglas Paal, a veteran Asia hand who has served in several US administrations. Mr Xi chose to bite his tongue, with conventional wisdom here suggesting that the Chinese leaders are sufficiently familiar with the election-year demands on American politicians to know when to ignore the heated rhetoric. While there is an element of truth to that, such reasoning runs the risk of underestimating the genuine anger and frustration with China that has been brewing in the US political and business establishment in recent years. For instance, US legislation aimed at punishing China for its currency policy - long dismissed as political theatre - has been clearing one notable threshold after another. Last October, the Senate passed such a currency Bill with a 63-35 margin, marking the first time such legislation has cleared the upper Chamber. Though the Bill has since languished in the lower legislative Chamber, a Romney victory in November could well revive it**. The Republican presidential front runner has vowed to label China a currency manipulator on** his first day in office **if he wins the White House.** 'There are some US-China issues in the campaign rhetoric **that are real.** This is not just people trying to get votes,' noted Mr Richard Bush, director of the Centre for North-east Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. 'There is a dimension of it where candidates **are raising serious** concerns about China's behaviour.' For now, there is no way to tell how Mr Xi feels about his treatment in the US, or how it might affect the way he handles bilateral ties in the future when he has fully assumed power. In fact, little is known about his personal views on the broad range of issues surrounding US-China ties. In his public comments in the US, he has mostly stuck to Beijing's standard talking points. He also steered well clear of the American media, avoiding even the established public affairs programmes that would have given him a serious platform to talk about the state of bilateral relations and where things are headed. The few occasions where he tried to show a personal side occurred at tightly scripted events that were unlikely to register with a general audience. For instance, his attempt at recounting a story about how he helped an elderly American widow reconnect with the Chinese childhood home of her late husband took place in the staid surroundings of a hotel ballroom filled with businessmen and officials. The tight leash on Mr Xi stems from the murky rules surrounding elite Chinese Communist Party politics, where the uncertainties surrounding leadership succession and the obsession with political precedence keep younger leaders like him under wraps for impractically long periods of time. For instance, it has been apparent to political observers since late 2007 that Mr Xi will be the one to eventually succeed current Chinese President Hu Jintao at a major party congress later this year. But the lack of official recognition of this impending change, plus the constant chatter about ongoing power struggles, meant that the younger leader could not be put on a plane to Washington in the intervening years. By all accounts, Mr Xi's visit was strictly bound by the precedence set by Mr Hu a decade ago when a similar leadership transition was percolating in Beijing. Back in 2002, months before Mr Hu was due to take over from outgoing leader Jiang Zemin, he made a trip to the US that outsiders saw as a 'final confirmation' of his imminent ascension. Mr Xi appears to be following in the exact same steps, even though the demands on US-China relations and the stakes involved have vastly grown. As Dr Henry Kissinger, the elder US statesman who played a pivotal role in opening relations with China, put it in a recent speech: 'If we work together, common solutions will emerge. If we differ, the world will be forced to choose between conflicting approaches, **which can only undermine the need for a cooperative relationship**.' Experts like Mr Bush of Brookings say Beijing has to find a way to get younger leaders like Mr Xi to engage with the US and other powers at an earlier stage. But there are no signs that such changes are on the cards any time soon, to say nothing of a repeat of the audacious move 40 years ago that shook the world.

#### Also reinstates mexico city and stops funding one child – turns their overpop internal link

Drezner 12

(Daniel, professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, “Romney: Year One” MAY 25, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/25/romney\_year\_one?page=full)

Just for fun, however, what if all those campaign words did matter? What if President Romney had to implement every foreign policy campaign promise he's ever made in every foreign-policy white paper, op-ed, campaign statement, or random utterance that came from his campaign? What would the first year of a Romney presidency look like when it met the real world?

The editors of Foreign Policy thought that would be a fun little thought experiment, and they've been keenly aware that I have paid close attention to Romney's foreign policy musings. So, at their request, here's what the first year of a Romney administration would look like for world affairs.

DAY 1: The first day of a Romney presidency brings two major shifts in foreign policy. First, Romney announces that he has "designated [China] as a currency manipulator" and demands that China play by the trade rules. Second, he reinstates the Mexico City policy. Combining these two policies, he also "cut[s] off funding for the United Nations Population Fund, which supports China's barbaric One Child Policy."

#### He’s locked in cause it’s in his foreign policy paper

Palmer 12

(Oliver, a junior fellow in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Before coming to Carnegie, he studied at Princeton Universitys Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Policy, “MITT ROMNEY'S CHINA POLICY” January 31, 2012, States News Service)

Understanding Romneys Approach to China Romneys public pronouncements predominantly target the ways that Chinese practices are problematic for the U.S. economy. In policy terms, Romney strongly advocates a rules-based international system, often repeating that China is cheating and needs to follow the rules with respect to intellectual property, currency manipulation, cyber warfare, and predatory pricing, all of which he argues are hurting the United States economically. Romneys economic plan also advocates a robust U.S. trade policy based on open markets, expanded trade agreements, and a stronger focus on trade policy as an instrument of statecraft. Much attention has been given to Romneys statement that on his first day in office he would label China a currency manipulator, and there has been some debate over whether this would actually trigger a trade war. Legally, such action merely obligates the treasury secretary to initiate negotiations with the Chinese; some argue it has no practical value other than to shame China. Currency issues have become less central in U.S.-China relations over the past two years, in part due to the steady real appreciation of Beijings currency, coupled with Washingtons own quantitative easing policies. But Romneys prescriptions for a tough trade policy to address other systemic economic frictions are at once both troubling and encouraging: troubling for the real possibility that punitive action against China would evoke some level of punitive response, and encouraging because he is the only remaining candidate whose proposals evince deeper thinking about how to influence China and address long-standing U.S. frustrations. Romneys assessment, both on trade issues and on security, is that Chinas desire for stability and access to U.S. and global markets form a key bargaining chip. This indicates that China can be influenced and robust U.S. policy can affect change. Despite Romneys clarity and consistency on economic and trade matters related to China, his remarks have not delved into the obvious security challenges associated with such a complex bilateral relationship. This narrow focus on economic issues rather than on geopolitical trends is likely based on an assessment that with respect to China, Obama is weakest on trade, and that, even though Obama promised in 2008 to be tough on China, he has avoided confronting Beijing directly in a major wayincluding refusing to label China a currency manipulator. Romney can use such behavior to point out supposed shortcomings in Obamas actual policies. It also likely reflects a judgment, based in part on opinion polling, that the U.S. public is primarily concerned about China as an economic, rather than a military threat. It is easy to criticize China because there is no clear and unified group within the United States that counters such criticism. And U.S. businesses, traditionally a group in favor of peaceful, stable ties with China, are somewhat divided on the issue as it has become harder to do business in China over the last few years. Security Issues Bear Further Discussion Despite his almost exclusionary focus on Chinas economic impact, Romneys general foreign policy ideas provide some insight into how Romney might approach U.S.-China security relations. Romneys foreign policy speech at the Citadel in South Carolina in October, along with other general statements on national security, emphasized a vision of continued U.S. predominance and advocated an American Century in contrast to prognostications of a coming Chinese Century. Romney draws the distinction of these two competing futures in terms of freedom and values that emanate from the nature of a regime. Fundamental to this vision is a perception of China as a possible threat, a belief that China can be shaped and influenced by U.S. action, and a prescription that the best way to steer China away from a threatening course is through maintaining U.S. military predominance. Romneys Citadel speech painted Chinas future as yet to be determineda choice between a new era of freedom and prosperity, and a darker path including building a global alliance of authoritarian states. The implication appears to be that China might become an ideological threat to the United States. Romneys solution comes back to his campaign narrative: focus on U.S. economic competitiveness and maintain military superiority. Romney repeatedly advocates high defense spending to preserve predominant U.S. military strength around the world. Articulated from a perspective of American exceptionalism, this advocacy draws on Reagans formulation of peace through strength, a notion prevalent in the U.S. government, especially within the Defense Department. At the same time, Romney has stated a desire to influence China to be a responsible partner in the international system, a system in which Romney hopes to create a predictable economic and security environment and minimize instability. Chinas desire for stability and its economic interdependence with the United States is again one of Romneys chief arguments for why China will not engage in a trade war over punitive measures against alleged Chinese cheating.

#### Relations are stable now—new pressure on China undermines cooperation—triggers a laundry list of impacts

Stokes, policy analyst – National Security Network, and Hachigian, senior fellow – Center for American Progress, 3/13/’12

(Jacob and Nina, “U.S.-China Relations in an Election Year,” http://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/2012/03/pdf/us\_china\_relations.pdf)

In contrast, the Obama administration’s approach is steady, clear-eyed, and focused on results. The administration has pushed back on China multiple times—taking China to task on unfair trade, forming a united front to get China to back down from aggressive actions in the South China Sea, and selling arms to Taiwan over furious protests from Beijing. President Obama’s Asia strategy, which is deepening partnerships and engagement in the region, is designed to ensure that as China grows it contributes to peace and stability and follows the rules of the international system. At the same time the administration does not let differences prevent the United States from working with Beijing on important joint challenges such as North Korea’s nuclear program and clean energy.

This progressive approach offers the best tactic for dealing with China because for the foreseeable future China will be both a rival and a partner. Our policymakers have to play the long game, ensuring our strategies for China make sense not just during campaign seasons but for this year, this decade, and beyond. Fostering successful policies toward China requires a steady hand and a concerted effort to refrain from overheated tirades and knee-jerk responses.

But reflexive belligerence toward China plays well on the conservative campaign trail. Already the election has seen the two top candidates for the Republican nomination fighting over who could be more confrontational toward China “on Day 1,” and a conservative candidate for the U.S. Senate using racially tinged advertisements to stoke fears about Chinese ownership of U.S. debt. In *The Wall Street Journal*, Mitt Romney offered a plainly zero-sum view of the U.S.-China relationship.

China policy via short-term political point scoring may help campaigns but it does not help the United States. In fact, a fair and mature relationship with China will serve U.S. interests in creating jobs and sustainable economic growth. Steady U.S.- China relations will promote stability in the Asia-Pacific region and security for the global commons. And it will enable both nations to help address transnational problems such as climate change, pandemic disease, energy security, and terrorism.

#### Tit for tat disputes spillover

Solomon 2/7

Richard Solomon, president of United States Institute of Peace. He was assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs from 1989 to 1992, 2/7/12, www.beijingshots.com/2012/02/managing-us-china-ties/

Former US president Richard Nixon’s week-long visit to China in 1972 concluded with publication of the Shanghai Communiqu, a unique joint political document that established the principles for normalizing US-China relations. Looking back over four decades, it is clear that Nixon’s visit, and his discussions with Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou Enlai, fundamentally changed the political dynamic of the Cold War – to the benefit of the security of both countries. The Soviet Union was put on the defensive, and the US and China began to dismantle their decades-long confrontation. The visit represented one of the most dramatic and transforming diplomatic initiatives of the 20th century. Full normalization of Sino-American relations was completed by former US president Jimmy Carter and Deng Xiaoping in late 1978. This development made possible a dramatic advancement in our bilateral relationship – especially in the economic and cultural realms. Where are US-China relations today? Some have characterized them as “strategically ambiguous”. We are neither allies nor adversaries. We have major areas of cooperation – especially in economic relations – but also significant areas of competition and disagreement. We share common interest in national security and a stable international environment; yet we have limited areas of cooperation and a significant measure of distrust. Our relations today are in a contradictory state of opportunity and some antagonism. **If** our **areas of disagreement are not carefully managed, we could again become adversaries.** Today, we can see that in the two decades since the end of the Cold War the world has entered a new era. The great power conflicts and wars that dominated the 20th century have given way to a time of international economic integration -involving both mutual benefit and competition. Today, our security concerns are about regional interstate rivalries (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea; India-Pakistan; Israel-Iran), and weak states that permit the growth of terrorist groups. We work to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to deal with the corrupting influence of narcotics cartels; and pirates capturing ocean shipping for ransom. And worldwide, ethnic and religious conflicts have replaced ideological rivalries as forces for political instability. As well, our security is affected by issues that are not military in character: the integrity of our electronic systems – the brains and nerves of modern societies; dependable access to energy and other resources necessary for economic development; and the humanitarian impact of global climate change, pandemic diseases, pollution of the environment, and natural disasters. We are still learning how to deal with these challenges, especially where international cooperation is required. And then there is a new force creating political change around the world: mass publics mobilized by the information revolution and social networking communications. In president Nixon’s time the relatively new technology of television could be used to change public opinion “from the top down”.Today, the Internet and social networking media give people the ability to exert political influence “from the bottom up”. History shows that serious economic problems, and even many security concerns, can be managed through determined diplomacy. Territorial disputes, however, are the kinds of issues that can lead to military confrontation – if not war. One of the outcomes of the Nixon-Mao talks of the early 1970s – as noted earlier – was an agreement to defer resolution of Taiwan’s status in order to cooperate on the strategic security challenge from the Soviet Union. Failure to manage Taiwan’s future relationship with the Chinese mainland peacefully is the most likely source of a breakdown in the US-China relationship. Having said that, over the past four decades there has been a remarkably positive evolution in cross-Straits relations, which have now evolved into increasingly constructive economic and social dealings between the island and the mainland. There is open political communication between leaders in Taipei and Beijing, and a growing sense of common interest. What can be done to maximize the benefits of normal Sino-American relations – much less minimize prospects for a return to confrontation? First is the necessity to vigorously confront the primary source of economic tension – the shared concern with “jobs, jobs, jobs”. In the Cold War era, the shared strategic concern with the Soviet threat helped pull the two countries together. Today, the common concern with jobs tends to pull the countries apart, although the reality is that globalization has created enormous numbers of jobs in both countries. The specific issues currently on the bilateral economic agenda – as noted earlier – affect jobs in both countries. There are a number of well-institutionalized bilateral and international fora and dispute-management procedures for dealing with these issues – most notably the annual US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. Both the US and China need an open international trading environment. And over time China will slowly make the transition from a development strategy of export-led growth to an economy with heightened domestic household consumption. For its part, America has to invest more at home, do so intelligently, consume less, and generate the political will to manage, on a bipartisan basis, our fiscal challenges. The second element of managing the US-China relationship should be the construction of a positive agenda of economic and security cooperation: **energy security**; access to raw materials; countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism; sea lane security; the impact of climate change and global health threats among other things. To conclude, Nixon called his visit to China in 1972 “the week that changed the world”. Four decades later, it seems this was not an exaggeration. Or to go back even further in history, Napoleon was even more far-sighted in saying 200 years ago that China would “shake the world” when aroused from her “sleep”. China today is indeed “shaking the world”. Only as leaders in both Beijing and Washington work to develop the positive factors in the relationship – while managing the areas of conflict – can they avoid the great costs that would come with a return to confrontation. This is the great contemporary challenge of managing US-China relations.

## at: uq ow

#### Obama will win now, but its tight

Nate Silver, 10/1/12, Sept. 30: Romney Down a Touchdown?, fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/01/sept-30-romney-down-a-touchdown/

We’ve probably already been in the fourth quarter for a week or so, because we’ve already passed the point when a convention bounce (if it was indeed a bounce and not a permanent shift in the conditions) might be expected to wear off. And we’ll reach a fourth-quarter landmark on Wednesday, when President Obama and Mitt Romney hold their first of three debates. Every now and then, the game goes into overtime — in which case things like turnout and the Electoral College math suddenly begin to matter a great deal. But let’s not get ahead of ourselves: it’s early in the fourth quarter and Mitt Romney finds himself down in the race. The question is how far behind he is, and what he’ll have to do to make up his deficit with Mr. Obama. According to the win probability calculator at AdvancedNFLStats.com, an N.F.L. team down by field goal with 10 minutes left to play in the fourth quarter has a 34 percent probability of winning the game. A team down by a touchdown wins just 16 percent of the time. (A technical note for sports geeks: these cases assume that the trailing team has possession of the football with first down and 10 yards to go at its own 20 yard line.) If you look at our estimate of Mitt Romney’s chances of winning the Electoral College, which are about 15 percent right now in the FiveThirtyEight forecast, the touchdown analogy works best: Mr. Romney has about as much chance of winning as an N.F.L. team does when it trails by a touchdown early in the fourth quarter. It might be surprising that a team down by just a touchdown — a close game, by any common description of it — winds up winning so rarely. But there are a few things to consider. First, a field goal alone won’t be enough for the team to come back. It needs something big to happen — or it needs to score at least twice. Second, although there’s still enough time in the game for the trailing team to have multiple opportunities to score, there is also enough time for the opponents to score as well and extend their lead. So the team still has to play defense — it’s not purely a two-minute drill. A third and often overlooked (if completely obvious) point: if the trailing team does score a clutch touchdown, it only ties the game. There are a lot of cases in which it will later lose anyway. Right now, our forecast says that Mr. Romney has only about a 15 percent chance of winning. But that does not mean that he only has a 15 percent chance of tightening the race — or of making it come down to the wire. But there are plenty of circumstances in which Mr. Romney has some good things happen, makes the race very close, and then loses — whether because he loses Ohio, or because his turnout operation isn’t much good, or because the polls turn out to be slightly biased toward him rather than against him. As for what might happen this week: the first debate alone will probably not provide an opportunity for Mr. Romney to score a touchdown. Historically, the largest shifts in the polls after the first debate have been about three points in either direction — smaller than Mr. Romney’s current deficit in most polls. This would be the equivalent of a field goal.

#### Obama win still decisively, but Romney is perilously close—events could flip the election

Harry Enten, Guardian election expert, 10/4/12, If Mitt Romney won the debate, will he win the election?, www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/oct/04/mitt-romney-won-debate-win-election

Romney gains on an increasingly vulnerable Obama, but the president still leads.

First, general election debates are not primary debates. If you took a polling chart of the 2012 Republican primary, it would look like a w's and m's. Candidate preferences were so flexible that Herman Cain – a man never elected to political office who would leave the campaign because of a sexual harassment charge – led the contest a year ago. The reason Cain took the lead was because he looked good in the debates. When policy differences are small, as they are in primaries, personality matters.

Personality isn't anywhere near as important in general elections. Voters can decide on the issues because there are true substantive differences. That's why most voters have already locked in their choice. President Obama has seemingly held a small, but consistent lead most of this election.

We cannot expect that this or any one debate will turn an Obama edge into a large Romney lead. Romney is down by about 3 percentage points in the Real Clear Politics average. Only 5% of the electorate is truly undecided. Most of these undecided voters weren't watching the debate and probably won't make their choice until election day.

Second, history tells us that debates probably matter under certain circumstances. Thomas Holbrook crunched the numbers since 1988 and found that the margin between the two leading candidates changed by an average of about 4 percentage points between before the first and after the last debate. The margin between Romney and Obama was less than that heading into Wednesday night's debate.

Now, it's awfully difficult to figure out whether it's a debate that is moving polling data or some other event(s) over the course of the debates season. Obama, for instance, gained ground over John McCain in 2008 partly because of the debates, but more because of a financial crisis from which we still haven't fully recovered.

Candidates seem to gain when they were already gaining before the debate or when they are underperforming the "fundamentals". Bush picked up steam in the 1988 debates – ,continuing his rise pre-debates. Bob Dole was vastly underperforming the fundamentals in 1996: he should have been showing behind, but not by 20 points. So, it was not a huge surprise that his polling numbers improved after the debates.

That's why I think Mitt Romney will make up some ground. Though the 5% of undecided voters may be unreachable, there's another 5% of "soft" support. Many of these had been leaning towards Obama or saying they were "undecided" since the conventions: Obama's one-time 1.5-point edge among likely voters doubled or even close to tripled at times during the last few weeks. Those voters are likely to come home to Romney. If they don't, they likely never will.

Romney's also underperforming Jacob Montgomery et al's ensemble forecast from all the fundamental models. These models take into everything from the economy to incumbency to primary season performance. The ensemble has Romney losing, but only by 0.6 percentage points.

Another plus for Romney is that he looked to have been picking up a little steam before the debates began. Obama's lead in the Real Clear average has shrunk from a lead close to 4.5 points back down to 3.

Third, underlying voter sentiment may not change, but enthusiasm probably will and that could change polls. You can go on Twitter and see dejection among many Democrats. Many likely voter models rely upon some level of voter interest or enthusiasm in the election. During the 2000 campaign, Gallup's likely voter model went absolutely bonkers because of enthusiasm differences. One day, Republican enthusiasm was up because of the debates and the next, Democratic excitement went through the roof.

The registered voter numbers, however, didn't move anywhere near as much. With Republicans potentially gaining back the enthusiasm edge they held earlier in the cycle, don't be surprised if an already ridiculously wide likely/registered voter gap actually expands.

Fourth, and most importantly, any president whose approval rating is less than his disapproval rating remains vulnerable. This, folks, is a key point and remains tied to point four. If you read Real Clear Politics, you'll notice that many polls that ask about the president's approval are among adults or registered voters. Those polls are fine when enthusiasm ratings between Democrats and Republicans are near equal. They are not an accurate representation of the electorate if Republicans make a surprisingly large share of the voters come November.

I would not be surprised if a likely voter model average at this point had Obama's approval rating below his disapproval, given the large likely voter/registered voter gap. That's a problem for Obama because no president has won re-election with an approval rating below 50% among the voting (a smaller group than adult) electorate.

The question, then, is whether or not Romney can yank up his favorable rating above his unfavorable. If he can't, Obama's going to win. You don't trade in the bad steak that doesn't make you ill for a bad steak that may give you food poisoning. If Romney can present himself as a viable alternative, then a lot of us might be surprised by the final result.

At this point, however, my belief is that we'll return somewhere close to where we were before the conventions: a small Obama lead of about 1.5 points. There just aren't that many minds that Romney can change at this point. Democrats can also take heart that Republican excitement eventually rebounded a few weeks following President Bush's 2004 debate debacle.

Still, my confidence in an Obama victory is at least somewhat shaken right now. Obama's lead is probably not big enough for him to play the super-cautious game he did on Wednesday.

#### Debate didn’t flip uniqueness, but it proves the brink—new info, like the plan, key

Nate Cohn, New Republic Election Expert, Part-Time Georgetown Coach -- his articles go through a TNR editing process and are available for all on his blog, He has been profiled on New York Magazine and MSNBC…he does not care about us…for realz, 10/4/12, Romney Won the Debate. But Will It Be Enough?, www.tnr.com/blog/electionate/108124/did-romney-reshape-the-race

It looks like Romney has been declared the winner of the first presidential debate. But will it be the turning point he needs. Romney’s performance was very strong, but the debates have not tended to fundamentally reshape past presidential elections, so the burden on Romney was quite high. For that same reason, a good performance by Romney might not have been good enough.

While Romney was on the offensive and Obama was listless, the president did not commit any gaffes and Romney did not level any blows that are likely to reverberate for the next few days. The president did not appear incapable or incompetent as much as he was simply out-debated. If you tend to believe that elections are about the incumbent, this matters. Forty-nine percent of voters have already made it clear that they're willing to reelect the president, so the question is whether tonight's debate introduced new information that might change their minds. If so, it would have to come from changing perceptions of Romney, not the president.

There’s no question that Romney came across as knowledgeable and substantive; to the extent that voters were unsure about his ability to handle the office, he certainly made real gains. But it’s unclear whether Romney made progress toward redressing his fundamental problem: low favorability ratings. It could be the case that Romney’s energy and interest in policy could help him address the “does Romney care” problem in an indirect way, even if it doesn't necessarily proven that he cares about the middle class. On the other hand, though, Romney didn’t go out of his way to stress a message oriented toward the middle class and he didn’t seem unusually empathetic. If anything, his quick pace might have left voters missing his message, even if they were impressed by his performance.

None of this is to say that Romney didn’t win the debate decisively, or even that voters won’t perceive that Romney won decisively. This analysis is just as nit-picky as it sounds, but with good reason: The threshold for assessing that Romney might have reshaped the race is quite high, so it’s worth questioning whether Romney’s good performance was good enough. History suggests that the answer is probably no, but it's not assured and we'll see over the next week or two.

Wouldn’t take a gigantic shift – undecided voters and turnout (breakdown appropriately for disad)

Seib, 9-24

Gerald Seib, WSJ columnist, “Three Reasons the 2012 Race Could Still Change,” WSJ, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444083304578016230048407660.html?mod=WSJ\_Election\_RIGHTTopCarousel\_1

Here's a news flash from the campaign front: The election isn't over yet, and Mitt Romney still could win.

This may seem like a statement of the obvious, and it won't come as a surprise to those inside either the Romney campaign or that of President Barack Obama. They know this remains a close race with six weeks—an eternity in modern politics—remaining.

Enlarge Image

image

image

Associated Press

Mitt Romney campaigned in Pueblo, Colo., Monday.

Enlarge Image

image

image

Associated Press

President Barack Obama arrived in New York ahead of an address to the United Nations Monday.

But it seems a point worth making in the wake of what all agree has been a bad stretch for Mr. Romney, one punctuated by his now-famous secretly taped comments about the 47% of Americans who don't pay federal income taxes, followed by a bout of sniping from within Republican ranks.

Most campaigns have periods like these, and they always present a good time to recall the assets that tend to get lost in the fog. In Mr. Romney's case, he retains three assets worth noting:

• Some highly motivated voters. In the latest Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll, Mr. Obama leads among all registered voters by six percentage points, and among those who appear likely to vote by five.

It seems an absurdly obvious point, but the campaign isn't over and Mitt Romney still could win. After the troubles of the last week, it's a good time to recall the assets he still retains. Jerry Seib has details on The News Hub. Photo: AP.

But among those who voice the highest interest in the election—in other words, those who seem most intensely interested in voting—Mr. Romney leads by three percentage points.

Now, some of these people are intensely interested in the campaign more because they want to vote against Mr. Obama than because they want to vote for Mr. Romney. But that's of no particular consequence in the Romney world if they show up.

[image]

 Live: Election 2012 Stream

 State of the Race: Map of latest projections

 Poll Tracker: Latest national, state polls

 Moneyball: A portrait of money in politics

 Super PACs: How much are they spending?

 Issues: Romney vs. Obama on key topics

It's also true that intensity of support for Mr. Obama is picking up as well. His voters, in short, now seem to be checking in. But the view in the Romney camp is that they still have more highly motivated voters and that it will be hard for Mr. Obama to repeat the fervor he generated four years ago in winning the White House initially.

"They don't have the same intensity they had in '08, and we have more intensity," says Rich Beeson, political director of the Romney campaign. He also argues that the Romney campaign has a better plan than Republicans did four years ago for reaching out to low-intensity voters. Already, he says, volunteers have knocked on two million more doors urging a vote for the GOP ticket than they did in all of 2008.

• Strong conservative support. One of the fears among Republicans all along has been that the party's conservative base, not considering a former governor of Massachusetts who once backed abortion rights and his own versionof government health insurance to be one of their own, would drift away.

But there's little sign of that. In the Journal/NBC News poll, Mr. Romney is getting the same level of support among conservatives that Sen. John McCain got four years ago, and with the same level of intensity.

Perhaps more surprising, Mr. Romney's Mormon religion doesn't seem to be turning off evangelical voters. He's getting almost precisely the level of support among them that George W. Bush got in his 2004 run for re-election.

• Grouchy undecided voters. As has been widely noted, much of the electorate seems locked into one side or the other in this campaign, and the share of voters truly undecided or still floating between the candidates isn't large.

But those that are still unattached tend to be more unhzappy with the current state of the country than are other voters, which ought to mean they're available to Mr. Romney.

In the Journal/NBC News survey, voters who say they aren't "definitely" supporting one candidate or the other are more likely than average to say the country is off on the wrong track. They give Mr. Obama a lower job-approval rating than voters in general, and they aren't as warm to him personally.

They also have a low opinion of Mr. Romney, which explains why they are still floating between the two candidates. But while Mr. Obama leads among voters overall, Mr. Romney holds a slight edge among these voters who aren't firmly attached.

In other words, undecided and persuadable voters are still there for the taking. And Mr. Romney now has three coming presidential debates to do the persuading.

None of this means Mr. Romney is in great shape. Nor does it mean trends haven't shifted against him in recent weeks. In particular, signs that Americans are feeling more confident about the economy are a bigger problem for the GOP than that famous video.

These factors do mean, though, that the race is still very much on. It wouldn't take a giant shift in the national mood to tilt the table in the six weeks left.

Turnout key

Hanson, 9-27

Victor Davis Hanson is a classicist and historian at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, “Election, 1980-Style” http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2012/09/27/election\_1980-style\_115600.html

Turnout will matter. Challenger Mitt Romney, like Reagan, is said to have the more fired-up base, but the demography of the electorate is far different than it was 30 years ago and now may favor Obama. There are no third-party candidates to skew the result, but the polls seem just as volatile, as Obama, like Carter, usually surges ahead for a while, only to fall back to even in tortoise-and-hare style.

Unless there is a war abroad or a financial crisis at home — such as the financial trauma that helped the struggling Obama surge past John McCain in mid-September, 2008 — the race between an unapologetic liberal and a confessed conservative will go down to the last week.

The winner probably won’t be decided by old video clips, gaffes, or even campaign money, but by turnout and the October debates — depending on whether incumbent Obama comes across as a petulant Carter and challenger Romney appears an upbeat Reagan. As in 1980, voters want a better president — but they first have to be assured he’s on the ballot.

# 2NR

## cards

Indian and Chinese development solve their ‘thorium good’ arguments, including prolif

Katusa 12

Marin Katusa, Contributor, Forbes, February 16, 2012, "The Thing About Thorium: Why The Better Nuclear Fuel May Not Get A Chance", http://www.forbes.com/sites/energysource/2012/02/16/the-thing-about-thorium-why-the-better-nuclear-fuel-may-not-get-a-chance/

Researchers have studied thorium-based fuel cycles for 50 years, but India leads the pack when it comes to commercialization. As home to a quarter of the world’s known thorium reserves and notably lacking in uranium resources, it’s no surprise that India envisions meeting 30% of its electricity demand through thorium-based reactors by 2050. In 2002, India’s nuclear regulatory agency issued approval to start construction of a 500-megawatts electric prototype fast breeder reactor, which should be completed this year. In the next decade, construction will begin on six more of these fast breeder reactors, which “breed” U233 and plutonium from thorium and uranium. Design work is also largely complete for India’s first Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR), which will involve a reactor fueled primarily by thorium that has gone through a series of tests in full-scale replica. The biggest holdup at present is finding a suitable location for the plant, which will generate 300 MW of electricity. Indian officials say they are aiming to have the plant operational by the end of the decade. China is the other nation with a firm commitment to develop thorium power. In early 2011, China’s Academy of Sciences launched a major research and development program on Liquid Fluoride Thorium Reactor (LFTR) technology, which utilizes U233 that has been bred in a liquid thorium salt blanket. This molten salt blanket becomes less dense as temperatures rise, slowing the reaction down in a sort of built-in safety catch. This kind of thorium reactor gets the most attention in the thorium world; China’s research program is in a race with similar though smaller programs in Japan, Russia, France, and the U.S.

**No impact**

Indur **Goklany 10**, policy analyst for the Department of the Interior – phd from MSU, “Population, Consumption, Carbon Emissions, and Human Well-Being in the Age of Industrialization (Part III — Have Higher US Population, Consumption, and Newer Technologies Reduced Well-Being?)”, April 24, <http://www.masterresource.org/2010/04/population-consumption-carbon-emissions-and-human-well-being-in-the-age-of-industrialization-part-iii-have-higher-us-population-consumption-and-newer-technologies-reduced-well-being/#more-9194>

In my previous post I showed that, notwithstanding the Neo-Malthusian worldview, human well-being has advanced globally since the start of industrialization more than two centuries ago, despite massive increases in population, consumption, affluence, and carbon dioxide emissions. In this post, I will focus on long-term trends in the U.S. for these and other indicators. Figure 1 shows that despite several-fold increases in the use of metals and synthetic organic chemicals, and emissions of CO2 stoked by increasing populations and affluence, life expectancy, the single best measure of human well-being, increased from 1900 to 2006 for the US. Figure 1 reiterates this point with respect to materials use. These figures indicate that since 1900, U.S. population has quadrupled, affluence has septupled, their product (GDP) has increased 30-fold, synthetic organic chemical use has increased 85-fold, metals use 14-fold, material use 25-fold, and CO2 emissions 8-fold. Yet life expectancy advanced from 47 to 78 years. Figure 2 shows that during the same period, 1900–2006, emissions of air pollution, represented by sulfur dioxide, waxed and waned. Food and water got safer, as indicated by the virtual elimination of deaths from gastrointestinal (GI) diseases between 1900 and 1970. Cropland, a measure of habitat converted to human uses — the single most important pressure on species, ecosystems, and biodiversity — was more or less unchanged from 1910 onward despite the increase in food demand. For the most part, life expectancy grew more or less steadily for the U.S., except for a brief plunge at the end of the First World War accentuated by the 1918-20 Spanish flu epidemic. As in the rest of the world, today’s U.S. population not only lives longer, it is also healthier. The disability rate for seniors declined 28 percent between 1982 and 2004/2005 and, despite quantum improvements in diagnostic tools, major diseases (e.g., cancer, and heart and respiratory diseases) now occur 8–11 years later than a century ago. Consistent with this, data for New York City indicate that — despite a population increase from 80,000 in 1800 to 3.4 million in 1900 and 8.0 million in 2000 and any associated increases in economic product, and chemical, fossil fuel and material use that, no doubt, occurred —crude mortality rates have declined more or less steadily since the 1860s (again except for the flu epidemic). Figures 3 and 4 show, once again, that whatever health-related problems accompanied economic development, technological change, material, chemical and fossil fuel consumption, and population growth, they were overwhelmed by the health-related benefits associated with industrialization and modern economic growth. This does not mean that fossil fuel, chemical and material consumption have zero impact, but it means that overall benefits have markedly outweighed costs. The reductions in rates of deaths and diseases since at least 1900 in the US, despite increased population, energy, and material and chemical use, belie the Neo-Malthusian worldview. The improvements in the human condition can be ascribed to broad dissemination (through education, public health systems, trade and commerce) of numerous new and improved technologies in agriculture, health and medicine supplemented through various ingenious advances in communications, information technology and other energy powered technologies (see here for additional details). The continual increase in life expectancy accompanied by the decline in disease during this period (as shown by Figure 2) indicates that the new technologies reduced risks by a greater amount than any risks that they may have created or exacerbated due to pollutants associated with greater consumption of materials, chemicals and energy, And this is one reason why the Neo-Malthusian vision comes up short. It dwells on the increases in risk that new technologies may create or aggravate but overlooks the larger — and usually more certain — risks that they would also eliminate or reduce. In other words, it focuses on the pixels, but misses the larger picture, despite pretensions to a holistic worldview.